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The scope of the dissertation is (broadly-defined) general macroeconomics. The
first essay is on optimal taxation and capital structure, the second essay is on firm
dynamics, and the third essay is on financial crises.
The first essay clarifies the role of the corporate income tax (as a form of double
taxation) for achieving socially optimal allocations in the Mirrlees framework when
the government cannot tax unrealized capital income at the individual level. Use
of the corporate tax requires changes in the individual capital tax. The novelty
of the paper is that the sophisticated tax system is designed to influence the in-
dividual agent’s portfolio choice of debt and equity, which in turn endogenizes the
leverage ratio. The optimum corporate tax is indeterminate, but a minimal level
is necessary. An immediate question is what happens to capital structure if we
increase or decrease the level of the corporate tax. Surprisingly, unlike in classical
capital structure theories, in this optimal tax mechanism, the firm’s leverage ratio
is independent of the corporate tax rate.
The second essay examines firm dynamics to explain the following empirical
facts: (i) The size of a firm and its growth rate are negatively correlated; (ii)
ii
but, they are often independent for firms above a certain size. Existing theories
of firm dynamics can explain the first fact, but cannot explain the second. This
paper studies a dynamic moral hazard problem under an AK-technology. In a first
best world, the expected growth rate is strictly decreasing with capital. However,
with information asymmetry our theory is consistent with both empirical facts be-
cause the optimal contract dictates under-investment in low-level capital states and
over-investment in high-level capital states. The reason is that the given convex
production technology becomes nonconvex in equilibrium due to the information
asymmetry and the degree of the nonconvexity differs by the level of capital. We
also fully characterize the agent’s incentives. The capital accumulation mechanism
induces incentive schemes that are different from optimal contracts in the literature
on principal-agent models.
Finally, in the third essay1, we propose a model of financial crises as transitions
from an efficient and unstable state to an inefficient and stable state in a simple
economy with sector-specific shocks. The main driving force of this transition is
the unwinding of unsecured loans. Introducing public debt increases the volatility
of stock prices. We also discuss possible policy interventions.
1This essay is a joint work with Costas Azariadis.
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Chapter 1
Mirrlees Meets Modigliani-Miller: Optimal
Taxation and Capital Structure
1.1 Introduction
Corporate taxation has been widely criticized for several reasons. First, the corpo-
rate income tax is one type of capital income taxes. A standard result in Ramsey
taxation models is that capital income taxes should be zero immediately or at least
in the long-run (Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997),
etc).1,2 Thus, the corporate tax should be avoided as well in the Ramsey framework.
Secondly, but more importantly, common investors consider corporate taxation as
a source of inefficiency since it is double taxation: corporations are owned by indi-
vidual investors who are already subject to individual capital income taxes.3 Some
economists probably do not pay much attention to literal words ’double taxation’.4
1There are a few exceptions: Conesa, Sagiri and Krueger (2009) argued that the optimal capital
tax rate should be significantly positive in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic,
uninsurable income shocks and borrowing constraints. Chen, Chen, and Wang (2010) also derived
the similar conclusion in a human capital-based endogenous growth model with the frictional labor
market. However, neither of them specified the role of corporate taxation.
2The similar result also holds in Mirrlees tax models. For example, the net (expected) capital
income tax is zero in Kocherlakota (2005).
3Not all countries have the double tax system although many countries including U.S. hold it.
4Suppose that by a certain reason the optimal total capital income tax rate should be 40%.
Then, what is the difference between (20%, 20%) and (30%, 10%) pairs of corporate and individual
capital income taxes? If the answer is simply ’no’, double taxation by itself has no problem and
1
More academically meaningful questions would be first, why we need to impose a
separate tax on the firm’s profits and second, whether it is possible to replace the
corporate tax by a capital tax at the individual level and vice versa. In this paper,
by using a simple model we investigate reasons and conditions where the corporate
income tax is required. We also answer the above two questions.
With these motivations in mind, this paper studies a dynamic Mirrlees taxa-
tion model5 with an additional but realistic constraint in the tax scheme that the
government cannot impose tax on unrealized capital income at the individual level.
The summary of the main results is as follows. Even under this restriction in the
tax scheme, the socially optimal (second best) allocation still can be implemented,
but in a fairly different tax system from the standard ones of Kocherlakota (2005)
and Albanesi and Sleet (2006). Moreover, in this tax system, the corporate tax is
crucial as a decentralization device. The introduction of the corporate tax requires
proper adjustment in other individual capital taxes. This sophisticated tax system
influences the individual agent’s portfolio choice of debt and equity, which in turn
endogenizes the firm’s capital structure as well. The optimum corporate tax rate is
generally indeterminate, but it must be greater than or equal to a positive minimal
level. Thus, the tax authority can design the corporate tax rate flexibly by adjust-
ing the other tax rates. Surprisingly, unlike in classical capital structure theories,
this co-movement property makes the leverage ratio independent of the change in
the corporate tax rate. Finally, we also investigate the impact of labor tax on the
leverage ratio and find some new results. The rest of the introduction describes the
this paper should not be written.
5The standard assumption in the Mirrlees tax framework is that the skill of each agent is private
information and stochastically move over time. See Section 1.2 for the detailed assumption. See
Kocherlakota (2005, 2009), Albanesi and Sleet (2006), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007, 2008), Fahri
and Werning (2008 a, b) and the references therein.
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intuition and the detailed reasons for these results.
We first start by showing how a standard dynamic public finance tax system
fails to achieve a socially optimal allocation under the assumption of the tax scheme
mentioned above. Notice that U. S. households pay personal property tax if they
hold real estate, vehicles, intangible assets (e.g., copyrights and patents), durable
goods, and other assets. However, capital gains tax is not paid until assets are
sold. Since we are interested in the assets that are being traded every second in the
market, i.e., debt (bond) and equity (stock), we abstract from those less frequently
traded asset markets and take the extreme, but realistic assumption that no tax is
imposed on unrealized capital income. In other words, agents never pay individual
taxes just by holding assets.
This assumption creates a nontrivial value for the tax timing option of the low
skill agent, which is the option of whether to cash in their investment gains. In
other words, the agent can evade taxes by deferring the realization.6 In order
to understand the effect of a tax timing option, we should notice the regressive
property of the capital taxation scheme in the dynamic public taxation models of
Kocherlakota (2005, 2009) and Albanesi and Sleet (2006). Let us describe the idea
using a simple example. Suppose that the economy has homogenous agents at time
0 and some of them become high skilled and the others become low skilled in the
next period with some probability. In a standard dynamic Mirrlees tax system,
a low skill agent pays the capital income taxes while a high skill agent receives
the capital subsidy. Then, the low skill agent does not want to realize gains in
6This idea may go back to Stiglitz (1973). Interested readers can refer to literature on tax
timing options or tax arbitrages, for example, Constantinides (1983). The important contribution
in this paper is to endogenize the optimal taxation as well as the optimal capital structure.
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capital income at this period if that will help evade taxes. This deviation, in turn,
undermines the socially optimal allocation. In order to remove the value of this tax
timing option, the government should set up an additional tax at the corporation
level. In other words, they should tax the corporate profits7, which leads to double
taxation.
Perhaps the most important contribution of this paper is that the capital struc-
ture of the corporation is endogenously determined together with the optimal in-
dividual/corporate capital tax system. Use of the corporate income tax by itself
cannot achieve the social optimum. Suppose the corporate tax, τc, is designed to get
rid of tax timing options of low skill agents. Then, similar to a common argument in
the trade-off theory of capital structure, one might suspect that every agent chooses
to hold corporate debt rather than equity just to avoid double taxation.8 This 100%
debt financing also allows the consumption of agents to deviate from the socially
optimal allocation. However, we carefully design the individual capital tax system
in accordance with the corporate tax. Technically, this capital tax system matches
the agent’s Euler equations, state-by-state with respect to equity holding and in
average with respect to debt holding. This mechanism makes firms indifferent to
any capital structure. Each individual agent, however, faces a portfolio selection
problem between debt and equity whose after tax returns are different for each type
of agent. More precisely, ex-post high skill agents will prefer to hold debt while
ex-post low skill agents will prefer to hold equity under the optimal capital tax
code. Thus, ex-ante, each agent should optimally choose the ratio of portfolios of
debt and equity one-period ahead, which in turn determines the aggregate leverage
7The definition of corporate profits in the paper is total output minus total wage and debt
payments, which is what is left to equity holders.
8We do not consider bankruptcy. Hence, there is no default risk on debt.
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ratio in the economy.
An important property of the corporate tax is its indeterminacy above a minimal
level. If the corporate tax rate falls below the minimum level, then the value
of the tax timing option becomes nontrivial. However, any corporate tax rates
greater than the minimal level can achieve the constrained optimum allocation if
individual taxes are properly adjusted. This minimal level requirement implies that
the corporate income tax can never be replaced by any taxes at the individual level.
Even when the current corporate tax is sufficiently high and the government decrease
(or increase) the rate, the other individual capital tax rates are not adjusted one-
to-one according to the change in the corporate tax rate.9 In addition, due to the
existence of corporate taxes, the aggregate capital tax is nonzero in this setting.10
On the other hand, if corporate taxes are indeterminate, how can they influence the
leverage ratio? This question is also important in a normative sense. Notice that the
leverage ratio is positively correlated with the level of corporate tax in conventional
capital structure theories. However, in our optimal tax system, changes in the
corporate tax level need not influence the leverage ratio because adjustment of the
individual capital income tax levels offset the effect of the change in the corporate
tax level.11
Given this analysis, we may have two evaluations on the past U.S. tax reforms
with respect to the corporate income tax. First, by the multiplicity of choosing cor-
9For example, suppose that the current corporate tax is 50%. Assume that the government
decrease the rate by 10%. Then, some individual tax rates should increase, but not by 10% in the
optimal tax code. In particular, capital income taxes on debt may not change at all.
10Notice that the aggregate capital tax (or the conditional expectation of the next period tax)
is zero in Kocherlakota (2005).
11Since our theory is normative, it is not fair to compare our result with the result of positive
theories. However, we need to mention the difference.
5
porate taxes, one cannot say without carefully examining individual capital income
taxes that the U.S. tax system has been very inefficient due to the historically high
corporate tax rates. Secondly, the past U.S. tax reforms may not be inconsistent
with the two long-run time series data of the corporate income tax rate and the
aggregate leverage ratio in U.S. (See Section 7 for more discussion).
Finally, we also investigate the impact of the labor tax on the leverage ratio,12 an
issue that is not treated in the literature on capital structure. In our tax mechanism,
an agent chooses between debt and equity to insure against future skill shocks. Thus,
how much subsidy (tax) an agent will receive (pay) for each future state should
affect his/her portfolio choice. We show that if the tax system provides more (less)
insurance against low skill shocks for the case of the balanced budget, then the
leverage ratio increases (decreases) because ex-post low skill agents prefer equity to
debt. More insurance against low skill shocks gives agents incentives to hold more
debts. Similarly if the intertemporal resource transfer is allowed, the leverage ratio
is positively correlated with the expected present value of labor subsidies conditional
on being a low skill agent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple
environment. We first pin down the constrained optimum of the planner’s problem
in Section 3. In Section 4 we briefly review how to decentralize the constrained
optimum using the capital/labor tax system using the known results. Then, we
study how this result can be distorted if the government cannot tax unrealized
capital income. Section 5 explains why we need to consider the corporate tax and
12Notice that not only the corporate tax but also the labor tax code are indeterminate. The
indeterminacy of the labor tax is basically due to the Ricardian equivalence. See Bassetto and
Kocherlakota (2004) and chapter 4 of Kocherlakota (2009).
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we show how to endogenize the capital structure as well as the optimal tax system.
We describe some comparative statics results in the leverage ratio with respect to
labor taxes in Section 6. Section 7 extends the model for more than two types
and explains the key properties of the corporate tax: (i) the optimal corporate tax
rate is indeterminate and (ii) the leverage ratio is independent of the corporate
tax. Section 8 provides practical discussion on the optimal tax code of this paper.
We also provide a brief history of the U.S. tax system. Section 9 considers other
generalizations: (i) with more than three periods and and (ii) with (aggregate)
uncertainty. Section 10 provide the related literature. Section 10 concludes. All
proofs are in the appendix.
1.2 A Simple Environment
Here we first consider a simple model. Later, we also extend the model to a general
case. The fundamental idea, however, is the same as the simple model introduced
here. Suppose there are ex-ante identical unit measure of agents living for three
periods with the following undiscounted utility function.13 Then,
2∑
t=0
[u(ct)− v(yt)],
where ct is consumption and yt is labor provided by the agent in time t. In period 0,
there is no uncertainty in types and all agents are homogeneous. In the beginning
of each period, each agent privately learns his/her type. The agent has a high skill
13It is easy to generalize the model with many (possibly infinite) periods and discounting. But,
there should be more than two periods since the tax timing option will not be created in the two
period model. Without loss of generality we assume there are three periods.
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with probability pi and a low skill with probability 1− pi. This distribution is i.i.d.
over time and across agents.14 If a high skill agent works, we get disutility v(y)
from labor y. We assume that the low skill agents cannot provide labor, i.e., y = 0.
It is rather an extreme case: An agent is either able or completely disable at period
1 and 2. This is for simplicity, thus we only need to consider incentives for the high
skill agents to work. Later we will extend the setup where there are more than two
types and all types of agents can work in Section 1.7. The production technology
is given by
F (K,Y ) = rK + wY,
where K is aggregate capital and Y is aggregate labor.15 Capital is depreciated at
the rate δ in each period and must be installed one-period ahead. Here without loss
of generality we replace r + (1 − δ) with r. The initial capital endowment is K0.
Every agent is assumed to have the same initial endowment k0, so that k0 = K0.
We first investigate the constrained optimal allocation in Section 1.3. The main
focus of this paper is on how to decentralize this social optimum by using a tax
system. In more detail, the government’s problem is to insure agents against skill
risks and to provide incentives to work by using capital and labor income taxes.
However, the government has the constraint in choosing a tax scheme since they
cannot tax on unrealized capital income at the individual level. Assume that there
is no government spending required.
14The i.i.d. assumption is for simplicity. All results are robust to the extension to a general
stochastic environment beyond the i.i.d. case.
15The results are also preserved for a variety of constant returns to scale production functions.
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1.3 Constrained Planning Optimum
The planner’s problem is to choose (c0, ch, cl, chh, chl, clh, cll, y0, yh, yhh, ylh, K1, K2),
each component of which is nonnegative to maximize an expected life time payoff
max u(c0)− v(y0) + pi (u(ch)− v(yh)) + (1− pi)u(cl)
+ pi2 (u(chh)− v(yhh)) + pi(1− pi)u(chl) + pi(1− pi) (u(clh)− v(ylh)) + (1− pi)2u(cll)
subject to the resource constraints
c0 +K1 = rK0 + wy0,
pich + (1− pi)cl +K2 = rK1 + wpiyh,
pi2chh + pi(1− pi)chl + pi(1− pi)clh + (1− pi)2cll
= rK2 + w
(
pi2yhh + pi(1− pi)ylh
)
,
and the incentive constraints
u(chh)− v(yhh) ≥ u(chl),
u(clh)− v(ylh) ≥ u(cll),
u(ch)− v(yh) + pi(u(chh)− v(yhh)) + (1− pi)u(chl)
≥ u(cl) + pi(u(clh)− v(ylh)) + (1− pi)u(cll)
u(ch)− v(yh) + pi(u(chh)− v(yhh)) + (1− pi)u(chl)
≥ u(ch)− v(yh) + piu(chl) + (1− pi)u(chl)
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u(ch)− v(yh) + pi(u(chh)− v(yhh)) + (1− pi)u(chl)
≥ u(cl) + piu(cll) + (1− pi)u(cll)
Let c := {c0, ch, cl, chh, chl, clh, cll} is the consumption plan of an agent at time 0,
working in period 1, non-working in period 1, working in both periods 1 and 2,
working in period 1 and non-working in period 2, non-working in period 1 and
working in period 2, and non-working in both periods 1 and 2, respectively. y :=
{y0, yh, yhh, ylh} is the amount of labor provided by corresponding agents. Note that
the disables at each period never work, i.e., yl = yll = yhl = 0. Notice the low type
agents cannot work, so that they do not lie. Only high types can pretend to be low
types. So, we have five incentive constraints that are specified above. However, in
the finite horizon setting, the following temporal incentive constraints are sufficient
to summarize all the truthful telling constraints:
u(chh)− v(yhh) ≥ u(chl), (1.3.1)
u(clh)− v(ylh) ≥ u(cll), (1.3.2)
u(ch)− v(yh) ≥ u(cl), (1.3.3)
(1.3.1) and (1.3.2) are the truth-telling constraint for the high skill agents in period
2 who is high skilled in period 1 and is low skilled in period1, respectively. (1.3.3)
is the instantaneous incentive constraint in period 1.
Let (c∗, y∗, K∗) := ({c∗0, c∗h, c∗l , c∗hh, c∗hl, c∗lh, c∗ll}, {y∗0, y∗h, y∗hh, y∗lh}, {K∗1 , K∗2}) be the
constrained optimum.16 Then, it is easy to see from the first order necessary con-
16We have the following convention for notations. A small letter represents individual choice or
allocation and a large letter represents an aggregate variable (a firm’s choice if there is a single
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ditions that the constrained optimum satisfies

u′(c∗0) =
r
pi
u′(c∗
h
)
+ 1−pi
u′(c∗
l
)
,
u′(c∗h) =
r
pi
u′(c∗
hh
)
+ 1−pi
u′(c∗
hl
)
,
u′(c∗l ) =
r
pi
u′(c∗
lh
)
+ 1−pi
u′(c∗
ll
)
v′(y∗0) = wu
′(c∗0), v
′(y∗h) = wu
′(c∗h)
v′(y∗hh) = wu
′(c∗hh), v
′(y∗lh) = wu
′(c∗lh)
, (1.3.4)

c∗0 +K
∗
1 = rK0 + wy
∗
0
pic∗h + (1− pi)c∗l +K∗2 = rK∗1 + wpiy∗h
pi2c∗hh + pi(1− pi)c∗hl + pi(1− pi)c∗lh + (1− pi)2c∗ll
= rK∗2 + w (pi
2y∗hh + pi(1− pi)y∗lh)
, (1.3.5)
and
u(c∗h)− v(y∗h) = u(c∗l )
u(c∗hh)− v(y∗hh) = u(c∗hl)
u(c∗lh)− v(y∗lh) = u(c∗ll)
(1.3.6)
The above conditions are also sufficient since the solution is in the interior and
unique. First notice that it is easy to show that all three incentive constraints
(1.3.1), (1.3.2), and (1.3.3) are binding, which results in (1.3.6). For example,
suppose u(ch)− v(yh) > u(cl). Then, by the concavity of u, the welfare goes up by
increasing cl a little bit and decreasing ch a little bit without violating the resource
constraint. The same argument applies to the second and the third equality.
firm). The superscript, ∗, represents optimality, i.e., solutions to the planner’s problem. For
example, kt is investment of an agent at t = 1, 2 and Kt is the aggregate investment or capital
raised by the representative firm. k∗t and K∗t are the optimal values of kt and Kt, respectively.
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The first three equations in (1.3.4) are so called the inverse Euler equations.
Golosov, Kocherlakta, and Tsyvinski (2003) first pinned down the intertemporal
wedge in a Pareto optimum between an individual’s marginal benefit of investing in
capital and his marginal cost of doing so, which suggests the positive tax on capital
income. Since then and contemporaneously, several optimal taxation mechanisms
have been developed. Among them, Kocherlakota (2005) first proposed how to
implement a market economy that is closest to the classical workhorse dynamic
general equilibrium models. He shows that the constrained optimum cannot be
decentralized by simply imposing homogenous capital income equal to the (ex-ante)
wedge. Instead he proposed capital income taxes equal to the ex-post wedge, which
makes agents with different skills face different capital tax rates. The optimal capital
income tax is zero in aggregate (or in the ex-ante expectation sense), but nonzero
for individuals (in the ex-post sense). For example, people who are relatively low
skilled in the next period pay a wealth tax; people who are relatively high skilled
receive a wealth subsidy.
Before going further, we introduce the following lemma that will be used several
times later to pin down size of optimal capital taxes.
Lemma 1. The optimal allocation satisfies
u′(c∗0) < ru
′(c∗l ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 still holds for a general case where there are many types of agents:
When there are more than two types of agents, l should mean the lowest skill agents.
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The following corollary of Lemma 1 is also used later.
Corollary 1. The optimal allocation satisfies
u′(c∗0) > ru
′(c∗h).
Proof. See the Appendix.
1.4 Known Tax Schemes
Two decentralization methods are examined in this section. In Section 1.4.1 we
briefly introduce a kind of Ramsey taxation scheme and explain briefly why it does
not work when the agent has private information on his/her skill, i,e, in the Mirrlees
framework. Section 1.4.2 describes the standard dynamic Mirrless tax scheme as
in Kocherlakota (2005) and Albanesi and Sleet (2006). Then, in Section 1.4.3 we
explain why this standard dynamic taxation method also fails to decentralize the
constrained optimal allocation. In particular, this section explicitly describes the
assumption of this paper and presents the intuition of how to use the tax timing
option.
In section 1.4.1 we define the Ramsey taxation scheme by the tax system includ-
ing the capital income tax that matches the wedge in the (ex-ante) Euler equation.
The next period capital income tax rate should be contingent on the information
available at the current period. Next, in Section 1.4.2 we define the standard dy-
namics Mirrlees taxation scheme by the tax system including the capital income
tax that matches the wedge in the ex-post Euler equation. The next period capital
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income tax rates should be contingent on the full labor history including the next
period (not even the current period).
Suppose there is a single firm that owns the technology. The firm rents capital
and labor in each period to produce output. In period 0 and 1, the household decides
how much to consume and work and how much capital to save (or accumulate). In
period 2, agents decide how much to consume and work.
1.4.1 Ramsey Taxation Scheme
First consider a tax system {τ, αh, αl} in period 1 where τ is a capital tax rate and
(αh, αl) are lump-sum taxes on the labor income of working/non-working agents.
The key point here is that the capital tax rate imposed on all types of agents are
the same. In particular, let us to set up τ such that
u′(c∗0) = E[r(1− τ)u(c∗1)] = pir(1− τ)u′(c∗h) + (1− pi)r(1− τ)u′(c∗l ). (1.4.1)
This tax system works if there is no information asymmetry (in a Ramsey taxa-
tion world). With private information it fails to achieve the constrained optimum
allocation. In particular, it fails to satisfy the incentive constraint of the high skill
agent. The high skill agent will deviate by oversaving and pretending to be low
skilled (See the two-period example in Kocherlakota (2005)).
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1.4.2 Standard Dynamics Taxation Scheme
Secondly, we consider a tax system {τi, αi}i=l,h for period 1 and {τij, αij}i,j=h,l for
period 2 proposed by Kocherlakota (2005). Note that l means that the agent does
not work and h means that the agent works. For example, τh is the (period 1)
capital tax on the agent who works in period 1, αlh is the (period 2) labor income
tax on the agent who does not work in period 1 and works in period 2. Notice that
the tax mechanism has the full labor-history dependence up to the period when the
corresponding capital tax is imposed. In essence, differentiating the tax rates on
capital is required to achieve a constrained optimal allocation.
Given the tax plan {τi, αi}i=l,h and {τij, αij}i,j=1,2, an agent’s problem is to
choose consumption (c0, ch, cl, chh, chl, clh, cll), labor (y0, yh, yhh, ylh), and investment
(k1, k2h, k2l) to maximize
u(c0)− v(y0) + pi (u(ch)− v(yh)) + (1− pi)u(cl)
+ pi2 (u(chh)− v(yhh)) + pi(1− pi)u(chl) + pi(1− pi) (u(clh)− v(ylh)) + (1− pi)2u(cll)
subject to the following budget constraints. The constraint in t = 0 is
c0 = rk0 − k1 + wy0,
the constraint in t = 1 is
ch = r(1− τh)k1 − k2h + wyh + αh, if yh > 0
cl = r(1− τl)k1 − k2l + αl, otherwise,
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the constraint in t = 2 when the agent works in t = 1 is
chh = r(1− τhh)k2h + wyhh + αhh, if yhh > 0
chl = r(1− τhl)k2h + αhl, otherwise,
and finally the constraint in t = 2 when the agent does not work in t = 1 is
clh = r(1− τlh)k2l + wylh + αlh, if ylh > 0
cll = r(1− τll)k2l + αll, otherwise.
Notice that positive α’s represent subsidy and negative α’s represent tax while
positive τ ’s represent tax and negative τ ’s represent subsidy. The market clearing
conditions are given by
(t = 0) c0 + k1 = rk0 + wy0,
(t = 1) pich + (1− pi)cl + pik2h + (1− pi)k2l = rk1 + wpiyh,
(t = 2) pi2chh + pi(1− pi)chl + pi(1− pi)clh + (1− pi)2cll
= r[pik2h + (1− pi)k2l] + w
(
pi2yhh + pi(1− pi)ylh.
)
Suppose the government does not period-by-period transfer resources, i.e., the gov-
ernment does not issue bonds. Then, the budget constraint of an agent and the
market clearing condition imply the following government budget constraint in each
period.
(t = 1) [piτh + (1− pi)τl]rk1 = piαh + (1− pi)αl, (1.4.2)
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(t = 2) pi[piτhh + (1− pi)τhl]k2h + (1− pi)[piτlh + (1− pi)τll]rk2l
= piαhh + pi(1− pi)αhl + (1− pi)piαlh + (1− pi)2αll. (1.4.3)
If we enable the government to finance their budget through government bonds, then
the labor income tax should be indeterminate.17 In this section we keep (1.4.2) and
(1.4.3) for simplicity. However, from the next section on we will see the case where
the government does issue bonds or does period-by-period transfer resources.
In order to achieve the constrained optimal competitive allocation, any tax
system must be consistent with the ex-post Euler equation (not ex-ante Euler
equation). Given the constrained optimum allocation (c∗0, c
∗
h, c
∗
l , c
∗
hh, c
∗
hl, c
∗
lh, c
∗
ll),
(y∗0, y
∗
h, y
∗
hh, y
∗
lh), and (k
∗
1, k
∗
2h, k
∗
2l), we require the capital tax system {τh, τl} and
{τhh, τhl, τlh, τll} to be defined so that the ex-post Euler equation is satisfied
with equality at each period and require the labor tax system {αh, αl} and
{αhh, αlh, αhl, αll} to satisfy the budget constraint as follows.
r(1− τh)u′(c∗h) = u′(c∗0), r(1− τl)u′(c∗l ) = u′(c∗0)
αh = c
∗
h + k
∗
2h − r(1− τh)k∗1 − wy∗h
αl = c
∗
l + k
∗
2l − r(1− τl)k∗1.
(1.4.4)
with pik∗2h + (1− pi)k∗2l = K∗2 , and
17Interested readers can see the arguments in Section 4.4.3 in Kocherlakota (2009).
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
r(1− τhh)u′(c∗hh) = u′(c∗h), r(1− τhl)u′(c∗hl) = u′(c∗h),
r(1− τlh)u′(c∗lh) = u′(c∗l ), r(1− τll)u′(c∗ll) = u′(c∗l )
αhh = c
∗
hh − r(1− τhh)k∗2h − wy∗hh
αhl = c
∗
hl − r(1− τhl)k∗2h
αlh = c
∗
lh − r(1− τlh)k∗2l − wy∗lh
αll = c
∗
ll − r(1− τll)k∗2l
(1.4.5)
Then, it is not hard to see that the agent’s optimal choice (c, y, k) is equal to
the constrained optimum, i.e., (c0, ch, cl, chh, chl, clh, cll) = (c
∗
0, c
∗
h, c
∗
l , c
∗
hh, c
∗
hl, c
∗
lh, c
∗
ll),
(y0, yh, yhh, ylh) = (y
∗
0, y
∗
h, y
∗
hh, y
∗
lh), and k1 = K
∗
1 , conditional on (yh, yhh, ylh) >> 0.
Then, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Kocherlakota (2005)). The competitive equilibrium is the con-
strained optimum allocation if the tax system satisfies (1.4.4) and (1.4.5).
Proof. See the appendix
Let us summarize the properties of the tax system of (1.4.4) and (1.4.5) in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. The tax system defined in (1.4.4) and (1.4.5) also satisfies Et[τt+1] =
0, in other words,
(a) piτh + (1− pi)τl = 0 and τh < 0 < τl.
(b) piτhh + (1 − pi)τhl = 0 = piτlh + (1 − pi)τll. Futhermore, τhh < 0 < τhl and
τlh < 0 < τll.
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Proposition 2 implies that the expected ex-ante capital tax is zero although the
ex-post capital tax is never zero. Notice that the expected labor income tax is not
necessarily zero.18 It is zero under the assumption that there is no intertemporal
transfer of consumption by the planner, i.e., the government does not generate any
debt repaid in the future. The working agents pay the labor income tax and the
disable agents receive labor subsidy, which means the government insures the agents
against the skill shocks. However, in order to give able agents incentives to work,
the government should award the working agents the capital income (or wealth)
subsidy instead of making them pay the labor income taxes for the disabled.
1.4.3 Tax Timing Options
The analysis in Section 1.4.2 is based on a standard framework of the dynamic
Mirrless taxation models. In fact, the main contribution of this paper start from
here. From this section on, we add real world features of the tax code into the
model as in assumption 1 below. With this assumption, an agent is entitled with
so called a tax timing option that is the option to realize capital incomes in each
period. Then, as will be shown later, the decentralization method in the previous
section fails to achieve the constrained optimum allocation. Notice that we are not
criticizing dynamic Mirrlees taxation models by citing practical problems. The idea
of tax timing options can also be applied to break down any dynamic Ramsey models
as well. What we want to focus on is how to correct this failure in the Mirrlees
framework, which eventually justifies corporate taxation. Now we introduce the
18If we assume that government never creates any bonds, we have piαh + (1 − pi)αl = 0 with
αh < 0 < αl and pi2αhh + pi(1− pi)αhl + (1− pi)piαlh + (1− pi)2αll = 0.
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following simplifying assumptions.
Assumption 1. (i) The government cannot impose tax on any unrealized capital
returns of individual agents.
(ii) In period 1, an agent can resell equities to the corporation (or firms repurchase
equities from the shareholders.) When they do so, they must pay the individual
capital taxes. Otherwise, they do not pay the taxes just by holding equities.
(iii) There is no long-term debt, in other words, only one-period bonds are available
in the market. Debt issued in period i must be paid in period i + 1, i = 0, 1.
Then, the individual taxes are imposed as well.
The most important is Assumption 1-(i). As mentioned before in the introduc-
tion, in the real world, people annually need to pay taxes on some capital holding
regardless of the capital gain realization, for example, real estates, vehicles, intan-
gible assets (copyrights, patents, etc) and durable goods. However, these assets
are not traded often and here we are interested in stocks and bonds that are being
traded every second in the market. In addition, it is factual that the capital gain
taxes are paid when stocks and bonds are sold.19 Therefore, we take assumption
1-(i).
Assumption 1-(ii) implies that dividend distribution and share repurchase are
identical. Practically, dividend payout usually has tax disadvantages relative to
share repurchase. In particular, in the current U. S. tax code, the effective tax
rates on dividends are slightly higher than those on share repurchases. Then, an
19The capital gain taxes are asymmetric. There are tax credits for capital loss. In this paper, we
do not consider the tax credits. This is for simplicity. In fact, since the model has no uncertainty
in production, we do not have to take capital loss into account.
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immediate question is why firms are distributing dividends. However, those topics
related to this dividend puzzle are beyond the scope of this paper (See Black (1976)
and Miller (1986) for the dividend puzzle). Therefore, for simplicity, we assume
that the share repurchasing is equivalent to dividends distribution. It also means
that the agents realize capital gains by receiving cash in exchange for all or some
fraction of the firm’s outstanding equity that they hold or by selling all or some
equity to any individual agent or the firm. In addition, we assume that there is no
floatation cost and no friction in issuing equity and debt.
Assumption 1-(iii) identifies the difference between debt and equity. Basically,
equity implies the ownership. Debt is the borrowing/lending contract between the
firm and the investor, therefore it should be paid at the specified time. Notice that
we do not consider bankruptcy of a firm. Technically, there are two differences.
First, debt is corporate tax-free while equity is not. Second, debt has a maturity,
so we assume for simplicity there is only one-period debt. However, equity can be
realized (cashed) at any time upon an investor’s request.
Now the intuition of the tax timing option is as follows. Although we have a
three-period model, the model can be easily extended to a general case. There-
fore, let us imagine that there are many periods and individual skills are arbitrarily
evolving (potentially very persistently). Suppose the tax system is given by equa-
tions (1.4.4) and (1.4.5). If an agent sees that the capital income tax is high enough
at the current period, then she can postpone realization of her capital income to
the next period. In this case, the unrealized returns are left in the firm20, which
is automatically transferred to reinvestment without taxes under assumption 1. In
20These unpaid retained earnings are sometimes called internal equities in the capital structure
literature. Then, common stocks traded in the market are called external equities.
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particular, the agent who has surprisingly low skill in the current period, therefore
is facing positive capital taxes, will have the incentive to defer her capital income
realization in order to evade the taxes. If she realizes her capital income at the
time she becomes (surprisingly) high skilled in some periods later, she can receive
even more subsidy proportional to the wealth accumulated without having paid
taxes than what she would get if she realized her capital income earlier. In particu-
lar, currently low skill agents choose to exercise the tax timing option whereas the
currently high type agents do not. Therefore, tax timing options provide typical
arbitrage opportunities. Now we are ready to show the following proposition which
is the starting point for the whole analysis in the remaining part of the paper.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, the the socially optimal allo-
cation cannot be implemented by the tax system {τi, αi}i=l,h and {τij, αij}i,j=h,l in
(1.4.4) and (1.4.5).
Proof. See the Appendix.
We have two remarks on Proposition 3. First, we focus only on the behavior of
the low skill agents in period 1. The high skill agents already do not have incentives
to deviate under the the second best world tax scheme. Second, although in the
second best world we only investigated the case where there is no intertemporal
transfer of resources, one should notice that, in general, the labor taxation is inde-
terminate. Therefore, the agent’s investment (or saving) strategy depends on how
much labor taxes will be assigned in period 1, in particular, how big (αh, αl) in
(1.4.4) are. Proposition 3 is true for any labor tax system, in other words, it is valid
regardless of whether the government period-by-period transfers resources.
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Now, using the argument in Section 1.4.1 and the argument in proposition 3, we
can establish the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. The constrained optimum cannot be
decentralized by any tax systems using the capital income tax defined (i) to be equal
to the ex-post wedge of the intertemporal Euler equation or (ii) to be equal to the
ex-ante wedge in the intertemporal Euler equation.
Corollary 2 gives a hint of how to design a optimal tax scheme in order to avoid
the tax timing option. If the market would fail to achieve the optimal allocation
by using only one of (i) and (ii) in the corollary, then one can think of a proper
mixture of them as a solution. The next section shows an alternative way.
1.5 The Third Best Taxation Scheme
How does the government prevent agents from this deviation as in the proof of
Proposition 3? For logical simplicity, we consider the following two cases step by
step: (1) when firms do not issue debts and (2) when firms issue both equities and
debts. In conclusion, the government should be required to tax unrealized returns
or earnings in the firm level (as well as in the individual level), which is so called
corporate taxation.
1.5.1 When No Debt, But Only Equity is Available
Assume firms are not allowed to issue debts. Then, corporate earnings in this case
is equal to output minus labor shares. If the government sets any taxes in the
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corporate level, then it makes all the agents pay capital income taxes although they
do not realize their capital income. In particular, if this tax is set to be same as τl in
(1.4.4), then the low skill agents cannot defer to pay the capital income taxes to the
next period, which means that they lose their tax timing options. More precisely,
consider the following tax system (τ ec , τ
e
l , τ
e
h) in period 1 where τ
e
c is the corporate
tax rate, τ el is the individual capital tax rate for non-working agents in period 1,
and τ eh is the individual capital tax rate for working agents in period 1 such that
τ ec := τl, τ
e
l := 0, τ
e
h := τh − τ ec . (1.5.1)
where τl and τh are defined by (1.4.4). Notice that the low skill agents are now
indifferent between realizing the return on capital investment and non-realizing.
The high skill agents should pay the corporate tax τ ec , but they can get back tax
benefits τh − τl when they realized their capital income. Therefore, the net capital
income is [(1− τh + τl)− τl]rk∗1 = (1− τh)rk∗1, which is the same as that under the
previous tax system (1.4.4) and (1.4.5).
1.5.2 When Both Debt and Equity are Available
Notice the tax system (1.5.1) is the optimal tax only if debt is unavailable. If debt
is available and the individual capital taxes are given by (τ el , τ
e
h), then the agents in
period 0 have no reason to buy equity since there is a positive corporate tax τc > 0.
Then, corporations raise 100% debt financing since we do not assume bankruptcy
costs. Therefore, the optimal allocation cannot be obtained under (1.5.1).
Now suppose both debt and equity are available in the market. We need to
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introduce more precise individual taxes as well as the corporate tax. Let us define
τ ∗c by the corporate tax rate and (τ
B
l , τ
E
l ) and (τ
B
h , τ
E
h ) by the individual capital
income taxes of non-working (l) and working (h) agents, respectively. Superscript
B represents debt and E represents equity. Then, we formalize the problem as
follows: find the optimal tax system (τ ∗c , τ
B
l , τ
E
l , τ
B
h , τ
E
h ) such that given the agents
tell the truth, the tax system guarantees that the agents choose the socially optimal
allocations and given the agents optimally chooses their allocation, the agents choose
to tell the truth.
Let us describe the idea of taxation as follows. Above all, unlike (1.5.1), we
impose positive individual capital taxes on both equity and debt holdings of the
low skill agents and, in particular, we set the tax rate on the debt holding of the
low type agents greater than the corporate tax rate. It follows that the individual
capital tax rates for the high skill agents should be adjusted to fit the Euler equation.
Similarly to the above subsection, the tax rate on equity of the working agents should
be negative. Then, the above idea is mathematically summarized as the following
criterion.
0 < τ ∗c < τ
B
l and τ
E
h < τh < 0. (1.5.2)
In fact, we need more constraints, but they are rather less important than (1.5.2).
They will be specified in the below. This minor importance is due to the fact that
if we set τBl = τ
E
l and τ
B
h = τ
E
h , then the other criteria will trivially hold.
Let us consider in the ex-post sense who prefer debt and who prefer equity under
(1.5.2). The high skill agents would be happier if they find themselves have more
bonds. The low skill agents would be happier if they find themselves have more
stocks. In other words, the high types prefer to be ”debt holders” while the low
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types prefer to be ”equity holders” in ex-post. Therefore, in the ex-ante sense, in
period 0, the risk-averse agents are facing a non-trivial portfolio selection problem
between equities and bonds given the tax system.
Notice that no corporate tax is required in period 2 since all the firms are
liquidated in period 2. Therefore, {τij}i,j=h,l of (1.4.5) is still the optimal capital
income tax in period 2. Define B1 and E1 by the amount of debt holdings and
equity holdings, respectively. Then, given the tax system (τ ∗c , τ
B
l , τ
E
l , τ
B
h , τ
E
h ), the
agent’s budget constraint in each period is as follows. In period 2, we have the same
constraints as in the second-best case:
chh = r(1− τhh)k2h + wyhh + αhh, if yhh > 0 (1.5.3)
chl = r(1− τhl)k2h + αhl, otherwise (1.5.4)
and
clh = r(1− τlh)k2l + wylh + αlh, if ylh > 0 (1.5.5)
cll = r(1− τll)k2l + αll, otherwise (1.5.6)
In period 1, however, we have
ch = r(1− τBh )B1 + max{realize, not}((1− τ
∗
c )(1− τEh ), 1− τ ∗c )rE1
− k2h + wyh + αh, if yh > 0 (1.5.7)
cl = r(1− τBl )B1 + max{realize, not}((1− τ
∗
c )(1− τEl ), 1− τ ∗c )rE1
− k2l + αl, otherwise (1.5.8)
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Assume first the criteria in (1.5.2) is true. Moreover, suppose an agent enter period
1 with positive amount of both debt and equity. If in period 1 the agent finds him
high skilled, then he would realize his return on equity since τEh < 0. Here, we need
another criterion: He would be better with more debt if the net return on debt is
greater than the net return on equity if
1− τBh > (1− τ ∗c )(1− τEh ). (1.5.9)
On the other hand, if in period 1 the agent finds him low skilled, then he would not
realize his return on equity if we have
τEl > 0. (1.5.10)
Then, he also would be better if he only holds equity since the net return on equity
is greater than the net return on debt:
1− τ ∗c > 1− τBl ,
which is true by (1.5.2). Therefore, in period 0, if the tax system satisfies (1.5.2),
(1.5.9), and (1.5.10), the agent faces a portfolio selection between (B1, E1) since he
does not know which type he will be in period 1. The budget constraint in period
0 is as follows.
c0 = rk0 − (B1 + E1) + wy0 with B1 + E1 = K∗1 . (1.5.11)
We now introduce the optimal tax system in period 1 as follows (The period 2
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capital taxes are the same as (1.4.5)). Define (τ ∗c , τ
B
l , τ
E
l , τ
B
h , τ
E
h ) and (τhh, τhl, τlh, τll)
by

r(1− τ ∗c ) = u
′(c∗0 )
u′(c∗l )
r(1− τ ∗c )(1− τEh ) = u
′(c∗0 )
u′(c∗h)
1− τBh > (1− τ ∗c )(1− τEh )
τEl > 0
pir(1− τBh )u′(c∗h) + (1− pi)r(1− τBl )u′(c∗l ) = u′(c∗0)
r(1− τhh)u′(c∗hh) = u′(c∗h)
r(1− τhl)u′(c∗hl) = u′(c∗h),
r(1− τlh)u′(c∗lh) = u′(c∗l ),
r(1− τll)u′(c∗ll) = u′(c∗l )
(1.5.12)
and define labor taxes (αh, αl) and (αhh, αhl, αlh, αll) such that their present values
are matched:
−{piu′(c∗h)αh + (1− pi)u′(c∗l )αl + piu′(c∗hh)αhh + (1− pi)u′(c∗ll)αll}
= u′(c∗0)(rk0 + wy
∗
0) + piu
′(c∗h)wy
∗
h + piu
′(c∗hh)wy
∗
hh (1.5.13)
− {u′(c∗0)c∗0 + piu′(c∗h)c∗h + (1− pi)u′(c∗l )c∗l + piu′(c∗hh)c∗hh + (1− pi)u′(c∗ll)c∗ll}
Moreover, we have
 u
′(c∗hh){c∗hh − wy∗hh − αhh} = u′(c∗hl){c∗hl − αhl}
u′(c∗lh){c∗lh − wy∗lh − αlh} = u′(c∗ll){c∗ll − αll}
(1.5.14)
Equation (1.5.13) results from adding the budget constraints (1.5.3), (1.5.4), (1.5.7),
28
(1.5.8), and (1.5.11), each of whom are multiplied by piu′(c∗hh), (1−pi)u′(c∗ll), piu′(c∗h), (1−
pi)u′(c∗l ), and u
′(c∗0), respectively and using the definitions of the capital income tax
code (1.5.12). Equation (1.5.14) is also derived using the definition of the capital
income tax code (1.5.12) such that
u′(c∗hh)r(1− τ ∗hh) = u′(c∗hl)r(1− τ ∗hl)
u′(c∗lh)r(1− τ ∗lh) = u′(c∗ll)r(1− τ ∗ll).
Technically τ ∗c and τ
E
h in (1.5.12) are first set up to be equal to the ex-post wedge
between the MRT and the MRS that appear in the first order condition (or Euler
equation) for the equity holding choice E1. Then, (τ
B
l , τ
E
l ) is determined in the first
order condition for the debt holding choice B1. There are two tax rates that can be
flexibly chosen: (τEl , τ
B
h ). τ
E
l should be positive. Notice that in (1.5.12) we set
τBh < τ
E
h + τc − τcτEh ,
which is in fact from (1.5.9). By simple algebra we have, by Corollary 1,
τEh + τc − τcτEh = 1−
u′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗h)
< 0,
which implies that τBh < 0. It is notable that either 0 > τ
B
h > τ
E
h or 0 > τ
E
h > τ
B
h
is possible.
Notice that B1 + E1 = K
∗
1 should be satisfied since the agents are homogenous
in period 0. On the other hand, it is not necessary that pik∗2h + (1 − pi)k∗2l = K∗2 if
we allow resource transfer between period 1 and 2. It is also easy to verify that the
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tax system (1.5.12) satisfies the intuitive criteria given in (1.5.2). The capital tax
system in period 1 of (1.5.12) can be rewritten as
τ ∗c = 1−
u′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗l )
, (1.5.15)
τEh = 1−
u′(c∗l )
u′(c∗h)
, (1.5.16)
τBh < τ
E
h + τc − τcτEh = 1−
u′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗h)
(1.5.17)
τEl > 0 (1.5.18)
τBl = 1−
u′(c∗0)− pir(1− τBh )u′(c∗h)
(1− pi)ru′(c∗l )
(1.5.19)
Here, note again τEl is arbitrary. From equations (1.5.15), (1.5.16), (1.5.17), (1.5.18),
and (1.5.19), we can directly confirm criteria (1.5.2), (1.5.9), and (1.5.10). We
summarize this result as the following lemma that will be used later.
Lemma 2. The tax system (1.5.12) satisfies
0 < τ ∗c < τ
B
l and τ
E
h < τh < 0.
One may be interested in the case where τBh ≈ τEh . The following lemma tells
about this special case.
Lemma 3. The tax system (1.5.12) is given. Then, τBh = τ
E
h if and only if τ
B
l =
τ∗c
1−pi .
Proof. This just results from (1.5.19).
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Now we are ready to state our main theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose the government can impose the corporate tax. Given the tax
system (1.5.12), the consumption and labor allocation of the competitive equilibrium
coincide with those of the constrained optimum allocation.
Proof. See the Appendix.
One may think that until now we have only considered the individual investors,
so that the role of firms are ignored in debt and equity issuance. In fact, the effect
of the corporate tax is offset by that of the individual capital taxes. Simple algebra
shows that the expected tax rate on holding equity in t = 0 is
pi[1− (1− τEh )(1− τ ∗c )] + (1− pi)τ ∗c = 0. (1.5.20)
Therefore the tax system (1.5.12) makes firms indifferent to any capital structure
as described in the proof of Theorem 1. In other words, the capital structure only
results from the aggregate debt and equity portfolio choice of individual agents.
Therefore, in the firm’s point of view, the Modigliani-Miller theorem still holds.
This idea is quite similar to that of Miller (1977).
Corollary 3 (Modigliani-Miller Theorem Revisited). The market value of any firm
is independent of its capital structure.
One important remark is that Corollary 3 is not automatically true for the case
of more than two types. As will be explained in Section 1.7, if the number of
types of agent is more than two (the number of assets in the market, debt and
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equity), the expected tax rate on equity is not necessarily equal to zero since we
have more degree of freedom to choose the tax rates. Therefore, the tax authority
need to set the expected tax rate to be zero. Otherwise, the capital market does
not clear. Therefore, for the case of more than two types of agents, Corollary 3 is
not a property of the optimal tax system, but it should be a condition when setting
up the optimal tax rates. This is the only one difference between the case where
there are two types and the case where there are more than two types of agents.
1.5.3 A Simple Example
This section provides a very simple example. For the case where the utility function
is logarithmic and the dis-utility function is linear, we describe some comparative
statics results. In particular, the corporate tax rate increases in pi, the probability of
being a high skill agent. In this sense, we provide a simple regression result between
the average schooling years and the corporate tax rates among OECD countries.
although we need carefully interpret the result due to the indeterminacy property
of the corporate tax when there are more than two types of agents (See Section
1.7).
Assume that the utility function is log and the disutility function is linear:
u(c) = log(c), v(y) = κy. (1.5.21)
Then, the the first order conditions (1.3.4) yields
c∗0 = c
∗
h = c
∗
hh = c
∗
lh =
w
κ
. (1.5.22)
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Putting this into the inverse Euler equation in (1.3.4) to get
c∗l = c
∗
hl =
(r − pi)w
(1− pi)κ , c
∗
ll =
1
1− pi
(
r(r − pi)
1− pi − pi
)
w
κ
. (1.5.23)
Notice that we need the following assumption to get the well-defined solution.
pi < r < 1 and r(r − pi) > pi(1− pi). (1.5.24)
Recall the linear disutlity function v(y) in (1.5.21). If (1.5.24) does not hold, then
the agent will choose negative work (therefore negative disutility) in order to increase
utility. Then,(1.3.6) gives
y∗h = log(c
∗
h)− log(c∗l ) = log
(
1− pi
r − pi
)
> 0
y∗hh = log(c
∗
hh)− log(c∗hl) = log
(
1− pi
r − pi
)
> 0
y∗lh = log(c
∗
lh)− log(c∗ll) = log
(
1− pi
r(r−pi)
1−pi − pi
)
= log
(
1
r(r − pi)− pi(1− pi)
)
> 0,
where all the equations are positive by (1.5.24). Then, finally we get y∗0, K
∗
1 , and
K∗2 from (2.4) as follows:
rK∗2 =
[
pi + pi(1− pi) + pi(1− pi)
(
r − pi
1− pi
)
+ (1− pi)
(
r(r − pi)
1− pi − pi
)]
w
κ
− w
[
pi2 log
(
1− pi
r − pi
)
+ pi(1− pi) log
(
1
r(r − pi)− pi(1− pi)
)]
= [pi + pi(r − pi) + r(r − pi)] w
κ
− wpi log
[(
1− pi
r − pi
)pi (
1
r(r − pi)− pi(1− pi)
)1−pi]
.
rK∗1 = K
∗
2 + r
w
κ
− wpi log
(
1− pi
r − pi
)
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wy∗0 = K
∗
1 +
w
κ
− rK0.
For the log utility case, we have the following optimal tax code:
τ ∗c = 1−
c∗l
rc∗0
and τEh = 1−
c∗h
c∗l
. (1.5.25)
Putting (1.5.22) and (1.5.23) into (1.5.25), we have
1− τ ∗c =
u′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗l )
=
r − pi
r(1− pi) .
Then, simple algebra gives the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose the agent has the log utility and the linear disutility func-
tions of (1.5.21). Moreover, assume (1.5.24) is satisfied. Other things being equal,
the following comparative statics analysis holds.
(i) The corporate tax rate τ ∗c increases in the measure (population) of high skill
agents, pi. In other words, dτ
∗
c
dpi
> 0.
(ii) The corporate tax rate τ ∗c decreases in the rate of return on investment, r. In
other words, dτ
∗
c
dr
< 0.
(ii) The corporate tax rate τ ∗c is independent of labor productivity, w. In other
words, dτ
∗
c
dw
= 0.
Proposition 4 can be interpreted as follows. Assume there are two closed
economies: (i) The corporate tax rate may be higher in the economy populated
with more skilled workers. (ii) The corporate tax rate may be higher in the econ-
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omy having higher return on investment. (iii) The corporate tax tare may be higher
in the economy having higher labor productivity. Notice that statement (i) should
be understood under the assumption of the law of large numbers. It is also generally
true if the production technology is given by a constant returns to scale production
function.
1.6 Aggregate Leverage and Some Comparative Statics Anal-
ysis
In this section we investigate how the taxes, in particular, the individual labor taxes
affect the leverage ratio. We first identify the explicit solution for (B∗1 , E
∗
1) in Section
1.6.1 and characterize its properties. It turns out that the debt and equity holding
depends on the labor taxes. Therefore, the labor income taxes affect the leverage
ratio. It implies that not only the capital income tax code (including the corporate
tax) but also the labor income tax code are important, when we investigate the
effect of a tax reform on the leverage ratio. However, the labor tax codes have been
often ignored in capital structure theories.
In particular, we perform some comparative statics analysis on the aggregate
leverage with respect to the change of labor tax codes. Recall that the labor taxes
are indeterminate by the Ricardian equivalence. Section 1.6.2 deals with the effect
of change in the labor tax. Suppose there is no period-by-period resource transfer.
If the tax authority provides more (less) insurance against, then the leverage ratio
increases (decreases). A similar result holds for the case when the intertemporal
resource transfer is allowed.
35
1.6.1 Endogenous Leverage
Recall that we have two budget constraints of high and low skill agent in period 1
and the initial investment decision B1 + E1 = K
∗
1 . As described in Section 4.4.3
of Kocherlakota (2009), the timing and the amount of labor taxation is arbitrary
as long as (1.5.13) and (1.5.14) is satisfied. Then, in fact, the individual opti-
mal investment (B∗1 , E
∗
1) in period 0 and (k
∗
2h, k
∗
2l) in period 1 depend on how the
government, period-by-period, transfers labor taxes (or subsidies). The following
proposition provide the analytic form of the debt and equity holding. In order for
simpler exposition, we introduce some positive number kˆ2 which is equal to the
period 1 aggregate investment, pik∗2h + (1− pi)k∗2l = kˆ2.
Proposition 5. Let pik∗2h + (1 − pi)k∗2l = kˆ2. Let (τ ∗c , τBh , τEh , τBm , τEm , τBl , τEl ) be an
optimal capital tax system given by (1.5.12). Then, given the labor tax code, (αh, αl),
the optimal portfolio of debt and equity (B∗1 , E
∗
1) is given by
B∗1 =
−X(αh, αl)−K∗2 + (piτEh + τ ∗c − piτEh τ ∗c )rK∗1
−r(piτEh τ ∗c + piτBh − piτEh + τ ∗c − (1− pi)τBl )
(1.6.1)
E∗1 =
X(αh, αl) +K
∗
2 − (piτBh + (1− pi)τBl )rK∗1
−r(piτEh τ ∗c + piτBh − piτEh + τ ∗c − (1− pi)τBl )
(1.6.2)
where X(αh, αl) := (piαh + (1− pi)αl)− kˆ2.
Proof. See the appendix.
First notice that the denominator in (1.6.1) and (1.6.2) are positive, which is
summarized in Lemma 5 in the appendix. Before describing the meaning of the
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above proposition, we first narrow down the case where there is no period-by-period
transfer by the government.
Corollary 4. Let (τ ∗c , τ
B
h , τ
E
h , τ
B
m , τ
E
m , τ
B
l , τ
E
l ) be an optimal capital tax system given
by (1.5.12). Suppose the period-by-period government budget is balanced. More
precisely, suppose that we take some positive numbers kˆ1b, kˆ1e, kˆ2h, and kˆ2l to have
(αh, αl) such that αh = c
∗
h − r(1− τBh )kˆ1b − r(1− τEh )(1− τ ∗c )kˆ1e + kˆ2h − wy∗h
αl = c
∗
l − r(1− τBl )kˆ1b − r(1− τ ∗c )kˆ1e + kˆ2l
(1.6.3)
where
kˆ1b + kˆ1e = K
∗
1 and pikˆ2h + (1− pi)kˆ2l = K∗2 .
Then, we have B∗1 = kˆ1b, E
∗
1 = kˆ1e, k
∗
2h = kˆ2h, and k
∗
2l = kˆ2l.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that the aggregate capital structure is determined by
X(αh, αl) as well as the capital tax code. Therefore, we present comparative stat-
ics results with respect to change of the labor income tax code and change of the
corporate income tax code in the next two subsections.
Notice B∗1 + E
∗
1 = K
∗
1 is fixed. Therefore, we only need to see the change of B
∗
1
in order to see the change of leverage ratio
B∗1
B∗1+E
∗
1
.
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1.6.2 Comparative Statics: Labor Taxation
For the comparative statics analysis on labor taxation, we should notice that the
labor tax code must satisfy the Ricardian equivalence: (1.5.13) and (1.5.14). For
example, if αl goes up, either or all of αl, αhh, or αhl must go down as in (1.5.13).
Although the tax authority cannot arbitrarily change the labor taxes, they have
enough degree of freedom. Due to this indeterminacy property, we face too many
cases. Hence, we focus on simple reasonable examples. Fixing the optimal allo-
cation, we divide the analysis into two cases: (i) when only period 1 labor taxes
(αh, αl) is changed (without intertemporal resource transfer) and (ii) when the
expected value of labor taxes will be changed (with the intertemporal resource
transfer).
Comparative Statics: Period 1 Labor Taxes (αh, αl)
Suppose, in this subsection, the labor taxes in the third period, (αhh, αhl, αlh, αll),
is unchanged. (1.5.13) implies that αl is increased if and only if αh is decreased.
This observation and proposition 5 give the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Suppose that given the optimal allocation, the tax authority only
changes the period 1 labor taxes whereas the period 2 labor taxes are fixed, i.e.,
αhh, αhl, αlh, and αll are fixed. Then, we have
dB∗1
dαl
> 0 and
dE∗1
dαl
< 0.
In other words, if the tax system provide more (less) insurance against low skill
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shocks, then the leverage ratio goes up (down).
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 6 is as follows. Recall that in period 1 the ex-post
low skill agents will prefer to hold more equities than debts. If the tax authority
insures more against the low skill shocks, then the agent in period 0 generally wants
to choose more debts. This effect pushes the leverage ratio up.
Comparative Statics: Expected Labor Taxes
Even if the period-by-period resource transfer is allowed, the basic idea of propo-
sition 6 still holds. The leverage ratio increases if the discounted expected subsidy
on being a low skill agent onward increases. From the optimal tax code (1.5.12), we
can have the relationship between the labor income tax and the optimal investment:
 k
∗
2h =
u′(c∗hh)
u′(c∗h)
(c∗hh − wy∗hh − αhh) = u
′(c∗hl)
u′(c∗h)
(c∗hl − αhl)
k∗2l =
u′(c∗lh)
u′(c∗l )
(c∗lh − wy∗lh − αlh) = u
′(c∗ll)
u′(c∗h)
(c∗ll − αll)
(1.6.4)
Using (1.6.4), we can rewrite X(αh, αl) as
X(αh, αl) = (piαh + (1− pi)αl)− (pik∗2h + (1− pi)k∗2l)
=
pi
u′(c∗h)
[u′(c∗h)αh + u
′(c∗hh)αhh] +
1− pi
u′(c∗l )
[u′(c∗l )αl + u
′(c∗lh)αlh] + C1
=
pi
u′(c∗h)
[u′(c∗h)αh + piu
′(c∗hh)αhh + (1− pi)u′(c∗hl)αhl]
+
1− pi
u′(c∗l )
[u′(c∗l )αl + piu
′(c∗lh)αlh + (1− pi)u′(c∗ll)αll] + C2, (1.6.5)
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where C1 and C2 are some constants consisting of optimal values (c
∗, y∗) independent
of α’s. Then, using the above expression (1.6.5) and the labor income budget
constraints (1.5.13) and (1.5.14), we have the following proposition about how the
change in labor taxes affects the debt and equity choice given the optimal allocation.
To be more specific, we need to define the expected present value of labor taxes
conditional on being a high skill agent:
A := u′(c∗h)αh + piu(c
∗
hh)αhh + (1− pi)u(c∗hl)αhl.
Proposition 7. Given the optimal allocation (c∗, k∗, y∗), suppose the government
changes the labor income tax codes (αh, αl) and (αhh, αhl, αlh, αll) that satisfies
(1.5.13) and (1.5.14). Other things being equal, we have
∂B∗1
∂A
< 0 and
∂E∗1
∂A
> 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 7 is quite similar to that of Proposition 6. Notice
A is negative. Therefore, A goes up if and only if the expected present value of labor
taxes conditional on being the high type goes down since the high skill agents in
equilibrium should pay the labor taxes and the low skill agents receive the subsidy.
In other words, A goes up if and only if the government provide less insurance
against being low skilled. Thus, agents choose more amount of equity (therefore
less amount of debt) for self-insuring her against the low skill shock. The ratio of
debt holding is negatively correlated with the expected present value of labor taxes
conditional on being the high type. On the other hands, the leverage goes up if the
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expected discounted value of being low skill agent in period 1 and being whoever in
period 2 increases, i.e., basically the tax authority provides more insurance against
low skill shocks.
1.7 More Than Two Types
In this section, we extend the model of previous sections into the case for more
than two types of agents. The fundamental idea is exactly same as before. We
can explicitly derive the tax system and the optimal market portfolio of debt and
equity that turn out to be easy extension of the previous results of the case for two
types. However, there is one crucial difference, which is the reason why we write
this section. The corporate tax rate when there are more than two types of agents
is indeterminate while the uniqueness does hold when there are only two types.
We first summarize the tax code in Section 1.7.1 and the optimal portfolio of
debt and equity in Section 1.7.2, which are analogues of previous results. Then, we
continue to investigate the other properties. Section 1.7.3 shows the indeterminacy
of the corporate tax level. In fact, it turns out to be that τc suggested in Section
1.7.1 is the minimal level and the government can choose the corporate income tax
rates greater than or equal to τc by properly adjusting the other individual capital
taxes according to the change of the corporate tax. This indeterminacy can provide
a normative interpretation about the historically fairly high corporate income tax
rates levied in many countries, in particular, during the last centuries in U. S..
The indeterminacy raises an immediate question: Given the current rate is high
enough, what if we increase or decrease the corporate tax rate? Section 1.7.4 deals
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with the effect of the change of the corporate tax on the firm’s leverage ratio. Sur-
prisingly, unlike the classical capital structure theories, the change of the corporate
tax rate does not have impact on the leverage ratio. Finally, due to the existence
of the corporate tax it is never surprising that the aggregate capital income tax is
nonzero, which is different from the classical result of the Ramsey taxation (Section
1.7.5).
1.7.1 Basic Results: A Simple Extension
The previous analysis should also work for any finite number of agents. Since the
basic intuition will be the same, here we show how to pin down the corporate tax
and how to set up the individual capital taxes when there are three types of agents.
It is straightforward to derive the general result for the case of n types of agents.
Suppose that there are three skill types {θh, θm, θl} with
θh > θm > θl.
Let Pr(θ = θi) = pii with i = h,m, l. So, pih+pim+pil = 1. θi is private information.
Shocks are i.i.d. over time across agents as well. Everybody can work. Their utility
functions are assumed to be the same as before:
2∑
t=0
u(ct)− v(et)
with yt = etθt, where et is the effort level at time t and yt is the labor provided by
the agent. et is private information. The production function is the same as before:
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f(K,Y ) = rK + wY . All the setup and the analysis are very similar as before.
It is tedious to write down the planner’s problem again. Thus, we skip it.
The first order conditions are similarly obtained. Assume that we have already
characterized (c∗, y∗, k∗), the constrained optimal allocation in this case. The most
important key is the following inverse Euler equation in period 1:
u′(c∗0) =
r
pih
u′(c∗h)
+ pim
u′(c∗m)
+ pil
u′(c∗l )
.
Each agent is indexed by subscripts h,m, and l, respectively. Then, the corporate
tax rate τc and the optimal individual capital tax code (τ
B
h , τ
E
h , τ
B
m , τ
E
m , τ
B
l , τ
E
l ) in
period 1 are give by

r(1− τc)u′(c∗l ) = u′(c∗0)
r(1− τc)(1− τEm)u′(c∗m) = u′(c∗0)
r(1− τc)(1− τEh )u′(c∗h) = u′(c∗0)
pihr(1− τBh )u′(c∗h) + pimr(1− τBm)u′(c∗m) + pilr(1− τBl )u′(c∗l ) = u′(c∗0),
(1− τBh ) > (1− τEh )(1− τc)
(1− τBm) > (1− τEm)(1− τc)
(1− τBl ) < (1− τc)
τEl > 0
(1.7.1)
and
pil(1− τc) + pim(1− τc)(1− τEm) + pim(1− τc)(1− τEh ) = 1. (1.7.2)
The first three equations in (1.7.1) is derived by setting the capital tax rates equal
to the ex-post wedges, each of which is the component of the Euler equation with
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respect to E1. The forth equation is the Euler-equation derived from the first order
condition with respect to B1. The next four inequalities are the conditions where
the high and middle skill agents will prefer debt while the lowest skill agents will
prefer equity in the next period, which in turn remove the tax timing options of the
lowest skill agents. Technically, we first pin down τc, τ
E
h , and τ
E
h , and then choose
τBh , τ
B
m , τ
B
l and τ
E
l flexibly through the inequalities.
The crucial condition is (1.7.2). This condition is designed to make firms indif-
ferent to choosing between debt and equity. (1.7.2) was not necessary for the case
where there are two only types of agents. In that case, the last equation is auto-
matically satisfied (See the proof of Theorem 1). However, for the case where there
are more than two types of agents, we should impose this condition when setting
up the capital tax rates. This is because the number of equity tax rates (equal to
the number of types) to determine is more than the number of assets (debt and
equity) in the market. If the last equation of (1.7.1) is not satisfied, then the firm
will provide either 100 % debt or 100 % equity financing while every agent chooses
both debt and equity with positive amount, which in turn fails to meet the market
clearing condition.
This idea to set (1.7.1) is also easier to understand if we look at the following
budget constraint of each type agent. In period 0,
c0 = rk0 − (B1 + E1) + wy0 with B1 + E1 = K∗1 ,
In period 1,
ch = r(1− τBh )B1 + max
realize, not
((1− τEh )(1− τc), 1− τc)rE1 − k2h + wyh + αh,
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cm = r(1− τBm)B1 + max
realize, not
((1− τEm)(1− τc), 1− τc)rE1 − k2m + wym + αm,
cl = r(1− τBl )B1 + max
realize, not
((1− τc)(1− τEl ), 1− τc)rE1 − k2l + wyl + αl
Now, it is easy to show the following lemma which is an extension of Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. The tax system (1.7.1) satisfies
τEh < τ
E
m < 0 < τc < τ
B
l .
Proof. See the appendix.
Similarly to Lemma 2, Lemma 4 tells that this tax system makes the ex-post
lowest skill agents prefer equity and all the other types prefer bonds. The only
lowest skill agents need to pay individual capital income taxes in period 1. This
is still true if we have more and more types. Only the lowest types of agents face
a positive capital tax rates. However, in a model with more than 3 periods, it is
no more true that the currently lowest type’s capital tax rates is the highest. In
Intuitively it would be usually true that the one who becomes very low skilled in
the current period relative to the previous skill status pays the highest tax rates
(See Section 1.9.1).
1.7.2 Endogenous Leverage for More than Two Types
The next proposition is analogous to Proposition 5. It provides the analytic form
of the debt and equity holding. In order for simpler exposition, we introduce some
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positive number kˆ2 which is equal to the period 1 aggregate investment, pihk
∗
2h +
pimk
∗
2m + pilk
∗
2l = kˆ2.
Proposition 8. Let pihk
∗
2h+pimk2m+pilk
∗
2l = kˆ2. Let Let (τc, τ
B
h , τ
E
h , τ
B
m , τ
E
m , τ
B
l , τ
E
l )
be the optimal tax system given in Proposition (1.7.1). Then, given the labor tax
code, (αh, αm, αl), the optimal portfolio of debt and equity (B
∗
1 , E
∗
1) is given by
B∗1 =
−X(αh, αm, αl)−K∗2 + [pihτEh + pimτEm + τ ∗c − (pihτEh + pimτEm)τc]rK∗1
rD3
(1.7.3)
E∗1 =
X(αh, αm, αl) +K
∗
2 − [pihτBh + pimτBm + pilτBl ]rK∗1
rD3
(1.7.4)
where X(αh, αm, αl) := (pihαh + pimαm + pilαl)− kˆ2 and
D3 = pih[(1−τBh )−(1−τEh )(1−τc)]+pim[(1−τBm)−(1−τEm)(1−τc)]+pil[(1−τBl )−(1−τc)].
Proof. See the appendix.
First notice that the denominator in (1.7.3) and (1.7.4) are positive, which is
summarized in Lemma 6 (easy extension of Lemma 5) in the appendix. One remark
is that the comparative statics analysis with respect to the change in labor taxation
is exactly same as shown in Proposition 6 and 7. The intuition is also the same,
thus we skip this analysis.
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1.7.3 Indeterminacy
The new result in this section is the indeterminacy of the capital income tax code.
Notice that if the tax authority take the corporate tax level less than τc in (1.7.1),
then the low skill agents still have incentives to defer the realization of capital in-
come. Then, what if the corporate tax level is higher than τc? The next proposition
provide an answer to this question.
Proposition 9. Let (τc, τ
B
h , τ
E
h , τ
B
m , τ
E
m , τ
B
l , τ
E
l ) be the optimal tax system given by
(1.7.1). Let τ˜c = τc + ² for some ² > 0. Then, there exist δh > 0 and δm > 0 such
that (τ˜c, τ˜
B
h , τ˜
E
h , τ˜
B
m , τ˜
E
m , τ˜
B
l , τ˜
E
l ) where
τ˜c = τ
∗
c + ², τ˜
E
h = τ
E
h − δh, τ˜Em = τEm − δm
is also an optimal tax system. In addition, the other tax rates can be properly
adjusted as long as the following inequalities are satisfied.
(1− τ˜Bh ) > (1− τEh + δh)(1− τc − ²)
(1− τ˜Bm) > (1− τEm + δm)(1− τc − ²)
(1− τ˜Bl ) < (1− τc − ²)
τ˜El > 0
Proof. See the appendix.
The proof of Proposition 9 is constructive, which means that we obtain δh and δm
explicitly in the proof. Proposition 9 also tells that the corporate tax rate τc in the
47
tax system (1.5.12) is the minimal level to support the socially optimal allocation.
The tax authority can take τ˜c greater than this minimal value τc. However, if the
corporate tax rate increases by ², then the other individual capital taxes should
be properly adjusted as well. In particular, the tax on equity of the higher skilled
agents decreases by δh and δm, respectively. The other tax rates must satisfy the
four inequalities and the Euler equation with respect to debt holding. In other
words, these tax rates can be either increased or decreased.
Although the model has three periods, one can infer from this result that the
corporate tax rates time series data of U.S. and many other OECD countries may
be possible although we cannot say that it is optimal. In U.S. the effective corporate
tax rates were over 50% during 1940-1950s and constantly decreased down to 25%
in 2000s, which is around 50% change. The corporate tax rate might be initially too
high. It is technically possible for the IRS to keep decreasing the rates during the
last 60 years, in particular, in accordance with the constant requests of decreasing
the rate from general investors. However, this story does not say that the IRS has
been working optimally.
1.7.4 Comparative Statics: Corporate Taxation
As shown in Proposition 9, the corporate tax is indeterminate as long as rate, τ˜c
is greater than or equal to the minimal level τ ∗c of (1.7.1). In other words, the tax
authority is free to change the rates. Therefore, given the sufficiently high level of
corporate tax rates, we can consider how the change in the rate affects the leverage
ratio (or cross-country comparison). More precisely we rewrite (1.7.3) and (1.7.4)
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using the tax code (τ˜c, τ˜
B
h , τ˜
E
h , τ˜
B
m , τ˜
E
m , τ˜
B
l , τ˜
E
l ) suggested in Proposition 9. Thus, we
introduce the following definition.
Definition 1. Let (B˜∗1 , E˜
∗
1) be the debt and equity holding when the capital tax code
is given by (τ˜c, τ˜
B
h , τ˜
E
h , τ˜
B
m , τ˜
E
m , τ˜
B
l , τ˜
E
l ).
Classical capital structure literature often predicts the positive correlation be-
tween the leverage ratio and the corporate tax rates, namely,
dB˜∗1
dτ˜c
> 0. (1.7.5)
In particular, the leverage ratio decreases if the corporate tax rate decreases because
the use of debt becomes less advantageous. Surprisingly, however, our paper predict
that the leverage ratio is independent of the change in corporate tax rates. The
change of the corporate tax need not affect the firm’s leverage ratio in the optimal
tax framework.
Proposition 10. Assume there is no period-by-period resource transfer and (αh, αm, αl)
are fixed. Let the current tax system be given by (τ˜c, τ˜
B
h , τ˜
E
h , τ˜
B
m , τ˜
E
m , τ˜
B
l , τ˜
E
l ) and τ˜c
is sufficiently higher than the minimal level τc defined by (1.7.1). Let the debt and
equity holding be given by (B˜∗1 , E˜
∗
1) corresponding to the current tax system. If there
no change in (τ˜Bh , τ˜
B
m , τ˜
B
l , τ˜
E
l ), then
dB˜∗1
dτ˜c
=
dE˜∗1
dτ˜c
= 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
Notice that from Proposition 9, if τ˜c changes, then τ˜
E
h and τ˜
E
h do change as well.
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However, the other tax rates, (τ˜Bh , τ˜
B
m , τ˜
B
l , τ˜
E
l ), do not necessarily change. If these
tax rates are constant, then the leverage ratio is unchanged although the corporate
tax rate is changing. Therefore, Proposition 10 tells that the changes in the other
individual tax rates are much more important rather than that of the corporate tax
rates when we examine the impact of tax reforms on the leverage ratio. Notice that
the aggregate leverage ratio in U.S. is around 0.4, which has been quite stationary
during the last 5-60 years (See Frank and Goyal (2010)). Notice that the results
in this section is only a comparative static analysis and this theory is normative,
not positive. Therefore, a right interpretation about Proposition 9 is that the past
U.S. tax reforms might not be unreasonable in the long run in terms of corporate
income taxes.
1.7.5 Non-zero Aggregate Capital Taxes
In the classical Ramsey models, the optimal capital tax rates should be zero if the
agents have constant relative risk aversion utility function or should converge to zero
as time goes by if they have general utility functions. It is still true in Kocherlakota
(2005) that the aggregate capital income taxes are zero (therefore capital income
taxes are purely redistributed) although individual capital taxes are never zero. In
this paper, even the aggregate capital taxes are never zero since the corporate tax
exists.
Proposition 11. Suppose the capital income tax code is given by (1.5.12). In period
0, the aggregate (expected) optimal capital tax of period 1 is negative.
Proof. See the appendix.
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In the proof of Proposition 11, the aggregate total capital income tax of period
1 is given by
r(pihτ˜
B
h + pimτ˜
B
m + pilτ˜
B
l︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
)B∗1
+ r(1− {pil(1− τ˜c) + pim(1− τ˜c)(1− τ˜Em) + pim(1− τ˜c)(1− τ˜Eh )}︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
)E∗1 . (1.7.6)
Component (a) of equation (1.7.6) is negative and component (b) of equation (1.7.6)
is 0. This means that the capital taxes from equity are purely redistributive while
the capital taxes from debt are not.
1.8 Practical Discussion on the Tax Scheme
1.8.1 On the Corporate Income Tax History in U.S.
The modern form of the corporate income tax in U.S. was introduced by the Rev-
enue Act 1909.21 Since the individual income tax was revived in 1913, a separate
corporate tax has remained until now. It is widely accepted that the first inception
of the corporate income tax was mainly for increasing the tax revenue. However,
the government and the IRS were certainly aware of individual incentives to avoid
taxes. They have continuously amended the tax law in this dimension.
One of notable evidence is the Revenue Act 1936 which introduced a surtax on
the undistributed profits of a firm. According to Lent (1948), this additional tax was
21The federal corporate income tax was first introduced in 1894 but found unconstitutional the
following year.
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designed to remove the inequality in corporate taxes on the shares of stockholders
who could afford to escape high surtaxes by withholding distribution of earnings.
The idea of withholding distribution of earnings is quite similar to the tax timing
option in the paper. Although the act itself was repealed several years later, the
notion of removing inequality due to withholding distribution was probably incor-
porated in the next tax reforms again and again. The Internal Revenue Report
(2002) concretely stated that from almost the beginning of the corporate income
tax, there have been restrictions or additional taxes on excessive accumulations of
undistributed corporate profits and special rules and rates for individuals who in-
corporate to avoid taxes. Therefore, we believe that the tax scheme in this paper
is not far away from the real world tax scheme in sprit.
1.8.2 On the Assumption
Whether the government can tax unrealized capital income depends on how well
it can monitor asset transactions among shareholders. Corporate taxation, in fact,
is never required if the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) can easily keep track of all
shareholders of a corporation. The constrained optimum can be implemented simply
by using an individual capital/labor income tax code (as in Kocherlakota (2005) or
Albanesi and Sleet (2006)) without using the additional tax instrument such of the
corporate tax. A real example is the existence of C corporations and S corporations
in the US tax code: C corporations can have an unlimited number of shareholders,
while S corporations are restricted to no more than 100 shareholders. C corporations
can have non-US residents as shareholders, but S corporations cannot.22 Because S
22Other differences are as follows: S corporations cannot be owned by C corporations, other
S corporations, LLCs, partnerships, or many trusts. C corporations are not subject to these
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corporations have simple ownership structures which can be easily accessed by the
tax authority, they are not required to face taxes at the corporate level. On the
other hand, the owners of a C corporation are changing every second in the stock
market, including foreign investors who are out of the control of the IRS. Therefore,
there is a role for corporate taxes on C corporations.
1.8.3 On the Data
It is notable that effective corporate tax rates in U.S. have decreased constantly
and significantly from over 50% in the 1940-50s to around 25% in the 2000s (Fried-
man, 2004).23 According to the standard capital structure theory, the leverage ratio
should have significantly decreased as well. However, a stylized empirical fact on
capital structure is that the aggregate market-based leverage ratio24 is fairly sta-
tionary during the last century with surprisingly small fluctuations (See Frank and
Goyal (2007)). Our theory is not inconsistent with two time series data. However,
again, this theory is normative, so we do not want to compare between our result
and the result from positive theories. We hope that this kind of a general equi-
librium approach will shed lights on solving the anomaly between two time series
data.
same restrictions. S corporations can have only one class of stock (disregarding voting rights). C
corporations can have multiple classes of stock.
23The effective tax rate is the corporate tax receipts as a percent of corporate profits.
24The market-based leverage ratio is defined by debt/(debt + market value of equity).
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1.9 Other Generalization
1.9.1 More than Three Periods
The model also can be extended to a multi-period model even incorporating many
types of agents suggested in the previous section. Although the analysis might not
be very tractable, the idea is simply preserved. The crucial thing is to how to take
the corporate tax in each period.
Suppose we already characterize the constrained optimal allocation in a multi-
period setting although we do not specify it here. Recall that the corporate tax
is designed to remove the tax timing option of the lowest skill agents in the three
period model. The lowest skill agent is the one who should pay the maximum
capital income taxes in the standard Mirrlees model. Then, we should remove the
tax timing option of the agent who faces the largest capital income tax in each
period. That is, the corporate income tax, τ ∗t+1,c, in period t+1 (contingent on t+1
history) is set to be
1− τ ∗t+1,c = inf
u′(c∗t )
βru′(c∗t+1)
,
given c∗t is the socially optimal allocation in period t and β is the discount factor.
Then, the other individual capital taxes should be adjusted according to τ ∗t+1,c.
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1.9.2 Aggregate Uncertainty: Production Shock
Suppose that the production function in period 2 is given by f(k, y) = r˜k + wy,
where r˜ is a random variable independent of θ,
r˜ =
 r1, with probability pr2, with probability 1− p
with r1 < r < r2. Note that r˜ = r in period 0 and 2. Let c
∗
i (r˜), i = l, h denote
the optimal consumption under the aggregate shock. Then, the optimal allocation
should satisfies the inverse Euler equation with λ(ri) > 0, i = 1, 2:
λ(ri)u
′(c∗0) =
1
E
[
1
u′(c∗1 (r˜))
| r˜ = ri
] = 1pi
u′(c∗h(ri))
+ 1−pi
u′(c∗l (ri))
i = 1, 2
pλ(r1)r1 + (1− p)λ(r2)r2 = 1.
Now the corporation raises funds by equities and debts. Let R1 and R(r˜) be the
period 1 return on one unit of debt and equity in period 0. Then, their relation is
given by
R(r˜) =
r˜(B1 + E1)−R1B1
E1
. (1.9.1)
Then, each period budget constraint is rewritten as follows. In period 0,
c0 = k0 − (B1 + E1) + wy0 with B1 + E1 = k∗1 (1.9.2)
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In period 1,
ch(r˜) = (1− τh(r˜))R1B1 + max
realize, not
{(1− τh(r˜))(1− τc(r˜)), 1− τc(r˜)}R(r˜)E1
− k2h(r˜) + wyh + αh(r˜), (1.9.3)
cl(r˜) = (1− τl(r˜))R1B1 + max
realize, not
{(1− τc(r˜))(1− τl(r˜)), 1− τc(r˜)}R(r˜)E1
− k2l(r˜) + αl(r˜), (1.9.4)
where each variable is contingent on r˜. The optimal tax system shows the state-
contingency: {τc(r˜), τBh (r˜), τEh (r˜), τBl (r˜)τEl (r˜)} with r˜ = r1, r2 satisfying
R(r˜)(1− τc(r˜))u′(c∗l (r˜)) = λ(r˜)r˜u′(c∗0)
R(r˜)(1− τc(r˜))(1− τEh (r˜))u′(c∗h(r˜)) = λ(r˜)r˜u′(c∗0)
piR1(1− τBh (r˜))u′(c∗h(r˜)) + (1− pi)R1(1− τBl (r˜))u′(c∗l (r˜)) = λ(r˜)r˜u′(c∗0)
(1.9.5)
In sum, there are two equations from (1.9.1), 4 equations from (1.9.3) and (1.9.4) ,
and the following three equations:
pik2h(r˜) + (1− pi)k2l(r˜) = K∗2 , (r˜ = r1, r2)
B1 + E1 = K
∗
1
Then, we can get 9 unknowns: R1, (B1, E1) and (k2h(r˜), k2l(r˜))r˜=r1,r2 , {R(r˜)}r˜=r1,r2 .
It is not hard to see that there is an interior solution of (B1, E1). Therefore, the
aggregate shock affects the capital structure in the quantitative sense.
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1.10 Literature Review
Capital Structure Theory The literature on capital structure is too large to
summarize. Roughly speaking there are two widely held views. One is the trade-off
theory and the other is the pecking order theory. The main driving force determining
the use of debt in the trade-off theory is the trade-off between tax benefits and
bankruptcy costs. In the pecking order theory, information asymmetry provides
a strict order of financing: due to adverse selection, internal funds are used first,
debt is issued if internal funds are depleted, and equity is a last resort if it is not
sensible to issue more debt. Each theory can explain many features of corporate
financing. As mentioned before, however, neither of them are satisfactory in terms
of the stylized empirical long run stability of the leverage ratio and the downward
trend in the corporate tax rates.25
Notice that it is not an entirely new view to explain the capital structure in
the general equilibrium context, in particular, using the difference between individ-
ual and corporate taxes. Miller (1977) first proposed the idea that the aggregate
leverage ratio results from different individual tax rates among investors given the
corporate taxes. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Auerbach and King (1983) for-
malize more micro-founded models. They, in addition, find that individual short-
25The pecking order theory is empirically rejected since firms often issue equities in wrong
times. The two most common critiques on the standard trade-off theory are that (i) measured
bankruptcy costs are too small, and moreover (ii) firms use too little debt. Dynamic versions of
the trade-off theory seem to successfully explain that the observed levels of debt are not surprising
(See Fischer et al. (1989), Hennessy and Whited (2005), Goldstein et al (2001), etc). In this
sense, the recent dynamic trade-off theory becomes more compelling although any judgement on
the results is still tentative. However, the amount of bankruptcy costs is still questionable and
the long-term stability of the leverage ratio is another concern. See Frank and Goyal (2007) for
excellent empirical surveys.
57
sale constraints are necessary for the existence of the equilibrium.26 The Miller
equilibrium, however, should be quite sensitive to the relative ratio of the corpo-
rate to the highest individual tax rates.27 The investors are separated into two
groups: Those agents whose individual tax rate is greater than the corporate tax
rate should be specialized in equities and the others in debts.28 Therefore, a change
in corporate taxes, ceteris paribus, should directly affect the leverage ratios. This is
also counterfactual to the stability of the leverage ratio given the very large changes
in corporate tax rates during the last century.29 Furthermore, the agents are not
completely separated in either equity or debt in this paper.
New Dynamic Public Taxation One notable progress in recent taxation theory
is called the new dynamic public finance, which developed the optimal tax system
by extending the seminal work of Mirrlees (1971) to a dynamic setting. The main
assumption in this literature is that agents in the economy have private information
about their skills, which evolve stochastically over time. They consider the capital
income taxes as a key device to implement the second best allocation. Our paper
follows this spirit and builds on Kocherlakota (2005).
Other papers closely related to this one are Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) and
Albanesi (2006). Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) study asset testing mechanisms
26The short-shale constraints are not necessary in our model.
27On the other hand, Graham (2003) and McDonald (2006) point out that the Miller equilibrium
in the 1970’s was plausible, when the highest personal tax rates exceeded the highest corporate
rates, but, in the 1980’s, the relative tax rates for corporations increased, making the Miller
equilibrium implausible.
28Miller (1977), DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), and Auerbach and King (1983) all predict that
high income people (with high tax bracket) hold equity whereas low income people (with low tax
bracket) hold debt.
29Even before these models appeared, Stiglitz (1973) stated ”Empirical studies of the effects of
taxation on corporate financial structure suggest that taxation has not had a very significant effect
on corporate financial structure, let alone the dramatic change that one might have anticipated
given the very large increases in the corporate tax rates in the last fifty years.”
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in the disability insurance system in which a disability transfer is paid only if an
agent has assets below a specified threshold.30 An asset test deters false claims by
penalizing the strategy of oversaving and not working. This idea can be applied
the mechanism where the high type agent should be prevented from oversaving
in order to avoid work. However, in our model oversaving is not the essential
problem. Whether the agent deviates does not directly hinge on the the amount
of agent’s current wealth, but on the fact that he has chance to be a high type
worker in the future. Albanesi (2006) considers the dynamic moral hazard problem
of entrepreneurs facing idiosyncratic capital risk. She investigates differential asset
taxation to implement the optimal allocation. She also shows that the double
taxation is optimal if entrepreneurs sell the ownership of their firms and buy the
ownership of other firms. The corporate tax in Albanesi (2006) is levied only on
outside investors, but not on the entrepreneur who also has the ownership. The
corporate tax, however, is the tax imposed on the earnings of each firm. To our
knowledge, our model is the closest one that explains the real world double taxation
mechanism. More importantly, the capital structure and optimal tax system are
endogenously determined in our paper.
1.11 Conclusion
We clarify the role the corporate tax in order to achieve the constrained optimal
allocation under the Mirrleesian taxation framework with an additional realistic
assumption. In addition, the existence of the corporate tax requires the individ-
30The disability shock in Golosov and Tsyvinski is an absorbing state; once the agent declares
disability, he/she can never come back to work.
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ual taxation properly adjusted. This sophisticated tax system affects an individual
agent’s portfolio holdings of debt and equity, in turn, it determines the aggregate
leverage ratio. Along this line, this paper investigates the endogenous character-
istics between the optimal tax system and the capital structure. The optimal tax
mechanism in this paper is designed to prevent the agents from using tax timing
options. Understanding the capital structure in optimal taxation framework may
seem somewhat unusual because taxation is often regarded as a normative the-
ory. However, we hope this approach can potentially shed on light in designing a
workhorse model in understanding capital structure issues better.
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Appendices
1.A Appendix for Section 1.3
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Recall the inverse Euler equation.
r
u′(c∗0)
=
pi
u′(c∗h)
+
1− pi
u′(c∗l )
.
Then, by the Jensen inequality we have
u′(c∗0) < rpiu
′(c∗h) + r(1− pi)u′(c∗l ) < rpiu′(c∗l ) + r(1− pi)u′(c∗l ) = ru′(c∗l ),
which completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. From the inverse Euler equation, we have
u′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗h)
=
1
pi
− (1− pi)u
′(c∗0)
piru′(c∗l )
>
1
pi
− (1− pi)
pi
= 1,
where the inequality follows by Lemma 1.
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1.B Appendix for Section 1.4
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. In fact, this proposition can be regarded as a special case of the general
theorem shown in Kocherlakota (2005). Hence, Readers who are interested in the
general set-up and its proof should refer Kocherlakota (2005). Under the tax system
(1.4.4) and (1.4.5) we rewrite the agent’s budget constraint as following:

cl = c
∗
l + r(1− τl)(k1 − k∗1)
ch = c
∗
h + r(1− τh)(k1 − k∗1) + w(yh − y∗h)
chh = c
∗
hh + r(1− τhh)(k2h − k∗2h) + w(yhh − y∗hh)
chl = c
∗
hl + r(1− τhl)(k2h − k∗2h)
clh = c
∗
lh + r(1− τlh)(k2l − k∗2l) + w(ylh − y∗lh)
cll = c
∗
ll + r(1− τll)(k2l − k∗2l)
Then, the first order conditions are given by

u′(c0) = pir(1− τh)u′(ch) + (1− pi)r(1− τl)u′(cl),
u′(ch) = pir(1− τhh)u′(chh) + (1− pi)r(1− τhl)u′(chl),
u′(cl) = pir(1− τlh)u′(ch) + (1− pi)r(1− τll)u′(cll),
wu′(c0) = v′(y0), wu′(ch) = v′(yh), wu′(chh) = v′(yhh), wu′(clh) = v′(ylh)
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
c0 + k1 = wy1 + k0
pich + (1− pi)cl + pik2h + (1− pi)k2l = rk1 + wpiyh
pi2chh + pi(1− pi)chl + pi(1− pi)clh + (1− pi)2cll
= r (pik2h + (1− pi)k2l) + w (pi2yhh + pi(1− pi)ylh)
Then, it is not hard to see that the solution to the above system coincides with the
constrained optimal solution. In fact, we need to check whether the individual agent
will optimally choose the corresponding planner’s allocation in each of following
cases: (i) yh > 0, yhh > 0, (ii) yh = 0, yhh > 0, (iii) yh > 0, yhh = 0, (iv) yh = 0,
yhh = 0. Since the agent’ derived utility is strict concave with respect to (y, k),
each pair of allocation (c, k, y) corresponding to all cases from (i) to (iv) is the
unique solution coinciding with the socially optimal allocation by using the above
first order conditions. We omit the tedious algebra.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Notice the following 3 equations for the first equality of (a):
r(1− τh)u′(c∗h) = u′(c∗0), r(1− τl)u′(c∗l ) = u′(c∗0), u′(c∗0) =
r
pi
u′(c∗h)
+ 1−pi
u′(c∗l )
.
Then,
piτh + (1− pi)τl = pi
(
1− u
′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗h)
)
+ (1− pi)
(
1− u
′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗l )
)
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= 1− u
′(c∗0)
r
(
pi
u′(c∗h)
+
1− pi
u′(c∗l )
)
= 0.
Then, since c∗h > c
∗
l , we have the second property of (a). The proof for (b) is similar.
For the proof of footnote 18, if there is no intertemporal transfer of resources
through the government, we have piαh + (1− pi)αl = r(piτkh + (1− pi)τkl)k1 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Before we start the proof of Proposition 3, there are two comments for easier un-
derstanding. First, the proof focuses only on the behavior of the low skill agents in
period 1. The high skill agents already do not have incentives to deviate under the
the second best world tax scheme. Second, although in the second best world we
only investigated the case where there is no intertemporal transfer of resources, one
should notice that, in general, the labor taxation is indeterminate. More precisely,
(k∗2h, k
∗
2l) in the tax system (1.4.4) can be assigned arbitrarily as long as the sum of
optimal capital accumulation of all the agents is equal to the capital investment of
the constrained optimum, in other words, as long as pik∗2h + (1− pi)k∗2l = K∗2 is sat-
isfied. Therefore, the agent’s investment (or saving) strategy depends on how much
labor taxes will be assigned in period 1, in particular, how big (αh, αl) in (1.4.4)
are. Due to this indeterminacy the proof of proposition 3 is divided into 2 cases.
Therefore, the proof is valid regardless of whether the government period-by-period
transfers resources.
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Proof. Consider an agent who exclusively owns a firm in period 0 become a low skill
agent in period 1. If she gets the capital income rk∗1, consume c
∗
l , and invest k
∗
2l as
in Section 1.4.2, her remaining expected utility X at period 1 is
X := u(c∗l ) + piu(c
∗
lh)− piv(y∗lh) + (1− pi)u(c∗ll). (1.B.1)
Now we investigate the two cases. In each case, we suggest a strategy to deviate
from the socially optimal allocation and show that the this allocation gives the low
skill agent better off, which completes the proof.
First suppose
k∗2l ≥ r(1− τl)k∗1,
which means that the low skill agent get enough labor subsidy. Consider the strategy
that the firm does not distribute the capital rent rk∗1 and she additionally invest k
′
1
into her firm. In this case her consumption in period 1 is αl− k′1 since she does not
pay the capital tax and gets the subsidy αl. Then, her remaining expected utility
Y is now
Y := u(αl − k′1) + piu[r(1− τlh)(rk∗1 + k′1) + wylh + αlh]− piv(y∗lh)
+ (1− pi)u[r(1− τll)(rk∗1 + k′1) + αll]
= u(c∗l + k
∗
2l − r(1− τl)k∗1 − k′1) + piu
(
c∗lh +
c∗lh
c∗l
(rk∗1 + k
′
1 − k∗2l)
)
− piv(y∗lh)
+ (1− pi)u
(
c∗ll +
c∗ll
c∗l
(rk∗1 + k
′
1 − k∗2l)
)
(1.B.2)
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In this case, we have X < Y as long as we can pick any k′1 satisfying
k∗2l − r(1− τl)k∗1 ≥ k′1 ≥ k∗2l − rk∗1.
This is possible since τl > 0 and k
∗
2l ≥ r(1− τl)k∗1. Note that k′1 = 0 can be allowed.
Secondly, suppose
r(1− τl)k∗1 > k∗2l,
which means that the labor subsidy is not enough, so the agent cannot afford to
invest more. Consider the strategy that the firm distributes only rk˜1 < rk
∗
1 amount
of capital rent to the owner (the disable agent). In this case, she pays rτlk˜1 as a
capital income tax and has αl+r(1−τl)k˜1 as net consumption in period 1. The rest
of capital rent (rk∗l − rk˜) is just remained (therefore reinvested) in the firm without
being taxed. Then, her remaining expected utility Y is
Y := u(αl + r(1− τl)k˜1) + piu[r(1− τlh)(rk∗1 − rk˜1) + wylh + αlh]− piv(y∗lh)
+ (1− pi)u[r(1− τll)(rk∗1 − rk˜1) + αll]
= u(c∗l + k
∗
2l − r(1− τl)(k∗1 − k˜1)) + piu
(
c∗lh +
c∗lh
c∗l
(rk∗1 − rk˜1 − k∗2l)
)
− piv(y∗lh)
+ (1− pi)u
(
c∗ll +
c∗ll
c∗l
(rk∗1 − rk˜1 − k∗2l)
)
(1.B.3)
We compare (1.B.1) with (1.B.3). Notice that r(1− τl)k∗1 − k∗2l < rk∗1 − k∗2l. Then,
if we take k˜1 > 0 such that
r(1− τl)k˜1 ≈ r(1− τl)k∗1 − k∗2l,
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then Y −X > 0. This completes the proof.
1.C Appendix for Section 1.5
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. By simple algebra, showing 0 < τ ∗c and τ
E
h < τh is equivalent to showing
u′(c∗0) < ru
′(c∗l ),
which is result of Lemma 1. On the other hand, from (1.5.15) and (1.5.19), τ ∗c < τ
B
l
is equivalent to τBh < 1− u
′(c∗0 )
ru′(c∗h)
, which is exactly (1.5.18).
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Only the period 1 tax codes are different between the second and the third
best world. The period 2 tax codes are the same. The optimal choice of the
agent between period 1 and 2 is same as the constrained optimal allocation, i.e.,
the agent’s consumption in t = 2 and investment in t = 1 are the same as the
constrained optimal allocation (This is simply the result of Proposition 1. Readers
can refer Kocherlakota (2005) for more general proof). Therefore, we focus on the
allocation between t = 0 and t = 1 given that
(k2h, k2l, chh, chl, cll, clh, yhh, ylh) = (k
∗
2h, k
∗
2l, c
∗
hh, c
∗
hl, c
∗
ll, c
∗
lh, y
∗
hh, y
∗
lh) (1.C.1)
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Without loss of generality we also assume that there is no period-by-period transfer
of resources. The result can be easily generalized for the case of resource transfer
although the individual investment {k1(= B1 + E1), k2hk21} will be different from
the constrained optimal allocation for this case.
First, consider the individual agent’s problem. Notice that after choosing be-
tween realizing and not-realizing their capital income, the budget constraints of the
agent are
c0 = rk0 + wy0 − (B1 + E1)
ch = r(1− τBh )B1 + (1− τ ∗c )(1− τEh )rE1 − k2h + wyh + αh, if yh > 0
ch = r(1− τBl )B1 + (1− τ ∗c )rE1 − k2lαl, if yh = 0
cl = r(1− τBl )B1 + (1− τ ∗c )rE1 − k2l + αl.
We only need to consider two strategies of a high skill agent since a low skill agent
cannot tell a lie. Suppose the agent works if she becomes a high skill agent in period
1. Substituting (ch, cl) into the objective function, we get the first order conditions
with respect to B1 and E1 as follows.
u′(c0) = pir(1− τBh )u′(ch) + (1− pi)r(1− τBl )u′(cl)
u′(c0) = pir(1− τEh )(1− τ ∗c )u′(ch) + (1− pi)r(1− τ ∗c )u′(cl)
v′(y0) = wu′(c0), v′(yh) = wu′(ch)
c0 = rk0 + wy0 − (B1 + E1)
ch = r(1− τBh )B1 + (1− τ ∗c )(1− τEh )rE1 − k2h + wyh + αh
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cl = r(1− τBl )B1 + (1− τ ∗c )rE1 − k2l + αl.
Notice the objective function is strictly concave. Given (1.C.1), (c0, cl, ch, yh) =
(c∗0, c
∗
l , c
∗
h, y
∗
h) is satisfied since the above first order conditions are the same as those
first order conditions for the constrained optimal allocation in (1.3.4), (1.3.5), and
(1.3.6) in Section 1.4.2.
The similar argument also applies for y = 0. Suppose a high skill agent does
not work in t = 1, i.e. yh = 0. Then, the under the given tax system, he will choose
100 % equity investment sincy τ ∗c < τ
B
l . The first order conditions in this case are
u′(c0) = r(1− τ ∗c )u′(ch) = r(1− τ ∗c )u′(cl)
v′(y0) = wu′(c0),
c0 = rk0 + wy0 − E1
ch = cl = (1− τ ∗c )rE1 − k2l + αl.
Given (1.C.1), setting (c0, ch, cl, y0, B1, E1) equal to (c
∗
0, c
∗
l , c
∗
l , y
∗
0, 0, k
∗
1) satisfies the
above first-order conditions by comparing these with (1.3.4), (1.3.5), and (1.3.6).
Hence, the agent is indifferent between working yh > 0 in period 1 (when becoming
high skilled) and not working in period 1.
Second, we consider the firm’s problem. Again we only focus on the firm’s
decision for period 0 capital structure to install capital and period 1 labor employ-
ment, assuming period 1 investment and period 2 labor employment optimally take
place. In fact, in period 1, the market becomes the classical second best world,
that is the Modigliani-Miller theorem world. Thus, we can, without loss of gener-
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ality, assume that the firm only the spot market to rent capital in period 1 as in
classical macroeconomic models. Define f by any general constant-returns-to-scale
production function (Thus, this proof is for general CRS production functions).
Let (rb, re) denotes by the return on equity and debt and w
′ denotes by the price
of labor. Here we first show that rb = re in equilibrium. Given the next period
investment plan K2, the firm’s problem is to raise debt B1 and equity E1 to install
capital K1 in period 0 and rent labor Y1 in period 1 to maximize
reE1 := max
(K1,B1,Y1)
(1− τ ∗c )E[f(K1, Y1)− w′Y1 − rbB1]
subject to B1 + E1 ≥ K1
Notice that K2 = K
∗
2 and this does not affect the value of equity in period 0. Then,
putting B1 + E1 = K1, we write the expectation operator in detail as follows.
reE1 = max
B1,Y1
(1− τ ∗c ){pi(1− τEh ) + (1− pi)}[f(E1 +B1, Y1)− w′Y1 − rbB1]
= max
B1,Y1
f(E1 +B1, Y1)− w′Y1 − rbB1.
since the tax code satisfies
pi(1− τEh )(1− τ ∗c ) + (1− pi)(1− τ ∗c ) =
piu′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗h)
+
(1− pi)u′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗l )
= 1. (1.C.2)
by the inverse Euler equation. Suppose there is an interior solution B1 ∈ (0, K∗1).
First order conditions with market clearing provide
rb = f1(K
∗
1 , Y
∗
1 ) and w
′ = f2(K∗1 , Y
∗
1 )
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Since f is CRS, we also obtain re = rb = f1(K
∗
1 , Y
∗
1 ). (This also justifies why
we have used re = rb = r in the main context without special comment when
f(k, y) = rk+wk. It is also clear to have w′ = w for this case.) On the other hand,
no arbitrage argument also can be applied: If re > rb, then an agent will buy a
stock using a money from selling a bond with interest rate r′ ∈ (rb, re), which gives
arbitrage. If rb > re, then one will establish his own firm with no debt financing to
get r return, instead of investing into a firm with return re.
Now consider equation (1.C.2). This is the expected effective after tax net return
on equity, which is one. Thus, in aggregation, the representative shareholder does
not pay the corporate tax. Since there is no bankruptcy, the firm is indifferent
to choosing between debt and equity. In addition, the firm value is indifferent to
capital structure. More precisely, suppose that there is an general equilibrium that
the firm has a particular value of debt and equity (Bc1, E
c
1). Then, we have
rEc1 = f(K
∗
1 , Y
∗
1 )− w′Y ∗1 − rBc1.
or
Ec1 +B
c
1 =
f(K∗1 , Y
∗
1 )− w′Y ∗1
r
.
Thus, the firm value depends on the aggregate variable, which is determined by
the market supply of capital and labor. The idea is quite similar to Stiglitz (1969).
This completes the proof.
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1.D Appendix for Section 1.6
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Given the tax system, we already know that the constrained optimal solution
of consumption and labor vectors (c∗, y∗) coincide with the solution to the competi-
tive equilibrium. Now, (k∗2h, k
∗
2l, B
∗
1 , E
∗
1) are obtained by solving the following system
of equations:

pi (1− pi) 0 0
0 1 −r(1− τBl ) −r(1− τ ∗c )
1 0 −r(1− τBh ) −r(1− τEh )(1− τ ∗c )
0 0 1 1


k2h
k2l
B1
E1

=

kˆ2
αl − c∗l
αh − c∗h + wy∗h
k∗1

(1.D.1)
Solving the above matrix equation (1.D.1), we have (1.6.1) and (1.6.2).
Sign of Denominators of (1.6.1) and (1.6.1)
The following lemma is useful to figure out the sign of aggregate debt and equity
holding in Proposition 5.
Lemma 5. Let D2 = −(piτEh τ ∗c + piτBh − piτEh + τ ∗c − (1 − pi)τBl ). Then, we have
D2 > 0.
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Proof.
D2 = pi[(1− piBh )− (1− τEh )(1− τ ∗c )] + (1− pi)[(1− τBl )− (1− τ ∗c )]
= pi(1− τBh )−
piu′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗h)
+
u′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗l )
− pi(1− τBh )
u′(c∗h)
u′(c∗l )
− (1− pi)u
′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗l )
= pi(1− τBh )
(
1− u
′(c∗h)
u′(c∗l )
)
− 1 + u
′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗l )
,
>
piu′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗h)
(
1− u
′(c∗h)
u′(c∗l )
)
+
u′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗l )
− 1 = piu
′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗h)
+
(1− pi)u′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗l )
− 1 = 0.
where the first inequality is a rewriting of D2, the second equality is by using
(1.5.12), the third and the last equality are by the inverse Euler equation, and the
third inequality is by (1.5.17).
The Proof of Corollary 4
Proof. Given (αh, αl), the aggregate transfer of labor income subsidy is given by
X(αh, αl) = piαh + (1− pi)αl = r(piτ ∗h + (1− pi)τ ∗l )kˆ1b + r(piτ ∗h + τ ∗c )kˆ1e.
Since there is no governmental transfer, kˆ1 = k
∗
1. Plugging the above equation and
kˆ1 = k
∗
1 into (1.6.1) and (1.6.2), we have the required result.
77
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. If αl goes up by ², then αh should be decreased by
(1−pi)u′(c∗l )
piu′(c∗h)
² from (1.5.13).
Therefore, the change in X(αh, αl) is
∆X(αh, αl) = pi
(
−(1− pi)u
′(c∗l )
piu′(c∗h)
²
)
+ (1− pi)²
= ²(1− pi)u
′(c∗h)− u′(c∗l )
u′(c∗h)
< 0.
In this case, (1.6.1) and (1.6.2) tell that change in debt will be positive and the
change in equity is negative, which shows that the leverage ratio goes up. On the
other hand, if αl goes down, then the opposite implication holds, which means the
leverage ratio goes down. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Using (1.5.14), we can rewrite (1.5.13) as
pi[u′(c∗h)αh + piu(c
∗
hh)αhh + (1− pi)u(c∗hl)αhl]
+ (1− pi)[u′(c∗l )αh + piu(c∗lh)αlh + (1− pi)u(c∗ll)αll] = D1,
where D1 is some constant consisting of optimal values (c
∗, y∗) independent of α’s.
Then, plugging this into (1.6.5) and rearranging the equation to get
X(α) = pi
(
1
u′(c∗h)
− 1
u′(c∗l )
)
[u′(c∗h)αh + piu(c
∗
hh)αhh + (1− pi)u(c∗hl)αhl] +D2,
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for some constant D2 consisting of optimal values (c
∗, y∗) independent of α’s. Notice
that c∗h > c
∗
l . Then, X(α) has the same sign with the expected present value of
labor subsidies conditional on being the high type, A,
A := u′(c∗h)αh + piu(c
∗
hh)αhh + (1− pi)u(c∗hl)αhl.
This shows that
∂k∗1b
∂A
< 0 and
∂k∗1e
∂A
> 0 since pi >
τ∗l −τ∗c
τ∗l
. This completes the proof.
1.E Appendix for Section 1.7
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. First two inequalities result from c∗l < c
∗
m < c
∗
h. Showing the third inequality
is equivalent to showing
u′(c∗0) < ru
′(c∗l ). (1.E.1)
Recall the inverse Euler equation.
r
u′(c∗0)
=
pih
u′(c∗h)
+
pim
u′(c∗m)
+
pil
u′(c∗l )
.
Then, inequality (1.E.1) comes from the Jensen’s inequality:
u′(c∗0) < rpihu
′(c∗h) + rpiu
′(c∗m) + pilu
′(c∗l )
< rpilu
′(c∗l ) + pimu
′(c∗l ) + rpilu
′(c∗l ) = ru
′(c∗l ).
This completes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. The proof is basically the extension of the proof of Proposition 5. Given the
tax system, we already know that the constrained optimal solution of consumption
and labor vectors (c∗, y∗) coincide with the solution to the competitive equilibrium.
Now, (k∗2h, k
∗
2l, B
∗
1 , E
∗
1) are obtained by solving the following system of equations:

pih pim pil 0 0
0 0 1 −r(1− τBl ) −r(1− τc)
0 1 0 −r(1− τBm) −r(1− τEm)(1− τc)
1 0 0 −r(1− τBh ) −r(1− τEh )(1− τc)
0 0 0 1 1


k2h
k2m
k2l
B1
E1

=

kˆ2
αl − c∗l + wy∗l
αm − c∗m + wy∗m
αh − c∗h + wy∗h
K∗1

(1.E.2)
Solving the above matrix equation (1.E.2), we have (1.7.3) and (1.7.4).
Sign of Denominators of (1.7.3) and (1.7.4) in Proposition 8
The following lemma is useful to characterize the sign of aggregate debt and equity
holding. This lemma is also used later.
Lemma 6. We have D3 > 0.
Proof.
D3 = pih[(1− τBh )− (1− τEh )(1− τc)] + pim[(1− τBm)− (1− τEm)(1− τc)]
+ pil[(1− τBl )− (1− τc)]
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= pih(1− τBh )−
pihu
′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗h)
+ pim(1− τBm)−
pimu
′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗m)
+
u′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗l )
− pih(1− τBh )
u′(c∗h)
u′(c∗l )
− pim(1− τBm)
u′(c∗m)
u′(c∗l )
− pilu
′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗l )
= pih(1− τBh )
(
1− u
′(c∗h)
u′(c∗l )
)
+ pim(1− τBm)
(
1− u
′(c∗m)
u′(c∗l )
)
+
u′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗l )
− 1,
>
pihu
′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗h)
(
1− u
′(c∗h)
u′(c∗l )
)
+
pimu
′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗m)
(
1− u
′(c∗h)
u′(c∗l )
)
+
u′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗l )
− 1
=
pihu
′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗h)
+
pimu
′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗m)
+
pilu
′(c∗0)
ru′(c∗l )
− 1 = 0.
where the second equality is by using (1.7.1), the third and the last equality are by
the inverse Euler equation, and the third inequality is by (1.7.1).
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. We will find (δh, δm, δl) explicitly. The first order conditions in the individual
agent problem under the tax system (τ˜c, τ˜
B
h , τ˜
E
h , τ˜
B
m , τ˜
E
m , τ˜
B
l , τ˜
E
l ) are given by
u′(c0) = pilr[1− (τc + ²)]u′(cl) + pimr[1− (τc + ²)][1− (τEm − δm)]u′(cm)
+ pihr[1− (τc + ²)][1− (τEh − δh)]u′(ch) (1.E.3)
u′(c0) = pilr[1− τ˜Bl )]u′(cl) + pimr[1− τ˜Bm ]u′(cm) + pihr[1− τ˜Bh ]u′(ch) (1.E.4)
In order to make the firm indifferent to issuing between debt and equity, we have
the following condition
pil(1− τ˜c) + pim(1− τ˜c)(1− τ˜Em) + pim(1− τ˜c)(1− τ˜Eh ) = 1. (1.E.5)
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for any optimal tax system. In this case,
pil[1− (τc+ ²)]+pim[1− (τc+ ²)][1− (τEm − δm)]+pih[1− (τc+ ²)][1− (τEh − δm)] = 1.
Let us define (1.E.3∗) and (1.E.4∗) by resulting equations after putting the optimal
solution (c∗l , c
∗
m, c
∗
h) into (1.E.3) and (1.E.4). Solving (1.E.3∗) and (1.E.5), we have
δm =
(1− τEm)²
1− τc − ² +
pil²
pim(1− τc − ²)
(
u′(c∗l )− u′(c∗h)
u′(c∗m)− u′(c∗h)
)
(1.E.6)
δh =
(1− τEh )²
1− τc − ² +
pil²
pih(1− τc − ²)
(
u′(c∗m)− u′(c∗l )
u′(c∗m)− u′(c∗h)
)
(1.E.7)
Finally, the other tax rates, τ˜Bh , τ˜
B
m , τ˜
B
l , and τ˜
E
l can be arbitrarily determined by
(1.E.4) and the following four inequalities
(1− τ˜Bh ) > (1− τEh + δh)(1− τc − ²)
(1− τ˜Bm) > (1− τEm + δm)(1− τc − ²)
(1− τ˜Bl ) < (1− τc − ²)
τ˜El > 0
Now, finally if we take the tax system (τ˜c, τ˜
B
h , τ˜
E
h , τ˜
B
m , τ˜
E
m , τ˜
B
l , τ˜
E
l ), then it is easy
to see that (c∗0, c
∗
h, c
∗
m, c
∗
l ) is the solution to the agent’s problem since (c
∗
h, c
∗
m, c
∗
l )
is the solution to the Euler equation (1.E.3) and (1.E.4) and the concavity is still
preserved under this transform with (δh, δm, δl).
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Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. Suppose τ˜c increases by ². Let operator ∆ denote by the change in any
variable corresponding to ² amount increase in τ˜c. For example, ∆τ˜
E
h = −δh and
∆τ˜Em = −δm by Proposition 9. We will show that ∆D3 = 0. Recall that in order to
make the firm indifferent to issuing between debt and equity, for any optimal tax
system (τ˜c, τ˜
B
h , τ˜
E
h , τ˜
B
m , τ˜
E
m , τ˜
B
l , τ˜
E
l ), the following equation should be satisfied.
pil(1− τ˜c) + pim(1− τ˜c)(1− τ˜Em) + pim(1− τ˜c)(1− τ˜Eh ) = 1.
Using the above equation, we can rewrite D3 as
D3 = pih(1− τ˜Bh ) + pim(1− τ˜mh ) + pil(1− τ˜Bl )− 1.
Since ∆τ˜Bi = 0 for all i = h,m, l by the condition of the Proposition, we have
∆D3 = 0.
Note that ∆X(αh, αm, αl) = 0 since (αh, αm, αl) is fixed. Then, By using the
similar analysis, the numerators of B˜∗1 and E˜
∗
1 are unchanged. In sum, there is no
change in the numerators and the denominators in B˜∗1 and E˜
∗
1 , which completes the
proof.
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proof of Proposition 11
Proof. The expected capital taxes (as the income of the government) are given as
r(pihτ˜
B
h + pimτ˜
B
m + pilτ˜
B
l︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=(a)
)B∗1
+ r(1− {pil(1− τ˜c) + pim(1− τ˜c)(1− τ˜Em) + pim(1− τ˜c)(1− τ˜Eh )}︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=(b)
)E∗1 .
Notice that (b) is zero (due to the condition that firms are indifferent between issuing
debt and equity), i.e.,
pil(1− τ˜c) + pim(1− τ˜c)(1− τ˜Em) + pim(1− τ˜c)(1− τ˜Eh ) = 1
Now we will show that part (a) is negative, which completes the proof as follows.
pihτ˜
B
h + pimτ˜
B
m + pilτ˜
B
l = 1− {pih(1− τ˜Bh ) + pim(1− τ˜Bm) + pil(1− τ˜Bl )} < 0. (1.E.8)
since we have
pih(1− τ˜Bh ) + pim(1− τ˜Bm) + pil(1− τ˜Bl ) = D3 + (b) = D3 > 0,
by Lemma 6.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Contracts and Firm Dynamics with AK
Technology
2.1 Introduction
Gibrat’s law states that the size of a firm and its growth rate are independent
(Gibrat (1931) and Masfield (1962)). Since then, there have been many studies on
the relationship between firm size and growth. The following empirical facts are
generally accepted:1
(i) There is a slightly negative correlation between the size of a firm and its
growth rate in various industries;2
(ii) The growth rate of a firm is often independent of its size and age for firms
above a certain size level.
These empirical regularities hold not only for cross-sectional data, but also for the
time-series data. The majority of firm dynamics papers have considered (i) as a
1For fact (i), see Kumar (1985), Dunne and Hughes (1994), Bottazzi and Secchi (2003), Gabe
and Krybill (2002), etc. For (ii) see Bottazzi et al. (2005), Droucopoulos (1983), Hardwick
and Adams (2002), Audretsch et al. (2004), Mansfiled (1962), Mowery (1983), Hart and Oulton
(1996), Lotti et al. (2003), Geroski and Gugler (2004), Caves (1998), etc. See Coad (2007) for a
nice survey.
2In some industries, Gibrat’s law cannot be rejected.
85
stylized fact and have successively built theories to explain it, for example, Albu-
querque and Hopenhayn (2004), Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), and Cooley and
Quadrini (2001). The key assumptions are financial market frictions such as limited
liability, limited enforcement, information asymmetry about profit realizations, ex-
ternal financing costs, and others. Notice that all of these papers assume a strictly
concave production function. Without those financing constraints, capital should
be immediately allocated at the efficient steady state level. Under those constraints,
optimal lending contracts dictate a gradual growth of capital up to the efficient level
at a decreasing rate. Once it reaches the steady state, the growth rate becomes zero.
Thus, although these models can explain growth of small firms well, they are rather
silent for large firms. In particular, there is no growth after the steady state is
reached, which is not consistent with (ii). Notice that fact (ii) is based on more re-
cent findings than (i). We also observe many large firms showing sustained growth
at even faster rates. This paper is first motivated by the discrepancy between the
existing theory and the empirical facts.
The simplest way to introduce endogenous growth is to adapt an Ak-technology.3
Thus, we hold a linear production function with respect capital and examine what
other factors or constraints can derive results similar to the empirical fact. First,
under the Ak-technology the steady state is discarded and the above financial fric-
tions becomes meaningless or do not play a significant role in designing the contract
implying the gradual growth of capital. Thus, we abstract from such financing con-
tracts and their impact on firm growth. Then, instead of shutting down the channel
of lending or borrowing from the outside entities such as banking or insurance sec-
3There are many papers trying to understand firm growth in terms of heterogeneity of firms
with a general equilibrium, e.g - Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2008) and Luttmer
(2008, 20010). Our paper focuses on the partial equilibrium aspects.
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tors, we stick to the case where a firm grows through the internal stochastic capital
accumulation mechanism. In turn, we also abstract from the debt contracts and
capital structure decisions of a firm. Then, our first objective is to find the simplest
economic environment (with Ak technology) consistent with the empirical regularity
introduced above.
This paper studies a continuous time principal-agent model in which capital
grows under the optimal contract. We adopt the classical moral hazard set-up with
an Ak technology, which is the key difference from existing firm dynamics models.4
A contract is signed at time 0 and is continuous-history dependent. The principal
commits to a contract that is incentive compatible to the agent. At each time t,
profits are determined by a simple constant returns to scale (linear) production
function with two arguments: capital provided by the principal and effort from the
agent which is unobservable to the principal. The contract specifies the instanta-
neous payment to the agent and the instantaneous dividend paid to the principal.
Then the remaining output is invested for future production, which in turn specifies
the size of capital and determines the growth rate of the firm.
The explicit solution can be obtained when both the principal and the agent
have the constant absolute risk aversion utility functions. In the first best case,
the expected growth rate is always strictly decreasing in firm size, more precisely,
inversely related to the size of capital. However, thanks to the Ak technology the
growth rate is asymptotically constant in capital. Gibrat’s law cannot be rejected
4Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) and DeMarzo et al. (2009) also study the moral hazard
problem, but they do not consider the production contribution from the agent. What it matter in
Clementi and Hopenhayn is to make entrepreneurs truthfully reveal their profits. In DeMarzo et
al. (2009), the manager only chooses a binary effort choice, {work, shirk} under which working
is basically equivalent to the truthful revelation of profits. In our model, the manager really con-
tributes to production by choosing different levels of efforts, hence we put the wording ”classical”
moral hazard.
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for those firms in the tail. Therefore, our model might be consistent with both
empirical facts (i) and (ii) even without considering the moral hazard problem. In
other word, it is sufficient to have a very simple model of the first best principal-
agent problem with linear production with respect to capital from the principal and
labor from the agent for explaining the firm dynamics with respect to firm size and
growth.
One potential weakness of the first best solution is that the growth rate for low
capital state seems too high. This requests further analysis for the second best case
in which the optimal contract would generate a proper growth behavior of the firm
in the quantitative sense. In the presence of moral hazard, in particular, the optimal
investment decision deviates from the first best contract, which is the deriving force
to have the reasonable result. We prove that in the second best case there are more
incentives to under-invest when the level of capital is low and that there are more
incentives to over-invest when the level of capital is high. As a consequence, the
growth rates for small firms become relatively lower and the growth rate for large
firms become relatively higher than those without information asymmetry, while we
still have the negative relationship between firm size and growth. Thus, the moral
hazard case is more consistent with both empirical facts (i) and (ii).5
There are two reasons why over/under-investment appears to depend on the
size of capital. First, in the production side, the given linear (therefore convex)
technology becomes nonconvex in the optimal contract. Furthermore, the degree
of nonconvexity differs by the level of capital, k, due to the incentive compatibility
condition for the manager’s effort. Due to the noncovexity, equilibrium marginal
5One remark about this model is that we do not try to fit the growth rate distributions. In
particular, we do not consider entry and exit of firms.
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production to capital, when k is small, is smaller than when k is big.6 Therefore,
it is advantageous to have more capital accumulation (or invest more) when k is
relatively big. On the other hand, since the noncovexity is more severe when k is
small, fast growth through more investment is not optimal. In other words, the
marginal cost of investment, which is the principal’s marginal utility of dividend,
is relatively higher for lower level of capital. This is the reason to under-invest for
low capital states.
The second contribution of the paper is that we fully analyze the incentive
scheme when both the principal and the agent are risk averse. In the purely the-
oretical sense, the model is a principal-agent problem with capital accumulation.
The immediate question is how capital growth affects the incentive provision for
the agent. The consideration about the firm’s capital accumulation yields a quite
different optimal contract from classical principal-agent models that only consider
profit sharing. Notice that the volatility of the shock is assumed to be proportional
to the square root of the size of capital,
√
k. By this capital size effect, we can
show that given the level of capital more effort derives less risky payments, which is
opposite to the result of classical principal-agent problems without growth. In the
classical framework, if the agent puts more effort, then the compensation gets more
volatile, which gives the agent an incentive to work harder. In our model, however,
as the firm size increases the sensitivity of the payment gets larger according to the
square root of the size regardless of the level of effort, thus it is not quite necessary
for the agent to put more effort and it is even better for the agent to work less.
Then how does the principal get the agent to exert effort? We find that there must
be an adjustment term or a stick in the incentive provision that makes the payment
6The definition of equilibrium marginal production is in Section 2.4.2
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drop instantaneously if the agent works less. This supports proper production at
each time and guarantees sufficient growth.
The third contribution of this paper is that the model can partially explain a
firm poverty trap, i.e., why some small firms with enough profits do not grow. We
assume that that the volatility of the growth rate is inversely related to the size of
capital. From this assumption, we derive an interesting phenomenon: firms under
certain conditions show little growth, which is optimal. The sufficient conditions
are very reasonable: (i) the project is sufficiently risky, (ii) the subjective discount
factor is high enough, or (iii) both the principal and the agent are fairly risk averse.
Under one of these conditions, ceteris paribus, there is a positive probability that
the capital process hits the zero boundary in finite time. Although the process
reflects to the positive region as soon as it hits the boundary, the process may go
back to the boundary again in finite time and reflect again, and so on. The under-
investment in small firms, in turn, reinforces the slow growth. In consequence, it
takes longer time for those firms to escape from the low capital states. We believe
that this might be one potential reasons for firm level poverty traps.
There is also a large literature on over- or under-investment issues.7 Dow, Gorton
and Krishnamurthy (2005) (henceforth DGK) and Albuquerque and Wang (2008)
predict overinvestment. DGK’s model is based on Jensen’s (1996, 1993) free cash
flow theory. The over-investment in DGK results from the assumption that man-
agers are empire-builders and so the shareholders should hire costly monitoring
7According to Stein (2003), there are broadly two categories of literature with respect to the
investment issue. One is the models of agency conflicts and the other is the models of costly
external finance. The former generally predicts over-investment and the latter generally predicts
under-investment. Here instead of surveying all those papers, we only introduce the models having
’dynamic’ features in order to narrow down the scope.
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auditors to control the manager’s decision making on payout and investment. On
the other hand, Albuguerque and Wang (2008) consider the agency conflict between
the controlling shareholder and outside investors. In Albuguerque and Wang, the
controlling shareholder does all the decision making for payout and investment al-
though he has a relatively small ownership of the firm compared to the outside
shareholders. Therefore, it is intuitively rather straightforward that firms over-
invest in both DGK and Albuguerque and Wang. But, in our model how much
is invested is specified by the optimal contract, not by an exogenous assumption
about the agency power. We neither assume the existence of extra costs in auditing
managers as in DGK nor assume exogenous costs when managers steal the outside
shareholders’ profits as in Albuguerque and Wang. The inefficient investment in our
model is generated by the moral hazard problem, not by the imperfect protection
of the shareholders.
On the other hands, the usual dynamic contracting theory for small firm-level
corporate finance such as Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) and Clementi and
Hopenhayn (2006), DeMarzo et al. (2009), etc, often predicts underinvestment in
financing a small firm’s project.8 Albuguerque and Wang (2008) point out that
overinvestment is likely to be the dominant issue for larger firms around the world
whereas the underinvestment implied by these contracting models is potentially
more important for smaller firms. To our knowledge, our model is the first that has
both under- or over-investment features depending on the firm size. This paper, in
turn, possibly sheds light on the integration of two separate theories in corporate
finance on investment decisions and the capital structure of small and large firms.
8The essential ingredient for overinvestment in our paper is that the effort choice set of the
manager is larger than those of most other papers. See footnote 4 on this.
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For technical side of the paper, we use the martingale method developed by
Sannikov (2008).9 Recently, several continuous time principal-agent models have
been studied such as DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), He (2008), Sannikov (2008),
and Williams (2009). However, none of those papers’ focuses are similar to ours.
The example in Williams (2009) looks similar to ours, but there is a substantial
difference as he did not consider capital accumulation. The output process can
take arbitrary negative values and he only cares about profit-sharing under hidden
action and hidden saving.
Finally, one also has concerns about a special assumption on the production
function in our model although this assumption gives a simple and tractable solu-
tion. Therefore, we also examine other possible production technologies in Section
8. Notice that the focus in this paper is to keep the asymptotic constant returns
to scale (CRS) property in terms of the size of a firm in order to have a positive
constant expected growth rate in the long run. It turns out that those seemingly
reasonable production functions, in equilibrium, violate the CRS property. There-
fore, we believe that our assumption on the technology is not only simple enough to
have main results, but also reasonable to be consistent with the empirical results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 shows the first and second best solutions. Section 4 explains the main
result of this paper. Section 5 explains the optimal payment schedule. Section
6 describes the dynamics of the firm in low capital states and its implication to
poverty traps. Section 7 provides brief explanation about risk sharing and business
9In the earlier version, we used the method from Williams (2009) and some literature on
backward stochastic differential equations (Yong and Zhou (1999), Pardoux and Peng (1990), and
El Karoui, Peng, and Quenez (1997, 2001)).
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cycle implication about the model. Section 8 examines whether there are other
production functions that can provide the main result of the paper. We show that
common cases often violate the CRS property. Section 9 gives concluding remarks
including some points for future research agenda. All proofs are in the appendix.
2.2 The Model and The Problem
We assume constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences of a principal and
an agent (or a manager). Let us denote by their utility functions up(d) and um(c),
respectively.
up(d) = − exp(−λd), and um(c, e) = − exp
(
−λ(c− e
2
2a
)
)
,
where λ > 0 is a risk aversion parameter and a is a positive number. c is the
payment to the agent and e is the level of the agent’s effort. d is the dividend
to the principal. In particular, the agent’s utility function is non-separable. This
assumption discards the income effect and makes algebra simple. They are expected
utility maximizers. The agent’s utility is given by E0
[∫∞
0
e−βtum(ct, et) dt
]
and the
principal’s utility is E0
[∫∞
0
e−βtup(dt) dt
]
.
The principal is endowed with an unique production technology. But, in order
to produce output she should hire an agent. Only if she can hire a worker, she can
operate her firm. The production technology10 without considering the uncertainty
is
f(k, e) = hk + e,
10In section x, we introduce the case for other production technologies.
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where k is capital provided by the principal and e ∈ E is the effort level exerted by
the agent where E will be specified later. We will work with a Brownian motion Wt
in a standard probability space (Ω,F , P ) with a continuous time framework. The
capital process k(t) follows the stochastic differential equation:
dk(t) = (f(k(t), e(t))− c(t)− d(t)− δk(t))dt+ σ
√
k(t)dWt,
= g(k(t), c(t), d(t), e(t))dt+ σ
√
k(t)dWt, (2.2.1)
where δ is the rate of capital depreciation and
g(k, c, d, e) := f(k, e)− c− d− δk.
Notice f(k(t), e(t))dt+σ
√
k(t)dWt is instantaneous production, (c(t)+d(t))dt is the
instantaneous payment, and therefore f(k(t), e(t))dt+ σ
√
k(t)dWt− (c(t) + d(t))dt
is instantaneous investment. Here, σ
√
kdWt can be regarded as an instantaneous
production shock which depends on the size of capital being installed.11 Specifically,
we assume neither the principal and the agent has saving and borrowing technol-
ogy. In particular, as mentioned in the introduction, we abstract from the outside
financing opportunities. Otherwise, in the Ak-technology framework, this problem
has no solution.
The discrete time analogue of (2.2.1) is
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it,
it = f(kt, et)− ct − dt + σ
√
kt²t+1,
11The size of shocks can be regarded to depend on investment at each time. This is related to
the idea of Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997).
94
where ²t+1 are i.i.d. normal. The reason why we assume the square root process is
two-fold: First, we do not allow negative values of k. The zero-capital level, here, is
the minimum bound for capital. If we set k = k0 as the minimum in which the firm
can start the project, then we can define the volatility structure as σ
√
k − k0dWt.
Without loss of generality we have k0 = 0. Second, more importantly, the volatility
of the growth rate dk
k
is assumed to be negatively related to the level of capital, that
is, σ√
k
. It is easy to see if we rewrite (2.2.1) as
dk(t)
k(t)
=
(
g(k(t), c(t), d(t), e(t))
k(t)
)
dt+
σ√
k(t)
dWt.
This is based on the empirical finding of Hymer and Pashingian (1962), Amaral
et al. (1997), Bottazi el al. (2001), etc. It is also consistent with some empirical
literature on the relation between GDP growth and volatility (Ramey and Ramey
(1995)).12
The triplet (c(t), d(t), e(t)) is a contract between the principal and the manager.
c(t) is the rate of payment schedule for the agent at each time t and d(t) is the rate
of dividend delivered to the principal at each t. e(t) ∈ E is the effort choice by the
manager which is unobservable to the principal, where E be the set of progressively
measurable processes with respect to Ft whose support is [0,M ] with some large
number M > a. Let S be the set of feasible contracts (c(t), d(t), e(t)) if e(t) ∈ E
and c and d are contingent on the all the previous history Gt, the completion of the
σ-algebra generated by all histories of capital, {ks}ts=0.
The principal’s problem is to offer an feasible contract (c(t), d(t), e(t)) ∈ S to
12Section 3.2 of Jones and Manuelli (2005) provides the excellent survey for the empirical results
between the mean growth rate and volatility.
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maximize her utility, satisfying the individual rationality (IR) and the incentive
compatibility (IC) for the manager. Mathematically,
max
(c,d,e)∈S
E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−βtup(d(t)) dt
]
subject to (2.2.1), (IR), and (IC):
(IR) E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρtum(ct, et) dt
]
≥ q0 and
(IC) e(t) ∈ argmax
e(t)∈E
E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρtum(ct, et) dt
]
,
where q0 is the reservation utility of the manager. Note that {e(t)}∞t=0 is incentive
compatible if it maximizes the agent utility given {c(t)}∞t=0 and {d(t)}∞t=0.
2.3 The Optimal Contract
In this section, we pin down the first best solution and heuristically derive the
second best solution. The formal proofs are in Appendix A and B. We follow the
method developed in Sannikov (2008). Taking for granted that the continuation
value qt and capital kt serve as two state variables, we rewrite the problem as
follows. The principal’s problem is to offer an incentive compatible admissible
(c(t), d(t), e(t)) ∈ S to the manager that maximizes
E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−βup(d(t)) dt
]
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subject to two underlying stochastic differential equations:
dkt = [(h− δ)kt + et − ct − dt]dt+ σ
√
ktdWt,
dqt = [βqt − um(ct, et)]dt+ γ(ct, et)σ
√
k(t){dkt − g(kt, ct, dt, et)}
with the initial condition (k(0), q(0)) = (k0, q0) and γ(c, e) is given by
γ(c, e) := min{y ∈ [0,∞) | e ∈ argmax
e′∈E
um(c, e
′) + ye′}. (2.3.1)
In this case, we have
γ(c, e) = − ∂um(c, e)/∂e
∂g(k, c, d, e)/∂e
= −∂um
∂e
(c, e) =
λe
a
exp
(−λ(c− e2/2a)) . (2.3.2)
Notice that γ(t) in the volatility part of q(t) process plays an important role. γ(t)
is often called sensitivity of the payment in the principal-agent literature. q(t) is
derived by the Martingale Representation Theorem and γ(t) is derived through the
incentive compatibility condition in the appendix. Using the underlying processes
we can derive the Bellman equation. The value function J(k, q) for the principal
satisfies the following Bellman equation
βJ(k, q) = max
c,d,e
up(d) + Jk[(h− δ)k + e− c− d] + Jq(βq − um(c, e))
+
1
2
(
Jkk + 2Jkqγ(c, e) + Jqqγ(c, e)
2
)
σ2k. (2.3.3)
Before solving the problem we introduce the following assumption for the parameter
values in order for the problem to be well-posed.
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Assumption 2.
A1 :=
h− δ
1 + λσ
2
4
> β
Assumption 2 holds throughout the paper. This guarantees that the first best
capital process does not fall below the zero-boundary. It is the condition that
the given technology should satisfy. Otherwise the contract cannot be made. It,
however, neither discard the case where the boundary is attracting nor is attainable.
In other words, the under a certain condition the equilibrium capital process starting
from the positive level can reach to the zero level even in finite expected time (See
proposition 17 and 18).
Here note that the domain of the solution (or the capital process) is defined on
[0,∞). The zero boundary should be interpreted as the minimum level of capital
that can initiate the firm. Then, the value function V (0, q) is the endogenous
genuine value of the project that the principal owns.
2.3.1 The First Best Contract
Suppose that the principal can perfectly observe the agent’s action. Then, we do
not have to consider (IC). The usual way to solve the first best solution (or Pareto
optimal solution) is to solve
max
c,d,e
E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−βtup(d(t))dt
]
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subject to (2.2.1) and (IR)
E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−βtum(c(t), e(t))dt
]
≥ q0.
On the other hand, since we will compare the first with the second best solutions
later, for a simple exposition, it is convenient to reuse the Bellman equation (2.3.3)
as follows.
βJ(k, q) = max
c,d,e,γ
up(d) + Jk[(h− δ)k + e− c− d)] + Jq(βq − um(c, e))
+
1
2
(
Jkk + 2Jkqγ + Jqqγ
2
)
σ2k. (2.3.4)
Notice that γ is now an arbitrary choice variable of the principal instead of being
derived through the incentive compatibility. Then, it can be easily verified that we
obtain the optimal solution from the above Bellman equation.
Proposition 12. The optimal solution (cf , df , ef ) to (2.3.4) is given by
cf (k, q) =
a
2
− 1
λ
ln(−qA1)
df (k, q) = A1k +B1 − 1
λ
ln
(
A1
−q
)
ef (k) = a,
where A1 =
h−δ
1+λσ
2
4
and B1 =
1
λ
(
2(β−A1)
A1
+ 2 logA1 +
λa
2
)
.
Proof. See the appendix.
Theorem 2 (The First Best Solution). The solution to the Bellman equation (2.3.4)
gives the first-best value of the principal. In other words, if the initial capital is given
99
by k0 and the reservation utility of the agent is given by q0, then the value of the
principal at time 0 is J(k0, q0), where J is the solution to (2.3.4).
Proof. See the appendix.
Corollary 5. The first best optimal capital stock k and the agent’s discounted utility
q follows
dk =
[
(h− δ − A1)k + 2(A1 − β)
λA1
]
dt+ σ
√
kdWt (2.3.5)
dq
q
= (β − A1)dt− λσA1
2
√
k dWt. (2.3.6)
Proof. See the appendix.
Since we have the explicit solution to (2.3.4), we can derive the first best optimal
contract {cft , dft , eft }∞t=0 using the functional forms (cf (·, ·), df (·, ·), ef (·)) described in
Proposition 12 as follows:
(cft , d
f
t , e
f
t ) = (c
f (kt, qt), d
f (kt, qt), e
f (kt, qt)), (2.3.7)
where (kt, qt) is given by (2.3.5) and (2.3.6) in Corollary 5.
Notice that the discrete time analogue of (2.3.5) is
kt+1 = (h− δ − A1 + 1)kt + 2(A1 − β)
λA1
+ σ
√
kt²t+1, ²t+1 ∼ i.i.d,
which is so called a CIR (Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross) process. It slightly differs from
a AR(1) process in the sense that there is a square root term
√
kt in the volatility
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part, which makes the process nonnegative.
2.3.2 The Second Best Contract
The next proposition is analogous to Proposition 12. While we get the explicit
solution for (2.3.4), we only have the semi-explicit solution form of (2.3.3). Thus,
we characterize the second best solution by using a system of ordinary differential
equations.
Proposition 13. Let (e(k), θ(k)) satisfy 13
θ(k) > 0, θ′(k) > 0, λθ′(k)2 > 2θ′′(k), ∀k ∈ [0,∞)
and be the C1-solution to the following system of the first order ordinary differential
equations
e′(k) = F (e(k), θ(k), k)
θ′(k) = H(e(k), k)
with initial conditions
e(0) = a and θ(0) =
1
λ
[
2(β − θ′(0))
θ′(0)
+ 2 ln θ′(0) +
λa
2
]
,
where the functional forms of F and G and the derivation of the initial conditions
13These are the sufficient conditions for the concavity of J
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are given in the Appendix. Let ψ be the function of e defined by
ψ(e) =
a+ λe2 − λae
a
= 1 +
λe
a
(e− a).
Then, the solution (cs, ds, es) to the Bellman equation (2.3.3) is given by
cs(k, q) =
e(k)2
2a
− 1
λ
ln [(−q)θ′(k)ψ(e(k))]
ds(k, q) = θ(k)− 1
λ
ln
(
θ′(k)
−q
)
es(k) = e(k)
Proof. See the appendix.
Now we are ready to describe the main theorem (verification theorem). In fact,
the proof of the theorem uses the properties in several lemmas that will be appeared
later which results from characterizing the system of ordinary differential equations
in Proposition 13 (e.g., Lemma 7 and Lemma 9). Therefore, one can skip the proof
of Theorem 2 in the first reading. We locate the theorem here for simple exposition.
It is also convenient to compare Section and Section .
Theorem 3 (The Second Best Solution). The solution to the Bellman equation
(2.3.3) gives the second-best value of the principal. In other words, if the initial
capital is given by k0 and the reservation utility of the agent is given by q0, then the
value of the principal at time 0 is J(k0, q0), where J is the solution to (2.3.3).
Proof. See the appendix.
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Corollary 6. The second best optimal capital k and the agent’s utility process evolve
as
dk =
[
(h− δ)k − θ(k)− e(k)
2
2a
+ e(k) +
1
λ
ln
(
θ′(k)2ψ(e(k))
)]
dt+ σ
√
kdWt
(2.3.8)
dq
q
= [β − θ′(k)ψ(e(k))] dt− λσ
a
θ′(k)e(k)ψ(e(k))
√
k dWt (2.3.9)
Proof. See the appendix.
Since we have characterized the solution to (2.3.3), we can derive the second
best optimal contract {cst , dst , est}∞t=0 using the functional forms (cs(·, ·), ds(·, ·), es(·))
described in Proposition 13 as follows:
(cst , d
s
t , e
s
t) = (c
s(kt, qt), d
s(kt, qt), e
s(kt, qt)), (2.3.10)
where (kt, qt) is given by (2.3.8) and (2.3.9) in Corollary 6.
2.4 The Optimal Growth Rates
This section describes the main result of the paper. Recall the empirical facts that
the growth rate of the firm has slightly negative dependence on its size, but, Gibrat’s
law holds for firms above a certain size level. In order to explain how the growth
rate changes as a firm grows, we first focus on how the investment decision changes
over the firm size. In particular, we need to compare the first with the second best
investment. The first step is to pin down the optimal effort levels.
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Figure 2.1: The optimal effort level: black-top (first best), blue-middle (second
best), dotted-bottom (second best limit). The parameter values are given by h = 6,
δ = 0.1, σ = 0.3, λ = 2, a = 1
2.4.1 The Optimal Effort
Notice that the effort level is independent of the agent’s continuation value. This is
because the agent’s utility function is assumed to be nonseparable so that there is
no income effect. Thus, the agent’s effort is nicely pinned down as only a function
of k. We show that starting from e(0) = a at k = 0, the second best effort level is
converging to the constant level as the level of capital goes to infinity. This helps
us a lot to analyze the properties of the solution.
Lemma 7. The second best optimal effort level e = e(k) satisfies
(1) e(0) = a and 0 < e(k) < a, ∀k > 0.
(2) limk→∞ e(k) = e∗, where e∗ is the largest solution in (a2 , a) to the following
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cubic polynomial equation:14
eψ(e) =
a
2
⇐⇒ λe3 − λae2 + ae− a
2
2
= 0.
Moreover, we have e∗ < e(k) < a for all k > 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
Lemma 7 immediately results in the following corollary which gives the bound
for ψ(e(k)) in Theorem 2. This property is also important to characterize the
properties of the solution in the following subsections.
Corollary 7. ψ(e) is decreasing in e and bounded with respect to k such that
1 +
λ
a
(e∗ − a) < ψ(e(k)) < 1, ∀k ∈ [0,∞).
Figure 2.1 shows an example of effort level with respect to capital. The effort
level is decreasing and asymptotically converging to the dotted line in the bottom.
The top constant line is the first best effort. Numerical examples show that the
second best effort e = e(k) is monotonically decreasing in k as seen in figure 2.1.
We suspect that this is generally true. But, it is hardly proven. Whether this is
true or not, all other asymptotic properties on consumptions and investment that
are introduced next subsections still hold by using lemma 7.
14The existence of the solution is easily seen by the intermediate value theorem.
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2.4.2 The Investment Comparison
In this subsection we compare the results of the first and the second best cases. We
can define the first best investment If and the second best investment Is at time
t in a discrete time approximation as follows using the solutions in theorem 1 and
2:15
If (t) = (h− A1)kt + 2(A1 − β)
λA1
+ σ
√
kt²t+1
Is(t) = hkt − θ(kt)− e(k)
2
2a
+ e(kt) +
1
λ
log
(
θ′(kt)2ψ(e(kt))
)
+ σ
√
kt²
′
t+1,
where ²t+1’s and ²
′
t+1’s are i.i.d. normal N(0, 1). Rather than comparing the time
series of If (t) and Is(t), it is more convenient to compare their conditional expec-
tations with respect to kt that are defined by I
i(k) = Et[Ii(t)|kt = k] for i = f, s.
Hence,
If (k) = (h− A1)k + 2(A1 − β)
λA1
Is(k) = hk − θ(k)− e(k)
2
2a
+ e(k) +
1
λ
log
(
θ′(k)2ψ(e(k))
)
The the difference between If and Is is
If (k)− Is(k) = θ(k)− A1k + 2(A1 − β)
λA1
+
e(k)2
2a
− e(k)− 1
λ
log(θ′(k)ψ(e(k)))
15Notice that the continuous time version of the instantaneous investment at time t is heuristi-
cally written as
Ii(t) = f(k(t), e
i(t)) + σ
√
k(t)dWt − ci(t)− di(t), i = f, s.
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= θ(k)− (A1k +B1) + (e(k)− a)
2
2a
− 1
λ
log
(
θ′(k)2
A21
ψ(e(k))
)
. (2.4.1)
Proposition 14 (Investment When k is Small). When the level of capital is suffi-
ciently low, there is under-investment. More precisely, If (0) > Is(0).
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 15 (Investment When k is Big). There is over-investment as capital
grows sufficiently large. More precisely,
lim
k→∞
If (k)− Is(k) = −∞. (2.4.2)
Moreover, the investment-capital ratio and the investment-output ratio for the sec-
ond best case converge those of the first best case. In other words,
lim
k→∞
If (k)− Is(k)
k
= 0. (2.4.3)
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 14 and 15 tell that there are more incentives to under-invest when
the level of capital is low and that there are more incentives to over-invest when the
level of capital is high. However, notice that their investment-output ratios as in
(2.4.3) are asymptotically same. This distinction might be empirically important.
Note the production function is f(k, e) = hk + e that is linear in k and e.
h is (explicit) marginal product of capital. But, the effort level is a function of
k, e = e(k) in the optimal contract, so that we define the equilibrium marginal
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Figure 2.2: The production technology frontiers: The left panels are the separate
plots of hk and e(k) and the right panels are aggregation of them, i.e., f(k, e(k)).
The top panels are the first best cases and the bottom panels are the second best
cases.
production to capital(EMPK) by
d
dk
f(k, e(k)) = h+ e′(k).
Notice that EMPK is generally increasing in k since e(k) is generally decreasing
as shown in Figure 2.1. Thus, the given convex technology becomes nonconvex in
the optimal contract. Comparing the top and bottom panels in Figure 2.2, we can
guess how the first and the second best are different in terms of technology.
EMPK, when k is small, is smaller than when k is high. Therefore, it is advan-
tageous to have more capital accumulation especially when k is high. Notice this
only tells that the investment-capital ratio or investment-production ratio, when
k is big, is higher than when k is small, however, it does not give the sufficient
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Figure 2.3: Expected growth rate of the first best (dotted blue curve) and the second
best (solid green curve); parameter values, h = 2.5, λ = 0.6, σ = 0.3, β = 0.94, a = 1
reason why there is even over-investment for high k. Notice that the second best
is always less efficient than the first best for any k > 0. The only way to get over
the current inefficiency is to grow faster so as to get more compensation from the
high dividend stream in the future. This motivation derives over-investment for
high k (for relatively high EMPK states). Notice that EMPK converges to h, the
greatest lower bound, as k goes to infinity. On the other hand, since the marginal
production is fairly small when k is small, the fast growth through more investment
cannot compensate the principal. This is the reason to under-invest for low capital
states.
2.4.3 The Expected Growth Rate
From the results of previous subsections, we know that e(k) and ψ(k) are bounded
and θ′(k) are all bounded for k. Therefore, the optimal investment is O(k) order
and asymptotically linear in k. Then, the equilibrium capital processes are given
109
by
(1st best)
dk
k
=
(
h− δ − A1 + 2(A1 − β)
λA1k
)
dt+
σ√
k
dWt,
(2nd best)
dk
k
=
(
h− δ − θ(k)
k
+
R(k)
k
)
dt+
σ√
k
dWt
where R(k) is define by
R(k) = −e(k)
2
2a
+ e(k) +
1
λ
log
[
θ′(k)2ψ(e(k))
]
.
Notice limk→∞
R(k)
k
= 0 since the numerator is bounded as k → ∞. The second
best drift term, the investment minus depreciation, still has the order of O(k) since
limk→∞
θ(k)
k
= A1 from Lemma 9 in the appendix. When the level of capital is high
enough, the process approximately looks like a stochastic process with affine drift
and square root volatility terms.
The first best and second best expected growth rate gf (k) and gs(k) are defined
by
gf (k) :=
If (k)− δk
k
= (h− δ − A1) + 2(A1 − β)
λA1k
gs(k) :=
Is(k)− δk
k
= (h− δ)− θ(k)
k
+
R(k)
k
.
Notice that gf (k) is strictly decreasing with order O(1/k), but gs(k) is not obvious.
Notice that the growth rate at the tail in the first best case is already constant.
This asymptotical property is thanks to the size effect or the linear technology in
capital. In fact, the first best solution already shows two empirical results, which
means that we may not require the agency friction to have the main result. In other
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words, we already found the simplest framework to show the empirical regularity.
On the other hand, notice the the growth rate gf (k) around very low capital
state is too high (See Figure 2.3). So, there is a problem of the first best solution
in the quantitative sense. We know limk→∞ gs(k) = h − δ − A1 = limk→∞ gs(s).
Furthermore, proposition 14 and 15 tell that
gf (k) > gs(k) for small k and gf (k) < gs(k) for large k,
which means the investment decision due to incentive compatibility make the second
best expected growth rate drop for small k and increases for large k in comparison
with the first best expected growth rate. Figure 2.3 shows this mechanism.16 It is
still true that the expected growth rate is generally decreasing in k, showing the
negative negative relationship between firm size and growth. This story is more
consistent with the two empirical evidence.
Remark that in our model we do not consider the entry or exit of firms therefore
the long run distribution for gi is degenerate. We do not try to match the firm size
or growth rate distribution in this model. This is the limitation of our model.
16For numerical simulations, we rewrite the first and second best capital processes as the fol-
lowing discrete time versions:
(1st best) kft+1 = [h− δ + 1−A1]kft +
2(A1 − β)
λA1
+ σ
√
kft ²t+1
(2nd best) kst+1 = [h− δ + 1]kst − θ(kst )−R(kst ) + σ
√
kst ²t+1.
The expected growth rate is computed by gi(kit) ≈ k
i
t+1−kit
kit
for i = f, s.
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2.5 The Optimal Payment Schedule
We can write down the optimal payment schedule, ci(t), i = f, s with respect to
capital by substituting the continuation value processes qt of (2.3.6) and (2.3.9).
Proposition 16. The optimal payment schedule is decomposed into following six
components:
cf (t) = − 1
λ
log(−q0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1f)
+
a
2︸︷︷︸
(2f)
+
∫ t
0
σA1
2
√
ksdWs︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3f)
+
λ
2
∫ t
0
σ2A21ks
4
ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
(4f)
− 1
λ
log(A1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(5f)
+
1
λ
∫ t
0
(A1 − β)ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
(6f)
.
and
cs(t) = − 1
λ
log(−q0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1s)
+
e(ks)
2
2a︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2s)
+
∫ t
0
σθ′(ks)e(ks)ψ(e(ks))
a
√
ksdWs︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3s)
+
λ
2
∫ t
0
σ2θ′(ks)2e(ks)2ψ(e(ks))2ks
a2
ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
(4s)
− 1
λ
log(θ′(kt)ψ(e(kt)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(5s)
+
1
λ
∫ t
0
(θ′(ks)ψ(e(ks))− β)ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
(6s)
(2.5.1)
Proof. See the appendix.
First notice that we align similar terms at similar positions in the first and
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second best payment schedule. They look similar at the first glace, however, it is
easy to realize that the second best payment depends on the effort level in order for
the agent to have proper incentives to work while the first best is not. We will pin
down this effect in detail.
Notice that (2.5.1) can be interpreted as following:
c(t) = (1s) reservation level of consumption+ (2s) the agent’s actual cost
+ (3s) compensation risk due to unobservability of the effort
+ (4s) risk premium due to the compensation risk
+ (5s) adjustment of compensation for future production
+ (6s) general wage-backloading
The above decomposition fully characterizes the agent payment schedule. Before
giving detail description of each term, let us recall the structural difference of ours
from usual moral hazard models. There is capital accumulation, so that the agent’s
current effort level not only determines current production, but also affects future
output since high effort today helps to accumulate the more capital so that it also
contributes high output for the future.
Term (1s) and (2s) are easy to understand. Term (3s) is due to the fact that the
contract is based not on the unobservable agent’s effort levels, but on the observable
production realizations. (4s) follows from (3s) since the agent is risk averse. Notice
that it is proportional to the risk-aversion parameter of the agent. Terms from (1s)
to (4s) are also found in Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) and Sha¨ttler and Sung
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(1993).17 Not surprisingly those 4 terms appear in our setup as well.
Even if (3s) and (4s) are analogue to the result of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987)
and Sha¨ttler and Sung (1993), implications are quite different. The integrand of
term (3s) can be rewritten as18
θ′(e(k))e(k)ψ(e(k))
√
k =
a
λσ2
√
k
· e(k)(a− e(k))
(−a+ e(k)ψ(e(k))) .
First, the payment schedule is less volatile when k is higher. This is obvious because
in our model capital becomes relatively more important in production than the
agent’s labor as k grows. Secondly, in order to understand the effect of effort let
us fix k. Then, it is easy to see e(a−e)−a+eψ(e) is decreasing in e ∈ (e∗, a] . This tells
that more effort derives less risky payment at t, given the level of capital. This is
opposite to the result of general principal-agent models. For example, the payment
schedule of Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) in our terminology can be written as
L(T ) = − log(−q0) +
∫ T
0
e(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ce(e(t))dWt +
λ
2
∫ T
0
σ2Ce(e(t))
2dt,
where L(T ) is the lump-sum payment at T and C(e) is disutility incurred by effort
e that is not dependent on k.19 Notice C(e) is assumed to be convex, so that its
derivative, Ce(e), is increasing in e. The third term in the above equation tells
that if the agent puts more effort, then the wage schedule becomes more volatile.
This gives the agent incentives to work harder. In our model, however, as capital
17In their models, the payment occurs only at the end of the contract period T .
18This is done by substituting θ′(k) by equation (2.B.7) in the proof of Theorem 2.
19Although it is not quite proper to compare, we can define the lump-sum proxy L(T ) in our
model by L(T ) =
∫ T
0
eβtc(t) dt. By the Fubini theorem, we can change the order of integration to
get the similar form with (2.5.1). The only difference is the new one has a proper discount factor
in the integrand.
114
increases size of the shock becomes larger according to
√
k, thus it is not quite
necessary for the agent to put more effort and it is even better for the agent to work
less to have enough compensation since the probability of getting high output goes
higher as capital gets larger.
Then how does the principal make the agent to exert effort? In (5s), we rewrite
the term inside the log as
θ′(k)ψ(e(k)) =
a
λσ2k
· a− e(k)
(−a+ ψ(e(k))e(k)) .
It is also easy to see that given fixed k, a−e−a+ψ(e)e is decreasing in e ∈ (e∗, a]. Note
that the minus sign in front of term (5s). Thus, given fixed k the payment drops
instantaneously as the agent works less. Therefore, term (5s) works as adjustment
or stick through which the principal prevent the agent from decreasing too much
effort. Hence, this supports proper production at each time t to guarantee sufficient
growth.
Finally the payment schedule in our model is continuous so that the principal
must consider tradeoff of how much she compensates the agent between today and
future. Term (6s) shows this tradeoff. It comes from the drift of the agent’s con-
tinuation process, q. In the first best case, (6f) shows that the wage is back-loaded
if we ignore all the other terms since A1− β > 0 by Assumption 2. In the 2nd best
case, it is not quite obvious whether β is less than θ′(k)ψ(e(k)) for all k, but we
expect that at least numerically for reasonable parameter values.20
20Note that limk→∞ θ′(k)ψ(e(k)) = A1ψ(e∗) > A1
[
1− λa (a− e∗)
]
> β if a is big enough from
corollary 7.
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The analogous result is appeared in Sannikov (2008). He shows that the wage
can be frontloaded or backloaded depending on how patient the agent is under
the possibility of firing the manager. In particular, the frontloading occurs if the
continuation value is close enough to the threshold levels of firing the manager when
the manager is sufficiently patient. In our model, there is no reason to replace the
manager even if the capital level hits the zero boundary, while the manager should
be fired in Sannikov (2008) due to the income effect when the continuation value
is too high (meaning the firm is fairly profitable). Therefore, there is no reason for
our model to have wage-backloading.
2.6 The Capital Process near the Boundary: Implication to
Poverty Traps
Before we introduce results, we need some definitions in order to characterize the
boundary behavior of the capital process in the next propositions. Let Tx be the
first hitting time to x of k(t) and define a random time Tl+ = limx↓l Tx for l ∈ R.
The boundary l is attracting if
Pr({Tl+ ≤ Tx | k(0) = k0)} > 0, for all l < k0 < x
and is attainable if
Pr({Tl <∞|K(0) = k0}) > 0.
In other words, l is attracting if there is a positive probability for the process to hit
l and is attainable if, in addition, it can hit l in finite time.
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Proposition 17. If 4(A1−β)
λA1
≥ σ2, then the first best capital process never reaches
to the zero-boundary almost surely. If 4(A1−β)
λA1
< σ2, then the zero boundary is
attracting and attainable.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 17 shows that the capital process reaches to the zero-capital level in
finite expected time with a positive probability if σ is big enough or the subjective
discount factor is very close to A1 or the agent is fairly risk-averse, i.e.,
4(A1−β)
λA1
< σ2.
It, however, reflects into the positive region as soon as it reaches to the boundary
since
dk =
2(A1 − β)
λA1
dt at k = 0 (2.6.1)
and A1 > β by Assumption 2.
The following proposition is analogous to Proposition 17.
Proposition 18. Suppose β is small enough such that β < θ′(0).21 If 4(θ
′(0)−β)
λθ′(0) ≥
σ2, then the second best capital process never reaches to the zero-boundary almost
surely. If 4(θ
′(0)−β)
λθ′(0) < σ
2, then the zero boundary is attracting and attainable.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 18 implies that the zero-capital boundary can be obtained in finite
time, other things being equal, if either (i) σ is high enough, or (ii) the subjective
21It seems at least numerically true with reasonable parameter values. Note that the strict
concavity of the value function J requires the strict increasing property of θ(k), i.e., θ′(k) > 0 for
all k. In addition, here we requires sufficient curvature of θ(k) around 0. If this condition fails,
then after the process reaches the boundary, it not only never reflects, but also, the problem is
not well-defined. In other words, such contracts cannot satisfy the participation constraint at all.
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discount factor is close enough to θ′(0), or (iii) both agents are fairly risk averse.22
Although the basic intuition is similar to the first best case, we infer from the
under-investment result of proposition 14 that the force driving the process to grow
is much weaker in the 2nd best case.
An easy way to check this is to investigate the process near the boundary. Sim-
ilarly to the first best case, the process reflects immediately into the positive region
once it touches the zero-boundary.
dk =
2(θ′(0)− β)
λθ′(0)
dt at k = 0 (2.6.2)
From lemma 8 in the below, equations (2.6.1) and (2.6.2) tell that the speed of
escaping from the boundary is slower for the second best case than the first best.
Lemma 8. θ′(0) < A1.23
Proof. See the appendix.
In sum, under any one of conditions (i) to (iii) in the above, we have a positive
probability that the capital process hits the minimum boundary in finite time and
this probability is strictly bigger for the second best case. Although the process
reflects to the positive region as soon as it hits the boundary, it is still true that
the process may go back to the boundary in finite time and reflect again, an so
22Notice that here the subjective discount factors β’s for the the manager and the principal are
the same, so it is not a good idea to have the economic interpretation in terms of whether agents
are impatient or impatient. On the other hand, fixing β, we focus on how h, λ, and σ affect the
firm dynamics.
23Recall Assumption 2 where β < A1. Mathematically, however, it can be shown that if A1 < β,
then θ′(0) > A1. In fact proposition 17 also tells that if A1 < β, the zero-boundary is attainable.
Notice also that Lemma 8 does not say about the comparison between β and θ′(0).
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on. Under-investment, in turn, reinforces slow growth in the second best case.
Therefore, it takes much longer time for small firms to escape from t he low capital
states if they face moral hazard problems.
In the micro-finance level industrial organization theory, there is a question of
why small firms do not grow. An easy answer might be that it is due to credit
constraints. Many small firms seem to be unable to get external financing. If so,
the next question is why they do not bootstrap by saving more portion of profits.
Recent empirical studies suggest that small firms have enough profits and it is hardly
believed that their production technologies are poor (for example, see McKenzie and
Woodruff (2006) and Michael, Lee, and Robinson (2008)).
The main driving force in this model making small firms spend longer time in a
low capital status is related to the assumption that the firm has capital-size-specific
shocks (not productivity shocks), i.e., recall σ
√
kdWt term. In the accordance with
this assumption, condition (i) might be the most important condition for the firm-
level poverty trap. Also, notice that low saving (or under-investment) results from
moral hazard. Although our model does not directly aim for explaining the firm-
level poverty trap, an answer is quite related to find a mechanism that hinders
small firms from having more investment. The incentive compatibility under moral
hazard might be one of the potential answers. We hope this view may shed light
on the line of research.
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2.7 Risk Sharing and Business Cycle Implication
One might be interested in how the payment, the dividend, and the investment
change corresponding to the shocks. Suppose there is a positive shock ∆W > 0
when kt = k. In this case, we have σ
√
k∆W amount of more production. Who gets
this? (2.5.1) shows that the payment to the agent increases by
σθ′(k)e(k)ψ(e(k))
a
√
k∆W.
whereas the dividend to the principal decreases by the exactly same amount.24
So, they are offset. If there is an negative shock, we have the opposite case: the
payment decreases and the dividend increases by the same amount. This is because
the principal and the agent have the same degree of risk aversion. Intuitively it
would be the case that if the agent is more risk-averse, then he would get paid less
at a good shock and have less payment decrease at a bad shock.
The important change occurs in the investment side. The whole σ
√
k∆W is
added to investment. That is, the principal instantaneously wants the firm to grow
faster rather than to get more dividend, so that she will get compensated in the
future from higher production. However, notice that this result is not from the
moral hazard side, but from the growth setup since we have the same result in
the first best case. The information asymmetry only affects the sensitivity of the
payment corresponding to the shocks.
24From the result of theorem 2, one can verify that c(t)+d(t) is independent of q. Given capital,
the shock affects the change of the continuation value. So, the total amount of c(t) + d(t) is not
changed according to the shock.
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2.8 Other Production Functions: Constant Returns to Scales
One may be curious about whether the results of the model are robust to the
assumption for the production function. One may argue that the given production
function is too simple. In fact, if we take a different production function, then the
result will be changed. However, it is easy to show that the asymptotic growth
rate is never constant for other possibly reasonable production functions. The
constant returns to scale property is violated. Therefore, this analysis justifies
our assumption on the production function form. Basically, we investigate two
cases. both case will violate the CRS property in equilibrium so that they are not
good models for investigating firm dynamics. We also can infer that other similar
production functions are not very appropriate for a firm dynamics model.
Here we only consider the first best case when the production function is given
by f(k, e). Without loss of generality we assume that capital is fully depreciated
(δ = 0). Then, we have the following HJB equation.
βJ(k, q) = max
c,d,e,γ
up(d) + Jk[f(k, e) + e− c− d)] + Jq(βq − um(c, e))
+
1
2
(
Jkk + 2Jkqγ + Jqqγ
2
)
σ2k. (2.8.1)
Then, by using first order conditions, we have
e = a
∂f(k, e)
∂e
(2.8.2)
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2.8.1 Multiplicity
Suppose
f(k, e) = (h+ e)k
where h is some constant. Then, (2.8.2) gives
e∗t = akt.
Then, the equilibrium production is f(k, e∗) = ak2 + hk. Therefore, the expected
growth rate becomes linear in k, which does not make sense.
2.8.2 Cobb-Douglas Case
Suppose
f(k, e) = hkαe1−α
where h is some constant. Then, (2.8.2) gives
e = ((1− α)ah) 11+αk α1+α .
Then, the equilibrium production is f(k, e∗) = Ck
2α
1+α , where for some constant C.
Thus, α = 1 should be taken in order to have the CRS. This is the case where the
manager has no impact on production.
In sum, by observing cases in Subsection 2.8.1 and Subsection 2.8.2, we can
conclude that our assumption on the production function is not unreasonable in
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order to keep the constant returns to scale.
2.9 Concluding Remark
We study the moral hazard problem affecting the firm’s growth by distortion of the
investment decision. We assume that technology is an Ak with small managerial
contribution onto production. This slight modification makes huge difference on
investment and growth of economies. These results seem more relevant to the
world economic growth phenomena rather than to the individual firms. There is
still ongoing debate on the Gibrat’s law. We also do not insist that the moral
hazard problem is the main driving force of the poverty trap.25 Maybe it might
be too hasty to consider things like poverty traps in a partial equilibrium context.
However, this exercise is still meaningful in the sense that moral hazard can be a
potential problem in growth. On the other hand, in order to consider how the moral
hazard problem affect the growth rate distribution, one needs to allow possibility of
entry and exit of firms or heterogeneity of firms, which we leave as a future research
topic.
The usual asset pricing implication of the models with agency conflict is some-
times quite straightforward. Since the dividend delivered to the outside shareholders
are less than that of the first best case, the stock price of the second best is smaller
than that of the first best such as Albuquerque and Wang (2008) and Dow, Gorton,
and Krishnamurthy (2005). But, this is not quite obvious in our model due to the
nonlinearity between the amount of investment to the firm and the dividend paid to
25For literature on poverty traps, see Azariadis and Stachurski (2005).
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the capital owner, not only in the current partial equilibrium setup, but furthermore
in the aggregation of all contracts in the market. This makes the general equilibrium
analysis fairly hard, so that the problem looks untractable. One notable exception
is Sung and Wan (2008). They study a general equilibrium model of a moral-hazard
economy and suggest several important results in terms of asset pricing. But, their
model is static in the sense that investment is one time event at the beginning of
the finite horizon and neither the continuous payment and dividend nor the capital
accumulation through the continuous investment are considered. We expect that
the dynamic general equilibrium approach might lead to quite different economic
intuition.
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Appendices
2.A Proofs of Theorem 2, Proposition 12, and Corollary 5
Since the first-best solution is easy to understand through the second-best solu-
tion, we just present the explicit solution of the first-best case. All the verification
procedures are omitted.
Proof. The first order conditions are
[c] : −Jk − Jqλ exp
(
−λ(c− e
2
2a
)
)
= 0
[d] : λ exp (−λd)− Jk = 0
[e] : Jk + Jq
λe
a
exp
(
−λ(c− e
2
2a
)
)
= 0
[γ] : γ = −Jkq
Jqq
Guess the value function J as
J(k, q) =
1
q
exp(−λ θ(k)),
where θ : [0,∞)→ R is a C2 function. Then, we have
Jk = −λθ′(k)J, Jq = −J
q
,
Jkk = (−λθ′′(k) + λ2θ′(k)2)J, Jkq = λθ
′(k)
q
J, Jqq =
2
q2
J.
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From FOC [γ], we first have
γ = −λθ
′(k)q
2
. (2.A.1)
From FOC [c],
λ exp
(
−λ(c− e
2
2a
)
)
= −Jk
Jq
= −λθ′(k)q or c = e
2
2a
− 1
λ
ln(−qθ′(k)) (2.A.2)
From FOC [d],
λ exp(−λd) = −λθ′(k)J or d = θ(k)− 1
λ
ln
(
θ′(k)
−q
)
(2.A.3)
FOC [e] and (2.A.2) give the optimal effort e∗ = a, which is constant. To simplicity,
using (2.A.2) and (2.A.3) together with this constant effort we define I, the drift
term without considering depreciation δk, by
I(k) = hk − c− d+ a = hk − θ(k) + 2
λ
ln (θ′(k)) +
a
2
.
Now putting the above optimal policies into the HJB equation we derive the fol-
lowing ODE with respect to k.
β = θ′(k)− λθ′(k)(I(k)− δk)− 1
q
(βq − θ′(k)q)
+
σ2k
2
[
(−λθ′′(k) + λ2θ′(k)2) + 2λθ
′(k)
q
(−λθ′(k)q
2
)
+
2
q2
(
λ2θ′(k)2q2
4
)]
=⇒ 2β = θ′(k)(2− λI(k) + λδk)− σ
2λ
2
kθ′′(k) +
σ2λ2
4
kθ′(k)2
or 2β = θ′(k)
(
2− λ(h− δ)k + λθ(k)− 2 log(θ′(k))− λa
2
)
− σ
2λ
2
kθ′′(k) +
σ2λ2
4
kθ′(k)2
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Putting θ(k) = A1k +B1 into the above ODE, we can get
A1 =
h− δ
1 + λσ
2
4
and B1 =
1
λ
(
2(β − A1)
A1
+ 2 logA1 +
λa
2
)
.
Finally, if we plug cf , df , and ef into the capital k and continuation q processes,
the proofs of proposition 12 and Corollary 5 are completed.
2.B Proofs of Theorem 3, Proposition 13, and Corollary 6
We first characterize incentive compatibility by using a similar method to martingale
techniques developed by Sannikov (2008). For notational simplicity, let σ(k) = σ
√
k
and g(k, c, d, e) = (h− δ)k − c− d+ e. Recall the underlying process is given by
dk(t) = g(k(t), c(t), d(t), e(t))dt+ σ(k(t))dWt.
Attentive readers might be worried that σ(k) = σ
√
k does not satisfy the Lipschitz
continuity. The existence and the uniqueness, in our model with the square root
volatility, follows by classical results of Yamada and Watanabe (1971).
Given an arbitrary pair of consumption, dividend, and effort, (c, d, e) = ({ct}, {dt}, {et}),
the agent’s expected remaining utility qt at time t is defined by
qt(c, d, e) = E
e
[∫ ∞
t
e−β(s−t)um(cs, es)dt | Ft
]
, (2.B.1)
where Ee denotes the expectation under the probability measure Qe induced by
the agent’s effort e. Then, we have the following stochastic representation of the
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continuation value process, q = {qt}.
Proposition 19. There exists a progressively measurable process γ = {γt} such
that
dqt(c, d, e) = (βqt − um(ct, et))dt+ γtσ
√
k(t)
(
g(kt, ct, dt, et)
σ
√
k(t)
dt− dWt
)
. (2.B.2)
with Ee[
∫ t
0
γ2sds] <∞ for all t ∈ [0,∞).
Proof. This can be easily shown by a standard application of the Martingale Rep-
resentation Theorem (see theorem 1.3.13 of Karatzas and Shreve (1991)). One can
also find the formal argument in the proof of proposition 1 of Sannikov (2008).
Proposition 20. Given the contract (c, d, e) = ({ct}, {dt}, {et}), suppose γt is the
process from Proposition 19 representing qt(c, d, e). Then, e is incentive compatible
if and only if
um(ct, et)− γtg(kt, ct, dt, et) ≥ um(ct, e′)− γtg(kt, ct, dt, e′), ∀e′ ∈ E (2.B.3)
for all t ∈ [0,∞) and Qe-almost surely
Proof. The proof is basically the same as the proof of proposition 2 in Sannikov
(2008). On the other hands, equivalently, one can refer the comparison theorem
(Theorem 3.2 in El Karoui, Peng, and Quenez (2001)): The necessary and sufficient
condition for q(0) being maximized is to minimize the drift term. More general
proof (in the finite horizon) can be found in Proposition 5.1 in Williams (2009) or
Theorem 4.2 in Schattler and Sung (1993).
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Notice that condition (2.B.3) is equivalent to condition (2.3.1) since d is irrel-
evant as seen in the equation. Therefore, we have γt = γt(ct, et). Then, the first
order condition to (2.3.1) pins down γ = γ(c, e) as in (2.3.2), i.e.,
γ(c, e) = − ∂um(c, e)/∂e
∂g(k, c, d, e)/∂e
= −∂um
∂e
(c, e) =
λe
a
exp
(−λ(c− e2/2a)) .
The above qt plays as a role of a state variable for the principal’s utility maximization
problem. Then, (k(t), q(t)) provides the principal’s problem a Markovian structure.
Notice that from the direct calculation we have
γc(c, e) = −λγ(c, e), γe(c, e) = a+ λe
2
ae
γ(c, e),
um(c, e) = − a
λe
γ(c, e),
∂um
∂c
(c, e) =
aγ(c, e)
e
,
∂um
∂e
(c, e) = −γ(c, e) (2.B.4)
We will use (2.B.4) for notational convenience when we calculate the first order
conditions. Then, the first order conditions to Bellman equation (2.3.3) are given
by
[c] : − Jk − Jquc(c, e)− [Jkqγ(c, e) + Jqqγ2(c, e)]λσ2k = 0.
[d] : λ exp(−λd)− Jk = 0.
[e] : Jk − Jque(c, e) + [Jkqγ(c, e) + Jqqγ2(c, e)]a+ λe
2
ae
σ2k = 0.
Proofs of Proposition 13 and Corollary 6
The following is the proof for Proposition 13 and Corollary 6 given that solution
J(k, q) to the Bellman equation (2.3.3) is the value of the principal when k0 = k
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and q0 = q.
Proof. Similarly to the first best case we also guess the value function J as
J(k, q) =
1
q
exp(−λθ(k)).
From FOC [c], FOC [e], and (2.B.4) we can get
− Jk − Jquc(c, e) + (Jk − Jque(c, e)) λae
a+ λe2
= 0
=⇒ λθ′(k) + 1
q
(
aγ(c, e)
e
)
+
(
−λθ′(k)− γ(c, e)
q
)
λae
a+ λe2
= 0
=⇒ λθ′(k)a+ λe
2 − λae
a+ λe2
+
γ(c, e)
q
a2
e(a+ λe2)
= 0
=⇒ γ(c, e) = λ(−q)θ′(k)e(a+ λe
2 − λae)
a2
≡ λ
a
(−q)θ′(k) e ψ(e), (2.B.5)
where
ψ(e(k)) =
a+ λe(k)2 − λae(k)
a
.
(2.B.5) yields the optimal consumption for the agent
c =
e(k)2
2a
− 1
λ
ln ((−q)θ′(k)ψ(e(k)))) . (2.B.6)
Putting (2.B.5) back into FOC [c],
λθ′(k) +
1
q
(
aγ(c, e)
e
)
− λσ2k
[
λθ′(k)
q
γ(c, e) +
2
q2
γ(c, e)2
]
= 0
=⇒ 1− ψ(e)− λ
2σ2
a2
k(−a+ 2ψ(e)e)ψ(e)eθ′(k) = 0
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or θ′(k) =
a(a− e(k))
λσ2kψ(e(k))(−a+ 2ψ(e(k))e(k)) (2.B.7)
From FOC [d],
λ exp(−λd) = −λθ′(k)J
=⇒ d = θ(k)− 1
λ
ln
(
θ′(k)
−q
)
(2.B.8)
Similarly to the first best case, using (2.B.6) and (2.B.8), we define I(k), the drift
term of the capital process without considering the depreciation δk by
I(k;θ(k), θ′(k), e(k)) = hk − c− d+ e
= hk − θ(k)− e(k)
2
2a
+ e(k) +
1
λ
ln
(
ψ(e(k))θ′(k)2
)
(2.B.9)
Putting the above optimal policies into the HJB equation, we get
β = θ′(k)− λθ′(k)(I(k)− δk)− 1
q
(
βq +
a
λe
γ(c, e)
)
+
σ2k
2
[
(−λθ′′(k) + λ2θ′(k)2) + 2λθ
′(k)
q
γ(c, e) +
2
q2
γ(c, e)2
]
or
2β = θ′(k)
[
1 + ψ(e(k))− λ(h− δ)k + λθ(k) + λe(k)
2
2a
− λe(k)− ln (ψ(e(k))θ′(k)2)]
− λσ
2k
2
θ′′(k) +
λ2σ2kθ′(k)2
2
[
1− 2
a
e(k)ψ(e(k)) +
2
a2
e(k)2ψ(e(k))2
]
(2.B.10)
Now the system of the ordinary differential equations is derived by manipulating
(2.B.5) and (2.B.10). It is described at the end of this proof. Then, plugging cs,
ds, and es into kt and qt processes, we completes the proofs of Proposition 13 and
Corollary 6.
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The following is the way of deriving the system of the ordinary differential equa-
tions. First note that we have
kθ′′(k) =
2
σ2λ
θ′(k)[1 + ψ(e(k))− λI(k) + λδk]
+ λk
[
1− 2
a
e(k)ψ(e(k)) +
2
a2
e(k)2ψ(e(k))2
]
θ′(k)2 − 4β
σ2λ
.
Notice that the numerical algorithm is in the next subsection.
1. Let us define functions H and G such that
H(e, k) =
a(a− e)
λσ2kψ(e)(−a+ 2ψ(e)e)
G(e, θ0, θ1, k) =
2
σ2λ
θ1[1 + ψ(e)− λI(k; θ0, θ1, e) + λδk]
+ λk
[
1− 2
a
eψ(e) +
2
a2
e2ψ(e)2
]
θ21 −
4β
σ2λ
2. Rewrite (2.B.7) and (2.B.10) as
θ′(k) = H(e(k), k) (2.B.11)
kθ′′(k) = G(e(k), θ(k), θ′(k), k). (2.B.12)
3. Taking a derivative in (2.B.11) with respect to k,
θ′′(k) = H1(e(k), k)e′(k) +H2(e(k), k). (2.B.13)
4. From (2.B.12) and (2.B.13) we have the following system of 1st order ordinary
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differential equations with two variables (e(k), θ(k)):
e′(k) =
G(e(k), θ(k), H(e(k), k), k)
kH1(e(k), k)
− H2(e(k), k)
H1(e(k), k)
:= F (e(k), θ(k), k)
θ′(k) = H(e(k), k) (2.B.14)
Proof of Theorem 3 (Verification)
Proof. Suppose J(k, q) is a solution to the Bellman equation (2.3.3). For any in-
centive compatible contract {c, d, e}, define the principal’s auxiliary gain process G
by
Gt(c, d, e) =
∫ t
0
e−βsum(ds)ds+ e−βtJ(kt, qt)
where kt and qt are capital and continuation value processes induced by {c, d, e} as
in Proposition 19. We will show that Gt is super-martingale and indeed martingale
when {c, d, e} is an optimal contract. By Ito’s lemma, we have
dGt = βe
−βtAtdt+ βe−βtσ
√
kt(Jk(kt, qt)− qJq(kt, qt)λ
a
θ′(kt)e(kt)ψ(e(kt)))dWt
where the drift term At is
At = up(dt)− βJ(kt, qt) + Jk((h− δ)kt + et − ct − dt) + Jq(βqt − um(ct, et))
+
1
2
(Jkk + 2Jkqγ(ct, et) + Jqqγ(ct, et)
2)σ2kt.
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Now it is easy to see that At is nonpositive by (2.3.3) and zero at optimum (c, d, e)
as in Proposition 13. Therefore, we are left to show that the diffusion term of Gt
at optimal {c, d, e} is bounded. The drift term can be rewritten as
σ exp(−θ(t))
(
−λθ′(kt) + λ
a
θ′(kt)e(kt)ψ(e(kt))
)
e−βt
√
kt
qt
.
Note that θ′(k), e(k), and ψ(e(k)) are all bounded by Lemma 7 and Lemma 9.
exp(−θ(t)) is also bounded. Thus, we need to show e−βt
√
kt
qt
is a square integrable,
i.e., for any T <∞,
E
[∫ T
0
e−βs
√
ks
qs
ds
]
<∞. (2.B.15)
Notice that qt should be bounded away from 0 for any time T . Suppose qt reaches
0 in some finite time S. This implies the payment ct takes infinite value at t = S,
which is never feasible. Therefore, (2.B.15) should be satisfied. This completes the
proof.
2.C Proof of Lemma 7 and 8
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. (1) Recall from the proof of Theorem 2
θ′(k) =
a(a− e(k))
λσ2kψ(e(k))(−a+ 2ψ(e(k))e(k)) > 0. (2.C.1)
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It is easy to see e(0) = a, otherwise θ′(k)→∞ as k → 0. Note that e(k) is C1 and
e(0) = a. Suppose k is small. Then, it is easy to see that
ψ(e(k))(−a+ 2ψ(e(k))e(k)) > 0 when e(k) ∈ (a− ², a+ ²)
for some ² > 0 by the continuity of e(k). Thus, it must be that case e(k) < a for
such k. Once e(k) enters the region below a, it cannot across a as k grows, otherwise
it violates θ′(k) > 0.
(2) Notice that ψ(e) > 0 for e ∈ [e∗, a]. Suppose not, i.e., limk→∞ e(k) < e∗.
This implies ψ(e(k))(−a + 2ψ(e(k))e(k)) is bounded away from 0. Then, kθ′(k) is
bounded by (2.C.1). It follows that
lim
k→∞
θ′(k) = 0, lim
k→∞
θ′′(k) = 0, lim
k→∞
kθ′(k)2 = 0, lim
k→∞
kθ′′(k) = 0 (2.C.2)
Consider ODE (2.B.10) derived from the bellman equation in the proof of Theorem
2.
2β = θ′(k)[1 + ψ(e(k))− I(k; (θ(k), θ′(k), e(k) + λδk]− λσ
2k
2
θ′′(k)
+
λ2σ2kθ′(k)2
2
[
1− 2
a
e(k)ψ(e(k)) +
2
a2
e(k)2ψ(e(k))2
]
.
Taking k →∞ on both sides, we get
2β = −λ(h− δ) lim
k→∞
kθ′(k)
using (2.C.2), which is a contradiction since the right hand side is non-positive.
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Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. Let us define a function f : (0,∞)→ R such that
f(x) =
1
λ
[
2β
x
− 2 + 2 log x+ λa
2
]
.
Then, B1 = f(A1) and θ(0) = f(θ
′(0)). First notice that θ(0) < B1 since the
first best solution is always bigger than the second best solution. Otherwise it
would be that the first best effort and the second best effort should be equal. But,
it is not true. f(x) has the global minimum value at x = β. limx→0 f(x) = ∞
and limk→∞ f(x) = ∞. f(x) is strictly decreasing in (0, β) and strictly increasing
in (β,∞). Notice again A1 > β. Then, it is easy to see that θ′(0) < A1 since
f(θ′(0)) < f(A1). Sketching the graph of f(x) confirms the proof.)
2.D Proof of Proposition 14 and Proposition 15
Lemma 9
First, we need following lemma that is useful to show the limiting behavior of the
investment level.
Lemma 9. (1) limk→∞
θ(k)
k
= limk→∞ θ′(k) = A1.
(2) limk→∞ k(−a+ 2ψ(e(k))e(k)) = a(a−e∗)λσ2A1ψ(e∗)
(3) limk→∞ k2e′(k) = − a(a−e∗)2λσ2A1ψ(e∗)(ψ′(e∗)e∗+ψ(e∗))
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(4) limk→∞(A1 − θ′(k))k = −∞.
Proof. (1) Since θ(k)
k
< A1 +
B1
k
, it is straightforward limk→∞
θ(k)
k
≤ A1. Note
θ(k) ∈ C2 so that the limit must exist and let limk→∞ θ(k)k = limk→∞ θ′(k) = x.
Then, dividing ODE (2.B.10) in the proof of Theorem 2 by k and taking the limit,
we get
x = −λσ
2
4
x+ (h− δ) or x = h− δ
1 + λσ
2
4
= A1
since e(k) and ψ(e(k)) are bounded and ψ(e(k))e(k)→ a
2
and θ′′(k)→ 0 as k →∞.
(2) Recall θ′(k) = a(a−e(k))
λσ2kψ(e(k))(−a+ψ(e(k))e(k)) . Then, taking limit on the both sides to
get the required result.
(3) Applying L’Hopital’s rule to (2), we can easily get the required result.
(4) Again by L’Hopital’s rule it is equivalent to show limk∞ k2θ′′(k) = −∞. Rear-
ranging ODE (2.B.10), we have
λσ2
2
k2θ′′(k) = θ′(k)kΦ(k),
where
Φ(k) := 1 + ψ(e(k)) +
λe(k)2
2a
− λe(k)− log(ψ(e(k))θ′(k)2)− 2β
θ′(k)
− λ(h− δ)k + λθ(k) + λσ
2θ′(k)
2
k
[
1− 2
a
ψ(e(k))e(k) +
2
a2
ψ(e(k))2e(k)2
]
It is enough to show that there are positive numbers ² and K such that Φ(k) < −²
for all k > K. First, we can write a Lorentz series
1− 2
a
ψ(e(k))e(k) +
2
a2
ψ(e(k))2e(k)2 ≈ 1
2
+
b2
k2
+
b3
k3
+ · · · (2.D.1)
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since from (2) we can express ψ(e(k))e(k) ≈ a
2
+ a1
k
+ a2
k
+ · · · for some constants
ai’s and bi’s. Note that there is no
1
k
term in series (2.D.1). Second, we know
θ(k) < A1k + B2. Using these two facts together with (1), we have there exists
some number K such that if k > K,
Φ(k) < 1 + ψ(e∗) +
λe∗2
2a
− λe∗ − log(ψ(e∗)A21)−
2β
A1
− λ(h− δ)k + λA1k + λB1 + λσ
2A1
2
[
k
2
+
b1
k
]
+ δ1
< 1 + ψ(e∗) +
λe∗2
2a
− λe∗ − log(ψ(e∗)A21)−
2β
A1
+ λB1 + δ2
for some small numbers δ1, δ2 > 0 since A1 =
h−δ
1+λσ
2
4
. Now we are left to show that
1 + ψ(e∗) +
λe∗2
2a
− λe∗ − log(ψ(e∗)θ′(k)2)− 2β
A1
+ λB1 < 0
⇐⇒ 3λe
∗2 − 4λae∗ + λa2
2a
− log(ψ(e∗))− 2 log
(
A1
θ′(0)
)
< 0 (2.D.2)
Now define G(e) = 3λe
∗2−4λae∗+λa2
2a
− log
(
a+λe2−λae
a
)
for e ∈ [a/2, a]. It is easy to
show that
G′(e) < 0, for e ∈ (a/2, a), and G′(a) = 0
if a ≥ 1. Hence G(e) attains the maximum at e = a and it is 0. On the other hand
θ′(0) < A1 by Lemma 8. This shows (2.D.2). So, the proof is completed.
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Proof of Proposition 14
Proof. Recall from Theorem 1 and 2
B1 =
1
λ
[
2(β − A1)
A1
+ 2 log(A1) +
λa
2
]
,
θ(0) =
1
λ
[
2(β − θ′(0))
θ′(0)
+ 2 log(θ′(0)) +
λa
2
]
.
Using the above equations, it is straightforward from (2.4.1) that
If (0)− Is(0) = 2β
λ
[
1
θ′(0)
− 1
A1
]
since A(k) is bounded and e(0) = a. Hence, If (0) > Is(0) from Lemma 8.
Proof of Proposition 15
Proof. We first rearrange ODE (2.B.14) in the proof of Theorem 2 that is derived
from the HJB equation as following. This is an analogue to the 1st best solution
(A1k +B1):
θ(k) = A(k)k +B(k), (2.D.3)
where
A(k) := (h− δ) + σ
2θ′′(k)
2θ′(k)
− λσ
2θ′(k)
2
[
1− 2
a
e(k)ψ(e(k)) +
2
a2
e(k)2ψ(e(k))2
]
B(k) :=
2β
λθ′(k)
− 2
λ
− 3e(k)
2
2a
+ 2e(k) +
1
λ
log(ψ(e(k))θ′(k)2)
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Replacing θ(k) of (2.4.1) with (2.D.3), we have
If (k)− Is(k) = (A(k)− A1)k + 2β
λ
[
1
θ′(k)
− 1
A1
]
− e(k)
2
a
+ e(k). (2.D.4)
From (1) and (3) in Lemma 9, (2.D.3), and (2.D.4), to show (2.4.2) is equivalent to
show that limk→∞(A(k)− A1)k = −∞. We have
A(k)−A1 =
(h− δ)λσ2
4
1 + 4λσ
2
4
+
σ2θ′′(k)
2θ′(k)
−λσ
2θ′(k)
2
[
1− 2
a
e(k)ψ(e(k)) +
2
a2
e(k)2ψ(e(k))2
]
.
Note that limk→∞ kθ′′(k) = 0 and limk→∞ ψ(e(k))e(k) = a2 . Thus,
lim
k→∞
(A(k)− A1)k = λσ
2
4
lim
k→∞
(A1 − θ′(k)) k = −∞
by (4) of Lemma 9, which shows (2.4.2). Now, it is straightforward to see (2.4.3)
since
If (k)− Is(k)
k
=
θ(k)
k
− A1 + 1
k
× [ some bounded term ]
from (2.4.1).
2.E Proof of Proposition 16
Proof. Here we only show the 2nd best solution since the 1st best solution is ob-
tained in the same way. We solve (2.3.9) to get the explicit form of the agent’s
continuation value. By Ito’s lemma, we have
log(−qt) = log(−q0) +
∫ t
0
(β − θ′(ks)ψ(e(ks))) ds
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−
∫ t
0
λσ
a
e(ks)θ
′(ks)ψ(e(ks))
√
ksdWs
− 1
2
∫ t
0
σ2λ2
a2
e(ks)
2 (θ′(ks))
2
ψ(e(ks))
2k(s)ds (2.E.1)
Putting (2.E.1) into the optimal consumption in Theorem 2, we can rewrite the
instantaneous payment schedule for the agent as the stochastic version (2.5.1) with
a single state variable kt.
2.F Proof of Proposition 17 and 18
Proof of Proposition 17
Proof. Now, for proposition 17 we use the results of Lemma 6.1 and 6.2 in Karlyn
and Taylor (1981) (henceforce KT). We first define
s(ξ) = exp
(
−
∫ ξ
ξ0
2a1k + 2b1
σ2k
dk
)
and S(x) =
∫ x
x0
s(ξ)dξ,
where a1 = h− δ −A1 and b1 = 2(A1−β)λA1 . Note that a1k + b1 is the drift term of the
1st-best capital process. Here, ξ0 and x0 are some constants whose value are not
important for the proof. Notice that a1 > 0 and b1 > 0 by assumption.
Let S(0, c1] = S(c1)− limx↓0 S(x) for some c1 > 0. We have
S(x) = C(ξ0)
∫ x
x0
e−
2a1
σ2
ξξ−
2b1
σ2 dξ
with some constant C(ξ0) only depending on ξ0. If 2b1 ≥ σ2, then S(0, c1] = ∞,
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which shows that the capital process never reaches the zero-boundary almost surely
by Lemma 6.1 of KT. On the other hands, if 2b1 < σ
2, then S(0, c1] is finite, which
means the zero-boundary is attracting.
To show the attainability, we define m(x) and Σ(l) by
m(x) =
1
σ2xs(x)
and Σ(l) =
∫ l0
l
(∫ l0
η
m(ξ)dξ
)
S(η)dη.
Note l0 is any positive number. Then, we have
Σ(0) = C(ξ0, x0)
∫ l0
0
(∫ l0
η
e
2a1
σ2
ξξ
2b1
c2
−1dξ
)
e
−2a1
σ2
ηη−
2b1
c2 dη
for some constants C(ξ0, x0) only depending on ξ0 and x0. Since −1 < 2bσ2 − 1 < 0,
we have
(∫ l0
η
e
2a1
σ2
ξξ
2b1
c2
−1dξ
)
< M bounded by some constant M as η ↓ 0 and thus
Σ(0) < MC(ξ0, x0)
∫ l0
0
e
−2a1
σ2
ηη−
2b1
σ2 dη <∞,
which shows that the zero-boundary is attainable by Lemma 6.2 of KT.
Proof of Proposition 18
Proof. Now, the proof of proposition 18 is analogous to that of proposition 17. we
also use the results of Lemma 6.1 and 6.2 in KT. We first define s(ξ) and S(x) by
s(ξ) = exp
(
−
∫ ξ
ξ0
µ(k)
σ2k
dk
)
(µ(k) is the drift of k(t)-process )
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= exp
(
−
∫ ξ
ξ0
2(h− δ)k − 2θ(k)− e(k)2
a
+ 2e(k) + 2
λ
log(θ′(k)2ψ(e(k)))
σ2k
dk
)
and
S(x) =
∫ x
x0
s(ξ)dξ = C(ξ0)
∫ x
x0
exp
(
−2(h− δ)
σ2
ξ
)
L(ξ)dξ,
where C(ξ0) is a constant only dependent on ξ0 and
L(ξ) = exp
(
−
∫ ξ
ξ0
−2θ(k)− e(k)2
a
+ 2e(k) + 2
λ
log(θ′(k)2ψ(e(k)))
σ2k
dk
)
.
Here, ξ0 and x0 are any positive constants. We want to check whether S(0) is finite
or infinite. If S(0) is infinite, we next need to check if Σ(0) is finite or infinite. (The
definition of Σ(l) is in the proof of proposition 17.) By the continuity of θ(k), θ′(k)
and e(k), we have with some constant C1(ξ0)
L(ξ) ≈ C1(ξ0)ξ−
−2θ(0)+a+ 2
λ
log(θ′(0)2)
σ2 for sufficiently small ξ > 0.
Thus, we can apply the similar argument as in proposition 17 to show the assertion.
The important criteria in proposition 17 is the size comparison between 2b1 =
4(A1−λ1)
λA1
and σ2. Similarly here −2θ(0) + a + 2
λ
log(θ′(0)) plays the same role with
2b1. Finally, notice that −2θ(0) + a + 2λ log(θ′(0)) = 4(θ
′(0)−β)
λθ′(0) . This completes the
proof.
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Chapter 3
Notes on Reputational Lending and Financial
Crises
3.1 Introduction
We propose to study financial crises as transitions from ”good” to ”bad” regimes,
or steady states, triggered by random shocks and facilitated by non-interventionist
economic policies. By ”good” states we mean bubble-like equilibria with strong
lending and a mixture of desirable and undesirable properties. These equilibria
feature high aggregate income, inflated asset prices, much unsecured borrowing
and consumption smoothing, and complete re-allocation of capital. We view such
regimes as welfare-desirable or ”constrained efficient”; they provide as much wel-
fare as could be furnished by a hypothetical central planner endowed with all the
allocative powers of existing markets. On the minus side, bubble states are fragile
or dynamically unstable in technical language.
”Bad” states or regimes are fundamental equilibria in which all borrowing is
frozen.1 These states have inferior welfare features among which are low values for
asset prices, lending and aggregate income, limited consumption smoothing, and
1The borrowing is only secured by collateral if a collateral asset is introduced in the model.
The same is the logic of the freezing reputational lending under the presence of the collateral asset.
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poor allocation of capital. We regard such states as ”constrained inefficient”; they
could be bettered by a central planner. To make matters worse, fundamental states
are dynamically stable and inherently difficult to change.
Our aim is to propose the simplest possible frame of reference that captures the
key properties of those two states, as articulated in the previous two paragraphs, to
describe the transition from the bubble regime to the fundamental one, and then to
ask the obvious policy questions: Are there activist policies that can alter or reverse
the stability properties of the two regimes? Is it possible to rule out convergence to
the bad state? By which policies?
We consider a two sector production economy with sectoral productivity shocks.
The financial market is complete and it includes a productive capital asset and con-
tingent claims. For simplicity we ignore collateral lending, factor accumulation,
aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) shocks, and labor markets. Instead we
only focus on the sectoral allocation of fixed capital stock through the financial
system which reallocates capital from the low marginal product of capital (MPK)
sector to the high MPK sector. Rapid reallocation leads to good economic outcomes
and slow reallocation due to a freeze of the capital market leads to bad outcomes.
The price of capital reflects MPK (or dividends) plus the shadow value of con-
straints; Equilibrium leverage is endogenously determined so as to rule out default.
In this model the crisis is an unwinding of a reputational bubble which destroys
unsecured lending. Investors in each sector plan to buy capital for the event of high
future MPK. This investment can be financed partly by internal funds (reduced
current consumption) and partly by contingent loans. We assume that all loans
are secured by reputation which conveys right to participate in future asset mar-
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kets; default is punished by perpetual market exclusion.2 Then, reputation can be
considered as a bubble: It is high-valued if the expected leverage is high, but not
otherwise. Dynamic complementarity connects future debt/equity limits to current
ones. Shrinking debt limits reduce investment demand and capital asset prices,
slow down capital reallocation from the low MPK to the high MPK sector, and
eventually hurt GDP.
One of the key features of the financial crisis is that the movement of the stock
price is more volatile than the fundament (macroeconomic) variable, i.e., output or
GDP. Moreover, the magnitude of the price drop is also much higher than that of
output. Suppose that the investors have log utility functions. In the baseline model
(in section 2), the price of capital and output turn out perfectly correlated, so that
the percentage change in the price is exactly the same as the percentage change in
output. However, if we introduce public debt, we can generate a higher volatility in
the stock price than in output, which results from the investors’ optimal portfolio
choice between government debt and stocks. We provide a reasonable calibration
exercise about this as well.
Nevertheless, if the preference is log and public debt is available, the sum of the
market capitalization and the total amount of pubic debt is still perfectly correlated
with the output. This result suggests a surprisingly simple empirical prediction: Big
fluctuation in stock prices and small fluctuations in output are equivalent to the
following events: The ex-post return on stocks is lower (higher) than the ex-post
return on public debt when the ex-post return on stocks is negative (positive). We
verify that these phenomena have been accrued during all the recession periods in
2Default is punished by seizure of collateral in the case of collateral borrowing.
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U.S. since 1960.
The closest paper to ours perhaps is Kocherlakota (2009) in the sense that
the existence of bubbles in his model is related with production efficiency. He
introduced the bubble bursting mechanism inspired by Kiyotaki and Moore (2008)
which is based on collateral borrowing and lending. However, Kocherlakota (2009)
does not consider unsecured reputational lending. In collateral-asset-based models
like his, the bubble component of the price reflects collateral services (shadow value
of debt constraints) with a given exogenous leverage. In particular, models with
collateral constraints need to assume no dividends from collateral assets and no
utility gain from the dividend. Otherwise, the bubble vanishes. In our paper, the
unsecured reputational lending is critical to play a role of bubble. Geanakoplos
(1997, 2002, 2009) considers an incomplete market collateral general equilibrium
models with heterogenous-belief agents. A particular aspect of Genakoplos (1997,
2002, 2009) is that the model allows for endogenous default. So his models can
generate endogenous leverage, but unfortunately do not show the dynamic features
of the financial crisis. Azariadis and Kaas (2009) consider the similar framework
with this paper, but in their model there is no financial asset.
The rest of paper is as follows. Section 1 introduces the model set-up. Section
2 analyzes a baseline case and its properties. The model is extended for economies
with public debt in section 3. Section 4 concludes. All the proofs are in appendix
A. Appendix B describes the detailed dynamics of the internal finance case; for
example, it covers the transition density function of the internal finance economy.
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3.2 Set-up
We assume for simplicity that there are two sectors i = 1, 2 in the economy. In this
model, we abstract from total factor productivity shocks and only focus on sectoral
technology shocks. This means that the technology frontier does not fluctuate, but
instead the capital mis-allocation in each sector may play the same role as TFP
fluctuations in a business cycle such as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Azariadis
and Kaas (2009).
There are two states st ∈ {1, 2}. Define history st = (s0, s1, . . . , st) and St by
the set of all st’s. Let st+1 = (st, st+1). The transition density pi(s
t|sτ ) for t > τ ≥ 0
is given by
pi(s′|s) = Pr(st+1 = s′|st = s).
Each sector is populated by continuum of entrepreneurs and workers with equal
mass. Entrepreneurs with a unit measure at each sector have common utility pref-
erence:
u¯i = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ci(s
t))|s0
]
=
∞∑
t=0
∑
st∈St
βtpi(st|s0)u(ci(st)),
where u(·) is a general common utility function with strict concavity. Each en-
trepreneur has a proprietary constant returns to scale (CRS) production technology
F (K,N), where K is capital (or land holding) and N is labor from workers within
the sector. Output Y (i, st) of sector i at state st is
Y (i, st) = z(i, st)F (k(i, st), N(st)),
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where z(i, st) = 1 if st = i and zi(s
t) = α ∈ [0, 1] if st 6= i. However, without loss of
generality we set α = 0. k(i, st) is capital of investors in sector i at history st.
Later we will see the general case. For simplicity, first we assume an Ak-
technology and abstract from labor, i.e.,
F (K,N) = K.
Furthermore, we assume that capital (land) is non-depreciable and non-producible
durable good with fixed supply:
k(1, st) + k(2, st) = 2, ∀st ∈ St.
Investors produce, consume, and trade financial assets, which will be specified
shortly. Let us define p(st) by the price of capital given history st in period t.
The return (yield) on capital, Q(i, st), is defined by
Q(i, st) =
z(i, st) + p(st)
p(st−1)
. (3.2.1)
There two kinds of contingent claims in the market for consumption and capital.
Their prices are q(st, st+1) and qK(s
t, st+1) with current history s
t and future state
st+1. By no-arbitrage, the price of capital is given by
p(st) =
∑
st+1
qk(s
t, st+1),
The quantities of each claim purchased by investors in sector i are defined as
b(i, st, st+1) and k(i, s
t, st+1) respectively. Then the budget constraint of agent i
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is given by
c(i, st) +
∑
st+1
[
qk(s
t, st+1)k(i, s
t, st+1) + q(s
t, st+1)b(i, s
t, st+1)
]
= b(i, st) +Q(i, st)p(st−1)k(i, st). (3.2.2)
The expected payoff of Investor i at history st is defined by
v(i, st) = E
[ ∞∑
j=0
βju[c(i, st+j)]|st
]
.
Investors have the following debt constraint
(1 + λ(i, st))b(i, st) + λ(i, st)p(st)k(i, st) ≥ 0, (3.2.3)
where λ(i, st) is the endogenous leverage ratio for agent i in history st, in other
words, λ(i, st) is the largest allowable ratio of debt to net worth and endogenously
set by market to deter default in all possible histories soon, which will be specified
clearly in the definition of the equilibrium later.
3.3 Without Public Debt
This section characterizes the properties of the equilibria in the economy where
there is no public debt. Let us start with the definition of competitive equilibrium.
Definition 2. A quantity list (c(i, st), k(i, st), b(i, st)), a price list (p(st), q(st, st+1), qk(s
t, stt+ 1), Q(i, s
t)),
and leverage ratio λ(i, st) are a competitive equilibrium if, for each st, they satisfy
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the following requirements:
(i) HHs maximize payoff v(i, st) subject to debt and budget constraints in (3.2.2)
and (3.2.3).
(ii) Markets clear, in other words,
(Goods)
∑
i=1,2
c(i, st) = k(h, st), for h = st
(Capital)
∑
i=1,2
k(i, st) = 2
(Consumption)
∑
i=1,2
b(i, st) = 0.
(iii) Leverage ratios are the largest values λ(i, st) consistent with no default in any
history, i.e.,
E
[ ∑
st+jÂst
βju[c(i, st+j)]|st
]
≥ VIF (k(i, st)), (3.3.1)
where VIF (k) is the payoff of autarky or internal finance for given capital k.
The LHS of (3.3.1) is the payoff from solvency given history st; the RHS is the
payoff from default (i.e, from financial autarky) at t with capital k(i, st). In autarky,
the agent can trade capital but cannot participate the loan market. More precisely,
the agent can buy and sell claims on capital but cannot buy and sell claims on
consumption.
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3.3.1 Optimal Bubble States: Reputational Lending
Here we first characterize the optimal bubble states with reputational lending, which
is the limited enforcement equilibrium with debt constraints. We first assume that
u(1) ≥ θu(2) + (1− θ)u(0) (3.3.2)
with θ ≡ (1− βpi)/(1 + β − 2βpi).
Theorem 4. Suppose (3.3.2) holds. Then the equal-treatment allocation is a com-
petitive equilibrium with high unsecured lending and slack debt limits. More pre-
cisely, we have perfect consumption smoothing, perfect capital mobility, and maxi-
mal aggregate output
c(i, st) = 1,∀(i, st)
k(i, st) =
 2 if i = st0 if i 6= st
y(st) = 2,∀st
and prices for capital, claims on consumption, and claims on capital are given by
p(st) =
β
1− β
q(st, s′) = βpi(s′|st)
qk(s
t, s′) =
q(st, s′)
1− β .
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The financial portfolio of investors is
b(i, st) =

−1
1−β if i = st
1
1−β if i 6= st
and the leverage ratio is
λ(i, st) ≥ 1
2β − 1 .
Proof. See the appendix.
The efficient equilibrium has perfect consumption smoothing and perfect capital
mobility. This efficiency helps to produce the maximum amount of consumption
goods so that the current price is the highest. Notice that the yield on equity in
the efficient equilibrium is Q(i, st) = 1
β
. The price of capital is, in fact, rewritten as
p(st) =
β
2(1− β)k(h, s
t), for s = st (3.3.3)
where k(st, st) is the amount of capital held by the productive investor (or the
sector with a good technology shock). This relationship is also true not for the
suboptimal case alone and but also for the intermediate transition from the efficient
equilibrium to the inefficient equilibrium. This tells that the price of capital and
output are perfectly correlated.
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Figure 3.1: Internal Finance Equilibrium Dynamics: (k¯, p¯) = ( 2β
1−β ,
β2
1−β2 ) ≈ 12(k∗, p∗)
if β ≈ 1.
3.3.2 Suboptimal No-Bubble States: Internal Finance
Now, we analyze the suboptimal no-bubble state, which does not allow any bor-
rowing and lending, so investors only rely on internal finance. This equilibrium is
unintermediated and financially autarkic. No loan is available and no financial asset
is traded, but spot market trades exchanging capital for consumption are open.
Decisions generally depend on the entire history of events. Now the budget
constraint of investor i at current history st is
c(i, st) +
∑
st+1
qk(s
t, st+1)k(i, s
t, st+1) = W (i, s
t) =
 (p(s
t) + 1)k(i, st) if i = st
p(st)k(i, st) if i 6= st
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where W (i, st) is the financial wealth of the investor. Investment decision simplifies
when u(c) = log(c) such as
c(i, st) = (1− β)W (i, st)∑
st+1
qk(s
t, st+1)k(i, s
t, st+1) = βW (i, s
t)
We characterize the dynamics of the internal finance equilibrium.
Theorem 5. Let kt be the amount of capital owned by a productive sector and
pt = p(s
t). Then, we have
pt =
β
2(1− β)kt. (3.3.4)
The aggregate output dynamics of (kt, pt) obeys
kt+1 =
 2(1− β) + βkt, if st+1 = st (w.p. pi),2β − βkt, if st+1 6= st (w.p. 1− pi), (3.3.5)
and
pt+1 =
 β + βpt, if st+1 = st (w.p. pi)β2
1−β − βpt, if st+1 6= st (w.p. 1− pi)
(3.3.6)
Proof. See the appendix.
The internal finance equilibrium is volatile with invariant set [0, 2] and unknown
asymptotic distribution. (See the figure 3.1.) If the sectoral shocks have positive
persistence (pi ≈ 1), then economy spends much time on a path to the efficient state
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k∗ = 2 and p∗ = β
1−β If the sectoral shocks have negative persistence (pi ≈ 0), then
economy spends much time gyrating around k¯ = 2β
1+β
and p¯ = β
2
1−β2 .
3.3.3 Comparison
Here we compare the allocations at the efficient and the inefficient states. Let index
eff represent the efficient equilibrium and index in represent the internal finance
equilibrium. Then, for output per capita, Yt, we have
Y eff = 1 > Y in(kt), ∀t
where kt is capital held by the productive sector. For price of capital,
P eff =
β
1− β > P
in(kt).
On the other hand, the baseline model shows that price and output are perfectly
correlated for all periods regardless of the states of the economy.
Proposition 21. The percent change in output is the same as the percent change
in price, in other words,
Yt − Yt+1
Yt
=
Pt − Pt+1
Pt
,∀t.
This means that the percentage change in GDP is the same as the percentage
change in prices, which is not consistent with the data. The above proposition
comes from the fact that in all equiribria - in the efficient state or the internal
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equilibrium or even during the transition from the efficient to the inefficient state -
we have the following relationship
p(st) =
β
1− βY (s
t)
as seen in (3.3.3) and (3.3.4).
3.4 Public Debt
If we introduce public debt in the basic model, then there is only one change in
Definition 2 of the competitive equilibrium. Let 2Bt is the total amount of debt
issued by the government and held by the public. Now the market clearing condition
for consumption becomes ∑
i
b(i, st) = 2Bt,
instead of
∑
i b(i, s
t) = 0 in the definition of the equilibrium. Then, the government
debt constraint is
qtBt+1 = Bt,
where qt is the price of the debt, which means the government cannot issue debt
arbitrarily. In addition, there is no government spending in this framework.
The previous analysis is still valid under log utility assumption. The only dif-
ference is the following equation with respect to the price dynamics.
Pt +Bt =
β
2(1− β)y(kt) (3.4.1)
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for y(·) is the GDP and kt is again capital held by the productive sector. For
the Ak-model, we have y(kt) = kt, where kt is the holding of capital in the high
productivity sector with z(i, st) = 1. Before going any further, we plot Figure 3.2,
market value of public debt relative to capital income at the bottom, stock market
capitalization relative to capital income in the middle, and the sum of two curves
at the top in using U.S. data from last 50 years. We can see that even in the low
frequency data stock market value has fluctuated relatively strongly while the debt
held by the public has not fluctuated much.
3.4.1 Optimal Bubble States: Reputational Lending
The efficient state in the presence of government debt is basically the same as the
efficient state without government debt. In other words, Bt = 0 in the efficient
state. This is because government debt is redundant: investors can borrow and
lend to finance their own projects without any frictions. Therefore, basically, we
have the same results as in Theorem 4. Note that the dynamics of price and capital
is
p(st) =
β
2(1− β)kt =
β
1− β , (3.4.2)
since kt = 2 for all t.
164
Figure 3.2: The curve at the top is the sum of two curves. All data are annual (from
1960 to 2009). The source for the market value of public debt (nominal) excluding
debt held by government(e.g., the Federal Reserve and the Social Security Trust
Fund) is obtained from CRSP. The nominal stock market capitalization is obtained
from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds Accounts (Table L.213, line marked as
market value of domestic corporations).
165
Figure 3.3: The recession between 04/1960 and 02/1961 (16 months): The blue line
plots represents the percent change in stock market capitalization, i.e., (Pt+1−Pt)/Pt
and the red line represents the percent change in the government debt held by the
public, i.e., (Bt+1 −Bt)/Bt.
Figure 3.4: The recession between 12/2007 and 06/2009 (18 months): The blue line
represents the percent change in stock market capitalization, i.e., (Pt+1−Pt)/Pt and
the red line represents the percent change in government debt held by the public,
i.e., (Bt+1 −Bt)/Bt.
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Recession Period % change in Pt % change in Bt consistency
04/1960 -1.57 1.63 yes
05/1960 3.03 -2.40 yes
06/1960 2.14 1.53 yes
07/1960 -2.25 1.96 yes
08/1960 2.73 -3.04 yes
09/1960 -5.88 -0.20 yes
10/1960 -0.59 -0.08 yes
11/1960 4.25 0.44 yes
12/1960 6.06 1.81 yes
01/1961 6.34 -0.73 yes
02/1961 3.30 3.96 -
Table 3.1: The recession between 04/1960 and 02/1961 (11 months): This table
shows that the analysis in section 3.4.2 is quite consistent with the data. In fact,
the data for all recessions defined by NBER since 1960 show the same consistency.
3.4.2 Suboptimal No-Bubble States: Short Sale Constraints
In the inefficient state when no private borrowing is allowed, there is a role of public
debt. Since public debt is available instead of private lending, the budge constraint
of investors in sector i is
c(i, st) +
∑
st+1
[
qk(s
t, st+1)k(i, s
t, st+1) + q(s
t, st+1)b(i, s
t, st+1)
]
= b(i, st) + [p(st) + z(i, st)]k(i, st).
with
b(i, st, st+1) ≥ 0, ∀st, st+1, i (3.4.3)
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Recession Period % change of Pt % change of Bt consistency
12/2007 -1.673057558 5.006265543 yes
01/2008 -6.509446333 1.261840481 yes
02/2008 -2.803570454 -2.227989569 yes
03/2008 -1.067556935 5.975709145 yes
04/2008 4.838793371 -2.504127775 yes
05/2008 2.088034702 -4.94043583 yes
06/2008 -7.902467504 7.92938367 yes
07/2008 -1.475947109 -0.592132354 yes
08/2008 0.887202423 -0.949081126 yes
09/2008 -10.17136462 5.55515366 yes
10/2008 -18.91537163 -1.552650689 yes
11/2008 -9.839817725 2.339153746 yes
12/2008 1.988322784 10.82486971 -
01/2009 -8.024960209 -3.905810843 yes
02/2009 -11.3864756 -2.306937452 yes
03/2009 7.451325519 14.98809852 -
04/2009 10.891628 -2.859539126 yes
05/2009 6.925002044 -2.630704213 yes
06/2009 -0.041403965 6.905923561 yes
Table 3.2: The recession between 12/2007 and 06/2009 (18 months): This table
shows that the analysis in section 3.4.2 is quite consistent with the data. In fact, the
data for all the recessions defined by NBER since 1960 show the same consistency.
The market clearing condition is given by
b(1, st) + b(2, st) = 2Bt, ∀st,
which is, in fact, in equilibrium,
b(i, st) = 2Bt if i 6= st.
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since the investor cannot borrow against the high productive state for the next
period. The government budget condition (or feasibility of public debt) is
2Bt =
∑
i
∑
st+1
q(st, st+1)b(i, st, s
t+1), (3.4.4)
which is, in fact, in equilibrium, by the same reason
2Bt = q(s
t, s′)b(i, st, s′) + q(st, s)b(j, st, s), for st = s, i = s, j = s′.
Theorem 6. Let pt = p(s
t). Summing over i = 1, 2, we have
pt +Bt =
β
2(1− β)kt. (3.4.5)
The dynamics of the price is given by
pt+1 =
 β + βpt if st+1 = stβ2
1−β − βpt if st+1 6= st
(3.4.6)
Proof. See the appendix.
The price dynamics with public debt as in (3.4.6) is exactly same as the price
dynamics without public debt as in (3.3.6).
Although investors cannot borrow in order to finance the future good project,
they can save through government debt. It is easy to see that consumption and
investment when public debt is available are better than when public debt is un-
available (as in section 3.3.2) in terms of welfare.
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However, the existence of the public debt makes the crucial difference in the
price dynamics. We divide the price dynamics into two cases: (i) when Pt > Pt+1
and (ii) when Pt < Pt+1 in the ex-post sense.
First, when Pt > Pt+1, there is change in states and kt > kt+1, we have a GDP
drop such that
∆yt
yt
=
yt − yt+1
yt
=
(Pt − Pt+1) + (Bt −Bt+1)
Pt +Bt
. (3.4.7)
Therefore, we want to have
Pt − Pt+1
Pt
>
(Pt − Pt+1) + (Bt −Bt+1)
Pt +Bt
=
yt − yt+1
yt
. (3.4.8)
The above inequality is equivalent to
Bt+1
Pt+1
>
Bt
Pt
. (3.4.9)
equivalently
Bt+1 −Bt
Bt
>
Pt+1 − Pt
Pt
. (3.4.10)
This means that the market capitalization drops much more than the market value
of the debt held by the public during the crisis time when there is change in states.
In this case, the important point is the ex-post return, i.e., the right hand side of
(3.4.10) is negative. In other words, when the (ex-post) return on stocks is negative,
the bond return is greater than the stock return.
Reversely, if the price goes up during recession (no change in states), i.e., kt+1 >
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kt, all the inequalities above are reversed:
Bt+1 −Bt
Bt
<
Pt+1 −Bt
Pt
, (3.4.11)
which means that when the (ex-post) stock return is positive, the stock return is
greater than the bond return. Notice that (3.4.10) and (3.4.11) are very consistent
with the data, in particular, the data in recession periods. For example, see Table
3.1 and Table 3.2. The data in two tables show that our theory is reasonable. We
just picked two recessions. However, not only these two recessions but also all other
recessions show almost same results with (3.4.10) and (3.4.11)
For comparison, we analyze the simplest case with deterministic shocks, i.e.,
pi = 1.
(z(1, st), z(2, st)) ≡ (z(t, t), z(2, t) =
 (0, 1), t = 0, 2, 4, . . .(1, 0), t = 1, 3, 5, . . .
In this case, investors budget constraints can be written as
c(i, t) + p(t)k(i, t+ 1) + q(t)b(i, t+ 1) = b(i, t) + (z(i, t) + p(t))k(i, t),
with bit+1 ≥ 0, ∀i, t. (3.4.12)
Equation (3.4.12) means that investors cannot borrow in time t although they have
a good investment opportunity in the next period (z(i, t + 1) = 1). However, they
can accumulate government debt for the consumption smoothing against the bad
shock in the next period (z(i, t + 1) = 0). Thus, the market clearing condition in
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the deterministic case implies
b(H, t) = 0 and b(L, t) = 2Bt.
Notice that there is no stationary density in the general case, i.e., pi 6= 1. How-
ever, we have the periodic steady state in the deterministic case. See the following
theorem.
Theorem 7 (Suboptimal Equilibrium: Deterministic Case with Public Debt). Sup-
pose pi = 1 and the public debt is available.
(i) There exists an unique internal finance stationary state such that
(cit, k
i
t) =
 (cˆH , kˆ), if z(i, t) = 1(cˆL, 2− kˆ), if z(i, t) = 0
(ii) Given bˆ, the vector (cˆH , cˆL, kˆ) is the solution to
1 +
1
pˆ
=
u′(cˆL)
βu′(cˆH)
,
cˆH = (1 + 2pˆ)kˆ − 2pˆ− bˆ (or cˆL = 2pˆ− 2pˆkˆ + bˆ),
cˆH + cˆL = kˆ,
where the asset price, pˆ, and the public debt price, qˆ, are given by
pˆ =
β2
1− β2 and qˆ = 1.
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(iii) If u(c) = log c, then
cˆH =
2β
(1 + β)2
+
(1− β)
β(1 + β)
bˆ
cˆL =
2β2
(1 + β)2
+
(1− β)
1 + β
bˆ
kˆ =
2β
1 + β
+
(1− β)
β
bˆ
Proof. See the appendix.
There are several comments on Theorem 7. Notice that bˆ = 2Bt by market
clearing in equilibrium, meaning that the total market value of the public debt is
just fixed as soon as the economy enters the internal finance stage while it has
been growing during the transition from the efficient state to the current inefficient
state. Its value basically depends on the amount of consumption saving of the
investor who has the good technology. The government debt can be considered
as the saving technology for the investors since the private borrowing and lending
market is frozen. This implies that if the government issues more debt above this
equilibrium amount, the price of debt drops so that the total market value is fixed,
which is the similar phenomenon as the inflation occurs when the government prints
more money. On the other hand, during the transition from the efficient equilibrium
to the internal finance equilibrium, the gross interest rate 1/qt has been decreased
in average (although it can fluctuate) and it finally reaches to 1.
Secondly, let us compare ∆CI the percent change in capital income (or output)
with ∆P that in price from the efficient state to the inefficient state as in the
173
following proposition. We first define
∆CI :=
ke − kˆ
ke
and ∆P :=
pe − pˆ
pe
(3.4.13)
Note that ke = 2 and pe = β
1−β for the efficient state.
Proposition 22. The percent change in capital income (or equivalently output)
from the efficient state to the inefficient state is lower than the percent change in
price, in other words, we have
∆CI < ∆P (3.4.14)
The proof follows from the simple algebra:
∆CI =
1
1 + β
− 1− β
β
B and ∆P =
1
1 + β
.
Thus, the inequality in (3.4.14) becomes deeper if B is bigger. Let me apply a very
simple calibration analysis. Let β = 0.9. Then, ∆P = 55.56, which means that
the price drops by about 56%. In this case, in order for having 27% drop of capital
income we should obtain B = 2.3, which is the public debt per capita. Notice that
the curve in the bottom of Figure 3.2 shows the market value of the U.S. public
debt as a fraction of GDP since 1960. The average value during the last 50 years is
0.59, which is corresponds to 1.77 as a fraction of capital income. This value seems
close enough to the calibrated value 2.3 although our model is simple enough.
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3.5 Conclusion
A model of the financial crisis is studied. In particular, crisis is viewed as the
transition from an efficient and unstable state to an inefficient and stable state by
using a two sector economy with sector-specific shocks. The main driving force of
this transition is the unsecured reputational lending. If we add collateral borrowing
and/or a labor market in this model, we may generate quantitatively more reason-
able results. Introducing public debt generates volatile stock prices during the crisis
time. In particular, this theory tells that the stock price is more volatile than out-
put during recession is equivalent to that the ex-posed stock return is lower (higher)
than the return on public debt when the ex-posed stock return realized negative
(positive). This empirical conjecture turns out to be fairly consistent with monthly
data for all recession periods since 1960, which strongly suggests the importance of
public debt.
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Appendices
3.A Proofs of Chapter 3
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The proof of Theorem 4 is easy to understand by characterizing the perfect
enforcement equilibrium without debt constraints. Ignoring (3.2.3) and assuming
equal initial wealth for all agents leads to the unique stationary equilibrium as spec-
ified in the theorem. More precisely, without any borrowing friction, the investors
can have perfect consumption, i.e., c(i, st) = 1 for all i and st and complete reallo-
cation of capital, i.e., k(i, st) =
 2 if i = st0 if i 6= st
. Using budget constraint (3.2.2) and FOC, we have
q(st, s′)
pi(s′|st) =
qk(s
t, s′)
pi(s′|st)p(st)Q(st, s′) =
βu′[c(i, st, s′)]
u′[c(i, st)]
= β.
Lastly, it is easy to see this allocation and the leverage ratio λ(i, st) under the
condition (3.3.2) satisfy the solvency constraint, (3.3.1). This completes the proof.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. First order conditions imply that
qk(s
t, st+1)u
′(c(i, st)) = β(p(st, st+1)+z(i, st, st+1))u′(c(i, st, st+1))pi(st+1|st), ∀st, i
(3.A.1)
If the preference is log-utility, then
∑
s′
qk(s
t, s′)k(i, st, s′) = β[p(st) + z(i, st)]k(i, st), ∀st, i.
Note kt be the amount of capital held by the productive sector at t and pt = p(s
t).
Summing the above equation over i = 1, 2,
2pt = 2
∑
s′
qk(s
t, s′) = β{(pt + 1)kt + pt(2− kt)},
equivalently we have
pt =
β
2(1− β)kt.
Now notice that
c(i, st) = (1− β)[pt + z(i, st)]k(i, st)
=
 (1− β)(pt + 1)kt if i = st(1− β)pt(2− kt) if i 6= st (3.A.2)
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Putting (3.A.2) into the first order condition (3.A.1), we have
qk(s
t, st+1)
(1− β)(pt + 1)kt =
β(pt+1 + 1)
(1− β)(pt+1 + 1)kt+1pi(st+1|s
t) if st+1 = st (3.A.3)
qk(s
t, st+1
(1− β)(pt + 1)kt =
βpt+1
(1− β)pt+1(2− kt+1)pi(st+1|s
t) if st+1 6= st (3.A.4)
qk(s
t, st+1
(1− β)pt(2− kt) =
β(pt+1 + 1)
(1− β)(pt+1 + 1)kt+1pi(st+1|s
t) if st+1 6= st (3.A.5)
qk(s
t, st+1
(1− β)pt(2− kt) =
βpt+1
(1− β)pt+1(2− kt+1)pi(st+1|s
t) if st+1 = st (3.A.6)
The price of arrow security in (3.A.3) should be the same as that in (3.A.6). The
price in (3.A.4) should be the same as (3.A.5). Therefore,
(pt + 1)kt
kt+1
=
pt(2− kt)
2− kt+1 if st+1 = st and
(pt + 1)kt
2− kt+1 =
pt(2− kt)
kt+1
if st+1 6= st,
Equivalently we have
kt+1 =
 2(1− β) + βkt if st+1 = st2β − βkt if st+1 6= st
This completes the proof.
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Given k(i, st, s′) > 0, we have the same first order conditions as (3.A.1) with
respect to Arrow securities for capital. For all st, st+1 and i = 1, 2,
qk(s
t, st+1)u
′(c(i, st)) = β(p(st, st+1) + z(i, s,st+1))u′(c(i, st, st+1))pi(s′|st). (3.A.7)
With respect to public debt holding notice that (3.4.3) is binding for st+1 = st, in
other words, the investor cannot borrow for the high productive state in the next
period. Therefore, the first order conditions for b(i, st, s′) are
q(st, s′)u′(c(i, st)) = βu′(c(i, st, s′))pi(s′|st), if i 6= s′ and i = st, (3.A.8)
q(st, s′)u′(c(i, st)) = βu′(c(i, st, s′))pi(s′|st), if i = s′ and i 6= st, (3.A.9)
putting s′ = st+1 for notational convenience. q(st, s′) in (3.A.8) represents the price
of Arrow security when there is no change in state between today and tomorrow.
q(st, s′) in (3.A.9) represents the price of Arrow security when there is change in
state. The investor in (3.A.8) has high productivity today and low productive
tomorrow and the investor in (3.A.9) has low productivity today and tomorrow.
The log utility assumption gives
∑
s′
[
qk(s
t, s′)k(i, st, s′) + q(st, s′)b(i, st, s′)
]
= β[p(st) + z(i, st)]k(i, st), ∀st, i.
Let kt be the amount of capital held by the productive sector at t. Let pt = p(s
t).
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Summing over i = 1, 2, we have the first required result, i.e.,
pt +Bt =
β
2(1− β)kt.
Let bt be the amount of debt held by the unproductive sector at the beginning of
time t, i.e., bt = b(i, s
t) for i 6= st. Now notice that
c(i, st) = (1− β)(b(i, st) + pt + z(i, st))k(i, st)
=
 (1− β)(pt + 1)kt if st+1 = st(1− β)[bt + pt(2− kt)] if st+1 6= st (3.A.10)
Then, putting (3.A.10) into (3.A.7), we get
qk(s
t, s′)
(1− β)(pt + 1)kt =
β(pt+1 + 1)
(1− β)(pt+1 + 1)kt+1pi(s
′|st) if s′ = st (3.A.11)
qk(s
t, s′)
(1− β)(pt + 1)kt =
βpt+1
(1− β)[bt+1pt+1(2− kt+1)]pi(s
′|st) if s′ 6= st (3.A.12)
qk(s
t, s′)
(1− β)[bt + pt(2− kt)] =
β(pt+1 + 1)
(1− β)(pt+1 + 1)kt+1pi(s
′|st) if s′ 6= st (3.A.13)
qk(s
t, s′)
(1− β)[bt + pt(2− kt)] =
βpt+1
(1− β)[bt+1 + pt+1(2− kt+1)]pi(s
′|st) if s′ = st
(3.A.14)
The price of arrow security in (3.A.11) should be the same as that in (3.A.14). The
price in (3.A.12) should be the same as (3.A.13). Notice that if bt = 0 and bt+1 = 0,
in other words, if public debt is unavailable, then (3.A.11) − (3.A.14) collapse to
(3.A.3) − (3.A.6), respectively.
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Therefore,
(pt + 1)kt
kt+1
=
pt+1[bt + pt(2− kt)]
bt+1 + pt+1(2− kt+1) if s
′ = st and
pt+1(pt + 1)kt
bt+1 + pt+1(2− kt+1) =
bt + pt(2− kt)
kt+1
if s′ 6= st.
Thanks to (3.4.5), we can rewrite the above equations as
(pt + 1)kt
kt+1
=
pt+1
[
β
1−β − pt
]
kt[
β
1−β − pt+1
]
kt+1
if i = s′ and
pt+1(pt + 1)kt[
β
1−β − pt+1
]
kt+1
=
[
β
1−β − pt
]
kt
kt+1
if i 6= s′.
Equivalently we have the dynamics of the price
pt+1 =
 β + βpt if i = s
′
β2
1−β − βpt if i 6= s′
A.4 Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. First we have the following first order conditions:
u′(cHt )pt = βu
′(cLt+1)pt+1
u′(cHt )qt = βu
′(cLt+1)
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u′(cLt )pt = βu
′(cHt+1)(1 + pt+1),
where cHt and c
L
t represent the consumption of the investor who has a good pro-
ductivity shock and a bad shock at time t, respectively. Then at the steady state
(cHt , c
L
t ) = (cˆ
H , cˆL), we have
qt = qˆ = 1 and pt = pˆ =
β2
1− β2 .
and
cL = βcH . (3.A.15)
Notice that the investor who will have a good shock tomorrow is rationed today,
in other words, bHt+1 = 0. Thus the budget constraint in the stationary periodic
equilibrium is
cˆH + pˆ(2− kˆ) + bˆ = (1 + pˆ)kˆ (3.A.16)
and cˆL + pˆkˆ = bˆ+ (0 + pˆ)kˆ (3.A.17)
The market clearing implies
cˆH + cˆL = kˆ and bˆ = 2Bt.
For the log-utility case, the total investment at each period is always the β fraction
of the financial wealth of the investor, i.e.,
pˆ(2− kˆ) + bˆ = β(1 + pˆ)kˆ and pˆkˆ = β(bˆ+ pˆ(2− kˆ)).
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Equivalently we have
kˆ =
2β
1 + β
+
1− β
β
bˆ. (3.A.18)
Putting (3.A.18) into (3.A.16) and (3.A.17), we have the required solutions for
(iii).
3.B Internal Finance Dynamics
In this appendix we characterize the dynamics and the probability density function
of the price and capital in the inefficient state. We only focus on the case where
there is no public debt. Recall the process st ∈ {1, 2} obeys a simple symmetric
Markov process with conditional prob:
pi(s′|s) = Pr(st+1 = s′|st = s), pi = pi(1|1) = pi(2|2)
Let us write state history st = (s0, . . . , st).
Let β ∈ (0, 1). Let k0 ∈ [0, 2]. Under this transition probability, recall the
dynamics of (kt, pt) is given by
kt+1 =
 2(1− β) + βkt, if st+1 = st (w.p. pi),2β − βkt, if st+1 6= st (w.p. 1− pi). (3.B.1)
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and pt =
β
2(1−β)kt, i.e.,
pt+1 =
 g
1(pt) := β + βpt, if st+1 = st (w.p. pi),
g2(pt) :=
β2
1−β − βpt, if st+1 6= st (w.p. 1− pi).
(3.B.2)
The recursive relation between the cumulative density of capital, F kt at time t and
F kt+1 at time t+ 1 can be derived in the following recursive.
F kt+1(x) = Pr(kt+1 ≤ x)
= Pr(kt+1 ≤ x|st+1 = st) Pr(st+1 = st) + Pr(kt+1 ≤ x|st+1 6= st) Pr(st+1 6= st)
= pi Pr(2(1− β) + βkt ≤ x|st+1 = st) + (1− pi) Pr(2β − βkt ≤ x|st+1 6= st)
= pi Pr
(
kt ≤ x− 2 + 2β
β
)
+ (1− pi) Pr
(
kt ≥ 2− x
β
)
= piF kt
(
x− 2 + 2β
β
)
+ (1− pi)
[
1− F kt
(
2− x
β
)]
. (3.B.3)
The limiting density F k = limt→∞ F kt should satisfy the following relation.
F k(x) =
pi
β
F k
(
x− 2 + 2β
β
)
+ (1− pi)
[
1− F k
(
2− x
β
)]
. (3.B.4)
Notice that kt and pt are discrete processes, so they have point density functions,
i.e., probability mass functions. Therefore, we cannot get pmf by differentiating Ft
or F .
Similarly, we can derive the recursive relation for the cumulative density function
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of the price, F pt and F
p
t+1 and its limiting density F
p.
F pt+1(x) = piF
p
t
(
x− β
β
)
+ (1− pi)
[
1− F pt
(
β
1− β −
x
β
)]
. (3.B.5)
and
F p(x) = piF p
(
x− β
β
)
+ (1− pi)
[
1− F p
(
β
1− β −
x
β
)]
. (3.B.6)
It is hard to use representations (3.B.3) and (3.B.5). Therefore, we directly draw
the density function by using somewhat complicated notations. Since we will use
the probability density of the price in the next section, we only derive the density
for pt. Let k0 be given. Then, p0 =
β
2(1−β)k0 is also given. Now recall (3.B.2). First,
it is easy to see that given p0, p2 has the following probability mass function.
p2 =

(g1 ◦ g1)(p0) if s2 = s1 = s0 (w.p. pi2),
(g2 ◦ g1)(p0) if s2 6= s1 = s0 (w.p. pi(1− pi)),
(g1 ◦ g2)(p0) if s2 = s1 6= s0 (w.p. (1− pi)pi),
(g2 ◦ g2)(p0) if s2 6= s1 6= s0 (w.p. (1− pi)2),
where gi ◦ gj is the function composition such that (gi ◦ gj)(p) = gi(gj(p)) for all
p > 0. Similarly, p3 can also be represented by using a total of 8 cases, each of
which with probability pi3, pi2(1− pi), pi(1− pi)2, . . . , (1− pi)3, respectively. Likewise,
there are 2t possible values for pt. Let
At = {(i1, i2, . . . , it) | in ∈ {1, 2} for n = 1, 2, . . . , t.}.
Then, set At has 2
t number of pairs of (i1, i2, . . . , it). The probability mass function
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for pt is given as follows. For each pair of (i1, i2, . . . , it) ∈ At,
pt =
(
git ◦ git−1 ◦ · · · ◦ gi2 ◦ gi1) (p0), with prob. pia(1− pi)b, (3.B.7)
where
a := the number of 1’s among {i1, i2, . . . , it} and
b := the number of 2’s among {i1, i2, . . . , it}.
Notice that since it is not true that gi = gj 6= gj◦gi (Operation ◦ does not commute),
the general representation is not simplified.
B.1 Risk Premium
To comput returns on safe and risky assets in efficient and inefficient states. We first
define prices for un-traded contingent claims from Household FOC’s in the internal
finance state: Generally, we have
q(st, s′) = βpi(s′|st) max
i
{u
′[c(i, st, s′)]
u′[c(i, st)]
}.
qk(s
t, s′) = βpi(s′|st) max
i
{Q(i, s
t, s′)u′[c(i, st, s′)]
u′[c(i, st)]
}.
More precisely, for log utility,
q(st, s′)
βpi(s′|st) = maxi
c(i, st)
c(i, st, s′)
= max
i
(pt + z
i
t)k(i, s
t)(
pt+1+zit+
pt
)
ptk(i, st, s′)
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= max
i
(pt + z
i
t)k(i, s
t)(
pt+1+zit+
pt
)
β(pt + zit)k(i, s
t)
=
1
β
max
i
(
pt
pt+1 + zit+1
)
=
pt
βpt+1
.
Hence, we have
q(st, s′) =
ptpi(s
′|st)
pt+1
. (3.B.8)
Then, from (3.B.2)
∑
s′
q(st, s′) =
pipt
β(1 + pt)
+
(1− pi)pt
β2
1−β2 − βpt
.
The risk-free rate RFt+1 is defined by
RFt+1 =
1∑
s′ q(s
t, s)
=
β(1 + pt)
pt
[
2pi − 1 + 1−pi
β−(1−β)pt
] . (3.B.9)
It is easy to see that RFt → 0 as pt → p∗ = β1−β and RFt+1 → ∞ as pt → 0. Notice
that time t+ 1 expected return of high technology sector at t is
RHt+1 = pi
(
1 + β + βpt
pt
)
+ (1− pi)
[
β2
(1− β)pt − β
]
.
Time t+ 1 expected return of low technology sector at t is
RLt+1 = pi
(
β + βpt
pt
)
+ (1− pi)
[
1 + β
2
1−β2
pt
− β
]
.
Therefore, economy-wide (average) return on investment is
R¯t+1 =
RHt+1kt +R
L
t+1(2− kt)
2
188
=
piβ + (1− pi)
(
1 + β
2
1−β2
)
pt
+ (2pi − 1)
(
β − 1 + 1
β
)
. (3.B.10)
since pt =
β
2(1−β)kt. Then, the risk-premium is
Ret+1(pt) := R¯t+1 −RFt+1
=
piβ + (1− pi)
(
1 + β
2
1−β2
)
pt
− β(1 + pt)
pt
[
2pi − 1 + 1−pi
β−(1−β)pt
] + (2pi − 1)(β − 1 + 1
β
)
(3.B.11)
B.2 Persistent Shocks: pi ≈ 1
Notice that the risk-premium when the shocks are highly persistent (pi ≈ 1) is
R¯t+1 −RFt+1 ≈
1− β
β
.
Historically 6% risk-premium implies β ≈ 0.9434.
B.3 General Case: 0 << pi << 1
The risk-premium defined Ret+1 by (3.B.11) is the function of pt. In this case, we
can have the expected value of Ret+1 given p0 or k0 by using the probability mass
function (3.B.7).
E[Ret+1|p0] =
∑
(i1,...,it)∈At
Ret+1(pt) Pr(pt = (g
it ◦ git−1 ◦ · · · ◦ gi1)(p0)) (3.B.12)
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Equation (3.B.12) is analytically hard to simplify, but it is not hard to numerically
calculate (3.B.12). Take t → ∞ and we can also get the long-run average value.
Here, we may consider the variance of Ret+1 as well. Then, matching the mean and
variance of Ret+1 for a long run calibrates β and pi. It can be performed numerically.
The direct computation using equation (3.B.12) is problematic. In particular,
the number of states grows exponentially (by 2t) as time goes by. Then, we face
memory problems. It is fairly hard to run a program more than 20 periods (t ≥ 20),
which technically implies that only short term equity premium less than 5 years
(20/4 quarters) is available by direct calculation. This limitation lead us to try
numerical simulations such as Monte Carlo simulations.
The figure shows one simulation generating a dynamics for a price and its cor-
responding dynamics for the risk-premium (t = 1000 periods). The price and the
risk-premium are non-stationary. Notice that neither
∑T
t=0 p(t)
T
nor
∑T
t=0Rt+1
T
con-
verges as T → ∞. One thing interesting is that when the price is increasing with
decreasing rates, the premium is going up (not going down; not in the other di-
rection). At the time of regime switching, both the price and the risk-premium go
down together. This is typical in autarky dynamics.
The simulation results are summarized in Table 3.3, Table 3.4 and Table 3.5.
We generate three sample paths (in each table) of 4000 periods. In order to check
whether the sample mean and standard variation are convergent, we also observe
subperiods (1000-periods and 2000-periods) sample means and and variances. If
we increase the number of periods (e.g. t = 40, 000), we still have similar results.
The results shows that they are not convergent, which means the stationary density
does not exist.
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Figure 3.5: Sample price dynamics and the corresponding risk premium when pi =
0.98 and β = 0.9897 which is the quarterly value of 0.96.
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t sample mean (price) sample s.d. (price) sample mean (return) sample s.d. (return)
1000 63.3697 20.8728 0.0303 0.0453
2000 65.2133 22.4009 0.0508 0.0901
4000 64.0350 22.6531 0.0436 0.0748
Table 3.3: The initial price is p(1) = 32.3464. pi = 0.99, β = 0.9898.
t sample mean (price) sample s.d. price) sample mean (return) sample s.d. (return)
1000 66.2186 22.4743 0.0422 0.0603
2000 74.4292 23.3482 0.0989 0.1245
4000 69.6540 24.1760 0.1054 0.1773
Table 3.4: The initial price is p(1) = 32.3464. pi = 0.98, β = 0.9898.
t sample mean (price) sample s.d. (price) sample mean (return) sample s.d. (return)
1000 63.6494 21.3277 0.0294 0.0424
2000 63.2871 22.5166 0.0376 0.0619
4000 63.4216 22.2575 0.0341 0.0527
Table 3.5: The initial price is p(1) = 48.5196. pi = 0.9, β = 0.9898.
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